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“Yet why, then, do states do what they do? The only thing which Wendt offers 
by means of clarification here is the concept of ‘roles’. It is the socially 
recognized role which a state adopts that gives it a certain script to follow” 
(Ringmar 2005, 304). 
 
 “For the writer, the DPRK is not a case study that cannot be analysed” 
(Lewkowitz 2007, 100). 
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Introduction 
In last twenty or thirty years, the North Korean foreign policy has become a 
popular topic for researchers all over the world. Very often, papers 
published in that particular field outnumber those dealing with the North 
Korean domestic politics. For example, there have been historical works 
mapping the developments of North Korean diplomacy (e.g. Armstrong 
2013), publications dealing with the DPRK's relations with particular 
countries (e.g. Suh 2014), increasing bulk of studies whose authors try to 
detect crucial processes and determinants influencing North Korean foreign 
policy formation (e.g.  Frank 2010) and many more.1 Nevertheless, not much 
attention has been paid either to North Korean perceptions of its own role in 
international politics or to the evolution of those perceptions. As I want to 
fill the existing gap, I focus on the issue of the North Korean foreign-political 
roles and their projection to the practical foreign politics of the DPRK. I aim 
to pay special attention to the patterns of changes that have appeared in the 
composition of the North Korean role sets. In order to grasp this 
phenomenon, I will use the conceptual framework of the role theory that 
was introduced in the field of foreign policy analysis by Kalevi J. Holsti 
(Holsti 1970).  
The role theory2 enables us to approach the study of North Korean politics 
in a unique way which has not been used for the DPRK’s foreign policy 
analysis yet. The only exception was a tangential analysis made by Holsti 
(1970) in the beginning of 1970s. Nevertheless, I will demonstrate later in 
                                                          
1 If I should mention some of the most recent works, it would be Kwak and Joo (eds.) 2009; 
Park (ed.) 2010; Kim 2011; Suh 2014; Lee Y. S. 2014; Bechtol 2014, or Cho 2016. 
2 The term role theory can be misleading as the role theory is not a theory in the strict sense. 
This is because the theory should mainly function as an explanatory model (Beneš 2009, 24). The 
role theory rather functions as a conceptual framework which enables us to analyse the complex 
world of the foreign policy. Nevertheless, the explanatory potential is not completely absent which I 
will demonstrate later in this thesis. 
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this thesis (see Chapter 1.3.1) his approach to the national role conceptions3 
was different from the one I intend to work with.  
The role theory innovativeness lies mainly in the way how it suggests we 
should approach the foreign policy. It proposes using the perspective of self-
presentation of a nation in the international environment. Besides the 
innovativeness, the role theory also helps us to grasp non-material aspects 
influencing the foreign political behaviour of the states (Breuning 2011, 22) 
and enables us to grasp the stable patterns, continuities and the changes of 
their foreign policies. Furthermore, it bridges various levels of analysis, i.e. 
the level of individual, society and system: the way the elites (individuals) 
understand the foreign political role of his or her nation or state (unit) is 
closely connected with his or her interaction with the international 
environment (system) (comp. Le Pestre 1997, 6–7). Chafetz, Abramson and 
Grillot (1996) also mention that the role theoretic approach enables us to 
explain the foreign political actions of the states as the roles may function as 
relatively stable stepping stone providing certain guidelines for the foreign 
policy formation. 
Another strength of the role theoretic approach can be directly connected 
with North Korean foreign policy analysis. When searching for suitable 
analytic tools for the foreign policy analysis of the Third World countries, 
Sofiane Sekhri (2009) mentions the role theory as the useful analytic 
framework and her conclusions can be linked to North Korean foreign policy 
analysis too. She deals with the existing obstacles such as the regime 
closeness in the Third World countries, unavailability of reliable data as far 
as the decision-making processes and bureaucratic networks are concerned 
or with the usability of speeches of the official representatives who are not 
genuine about their motivations of actions their undertake. In particular, 
                                                          
3 I cannot avoid using the role theoretic terminology in the introduction. Therefore, if some 
questions or doubts arise regarding to the definitions of particular concepts, I recommend reader to 
refer to Chapter 3 of this thesis where I deal with the operationalization of these concepts. 
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Sekhri (2009, 431) argues that neither dishonesty nor irrationality is pretext 
to decline the usefulness of the role theoretic approach. This is especially 
relevant for this thesis too. Besides the fact those features can easily be 
found even in Western democracies, the sincerity is not really the issue I aim 
to investigate in this thesis. Rather, I focus on how the North Korean elites 
represent the role the DPRK should play in international politics and how 
this representation impacts the way how they conduct the actual foreign 
politics. Therefore, the starting point for me in this thesis is the analysis of 
North Korean roles perceived as self-presentations of a nation on the 
international scene. I will make clearer later in this thesis that I perceive 
roles mainly as products of the DPRK´s interactions with other actors on the 
international scene. This is closely connected with my methateoretical 
background which I will also discuss later on in this introduction. Last but 
not least, the usefulness of the role theory for the foreign policy analysis of 
the authoritarian regimes is confirmed by the existence of studies dealing 
with China (Shih 1988, or Beylerian and Canivet 1997), Belarus (Chafetz, 
Abramson and Grillot 1996), Russia (Grossman 2005) and many other cases. 
As I have already mentioned above, the pivotal article written by Holsti 
(1970) also analyses the foreign policy of authoritarian countries.  
Of course, the role theoretic approach suffers from weaknesses as well. At 
this place, I will try to briefly depict those ones that are relevant for my case 
study of North Korean foreign policy. Thies (2009, 35) mentions the 
vagueness of the concept of “role” itself when arguing that many 
interpretations of it appeared. Although the role theory offers “(…) rich 
conceptual language complete with numerous built in propositions for 
foreign policy analysts to explore” as Cameron Thies (2009, 35) states, the 
approach suffers from the lack of its own methodological apparatus which 
could be used for coherent studying of the roles (Wehner and Thies 2014, 
413). Nevertheless, this problem can be surmounted relatively easily by 
supplementing the role theory with content or discourse analysis methods. 
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Many authors using the role theory do so this (compare for example Holsti 
1970; Le Pestre 1997; Wehner and Thies 2014, or McCourt 2012) and this 
thesis will not be any exception.  
Another problem that requires some attention is connected with the 
constructivist background which many scholars using the role theory 
recently adopted. As Breuning (2011, 22) points out, the border between the 
constructivist writings on identity or self images and constructivist works 
dealing with the national roles is rather vague. Moreover, the constructivist 
or interactionist wave in the role theory introduced a gap in understanding 
the definitions of the key role theoretic concepts (such as role change) (ibid.). 
I address this problem in detail when I grasp the issue of the role change 
later in this thesis (see Chapter 1.3.3). Last but not least, Breuning claims the 
potential of role theory to grasp the non-material aspect of foreign policy 
behaviour has not been sufficiently exploited yet (ibid.). I try to deal with 
this reproach by paying more attention to the process of social construction 
of roles. First, I hope I will be able to contribute to the debates about social 
sources of roles and their changes and second, to bring an alternative 
interpretation of the North Korean foreign policy based on the social 
constructivist positions in the role theory. The second mentioned is 
especially relevant as this approach has not been used for the DPRK´s 
foreign policy analysis yet. 
Let me now approach to the articulation of the goals of this dissertation 
thesis. My goal is to better understand how North Korea perceives the part it 
plays (or should play) in the international politics and how its interaction 
with other actors impacts that. I aim to do so as I argue that the revelation of 
these aspects can potentially help to facilitate the communication with the 
DPRK. I will achieve the above mentioned goal by using specific tool for 
interpretation of the DPRK's foreign policy, i.e. the role theory. To be more 
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specific, I adopt the role theory prism4 in order to find and grasp the 
patterns of continuities and changes in the roles North Korea declares. After 
I identify the roles North Korea speaks out, I aim to examine the correlation5 
between these roles and actual foreign policy of the DPRK. In particular, I 
aim to identify the situations where significant changes in the role saliency 
occur, where the DPRK either starts to emphasize some role over another, or 
where the old roles are refused and new roles show up. After I do so, my 
goal is to contextualize these role shifts with the shifts in actual North 
Korean foreign policy and with North Korean interaction with its significant 
others. I claim the identification of the formative moments or situations of 
the role shifts can help me to better understand the dynamic of North 
Korean foreign political processes and reveal and interpret some sources of 
their changes that turn up.  
Right at this place, I feel obligated to make clearer both my metatheoretical 
commitments and my position as far as the existing approaches inside the 
role theory are concerned. I perceive myself as a moderate social 
constructivist. I believe I can generate useful knowledge about the world we 
live in, i.e., I can actually approach the roles North Korea declares using the 
method of content analysis of North Korean discourses. Therefore, from 
epistemological point of view, similarly as Alexander Wendt (1999, 39–40) 
does, I believe in science in the framework of socially constructed world. As 
it has probably become obvious after reading the previous paragraph, my 
aim on the field of science is the understanding: I want to better understand 
how the North Korea perceives the part it plays in the international politics 
and how its interaction with other actors impact that as it can potentially 
facilitate the communication with the DPRK.  
                                                          
4 It has probably become clear after reading the previous pages that the role theoretic 
approach is rather broad and rich in interpretations. For now, it is sufficient to declare I incline to 
the interactionist tradition of the role theory. I will elaborate this statement in the methodological 
and theoretic section of this thesis which follows after the introduction. 
5 In the past, there have been several studies whose authors searched the correlation 
between declared roles and actual foreign policy. Studies of Walker (1987), Chafetz, Abramson and 
Grillot (1996), or Wish 1980 are just some examples.  
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It results from my metatheoretical stances that I am interested in social 
roots of North Korean foreign policy. Thus, I incline to the interactionist 
tradition of role theory (which I call second wave of role theory later in this 
thesis). Of course, adopting the interactionist or constructivist approach 
brings certain implications for my investigation. First, I approach roles 
mainly as products of actor's interaction with its significant others, i.e. the 
primary socializing agents for particular role beholder (Harnisch 2011a, 1; 
for further explanation see Chapter 1.3.1). Second, in my point of view, roles 
cannot be understood as objectively existing facts but rather, as North 
Korean expressions of the part it plays (or should play) in the international 
politics. Again, these expressions are co-constituted in the process of 
interactions with the significant others. Furthermore, arising from the 
constructivist background of the second wave of the role theory, I claim 
these expressions can change and do change which may be the result of the 
North Korean interactions with the significant others. I choose role theoretic 
approach to the study of North Korean foreign policy as I want to offer more 
social interpretation of this phenomenon. Majority of existing works6 do not 
approach the DPRK in that manner although it might bring us to useful and 
alternative understanding of the DPRK's foreign policy.  
Of course, by admitting the significant others are the important source of the 
roles North Korea declares, the need emerges to find out who the significant 
others are in the North Korean context. Some actors (such as the United 
States or South Korea) seem to be very obvious representatives of this group 
whereas the influence of other actors (such as various human rights groups 
or coalitions) on the North Korean role formation is much less apparent. So 
far, there has been a serious lack of literature dealing with this issue and 
thus, it is one of my component objectives in this thesis to determine who 
                                                          
6 One exception is the article written by Young Chul Cho (2011) which interprets the North 
Korean identity formation as a product of its delimitation against the United States and South 
Korea. 
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the significant others were in the time period I examined. The content 
analysis I use in this thesis is an instrument that will help me with this task. 
The main goal I delimited above will be accomplished in two steps. First one 
is to identify the roles North Korea declared between 19947 and present, i.e. 
2015 using the method of content analysis of two kinds of texts. First, I 
concentrate on the discourses delivered by the regime elites. I located these 
texts in North Korean periodicals because the original full text recordings or 
transcriptions were with some exceptions unavailable. Second, I analyse 
carefully selected general8 and on foreign policy focussed articles or extracts 
of the articles published in The Pyongyang Times newspapers and Korea 
Today magazine. With respect to the fact news redactions members' 
statements articulated in articles function as a regime bullhorn, it is possible 
to accept them as relevant resources where I can also look for the roles. I 
thoroughly explain the process of selection of relevant materials later in this 
dissertation (see Chapter 2). Similarly as Aggestam (1999), I assume the 
deep analysis of roles nation declares can help us to trace down changes in 
the operational framework of its foreign policy. Furthermore, the analysis 
and identification of the roles North Korea declares also seems to be a 
feasible instrument for tracking down the long term patterns of North 
Korean foreign political behaviour.9  The first step will result in the 
formation of a codebook which will follow the developments and changes in 
sets of North Korean national roles. This codebook is enclosed as an 
appendix in the very end of this thesis. 
                                                          
7 I selected year 1994 as a starting point for my analysis as it was the year of death of Kim Il 
Sung. Owing to these circumstances, it is possible to expect the occurrence of significant speeches 
and statements where the elites will articulate the important determinants of future course of the 
DPRK’s foreign policy. Therefore, year 1994 is a good stepping stone for searching for the baseline 
texts (see Chapter 2.5 for further explanation) where the salient roles will be identified. 
8 It is suitable to work with rather general texts that usually include a broad spectrum of 
issues instead of all the foreign policy-related discourses as our goal is not to follow individual 
events/DPRK relations with any particular state in detail. Rather, the foreign political course and 
trends are important for our purposes (comp. Thibault and Lévesque 1997, 17, or Chafetz, 
Abramson and Grillot 1996, 740). 
9 The role theoretic approach does not enable us to observe particular foreign-political 
decisions. Nevertheless, this does not constitute any problem for the purposes of my analysis which 
is supposed to observe the patterns and trends of foreign policy rather than particular steps. 
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Once the codebook is created, I will be able both to identify certain 
preliminary patterns of continuities and changes that occurred in the role 
sets and to concretize the significant others against whom the DPRK delimits 
itself. After that, the second step will follow. I will further work with the 
codebook as I will try to examine the changes in the role sets and I will 
contextualize them with North Korean (social) interactions with the 
significant others. Similarly as Cho (2011, 315), I understand the DPRK as an 
actor constantly engaged in the debate about its role with the significant 
others. Last but not least, I focus on how the roles North Korea declares 
projects in its foreign policy. This is also connected with the issue of role 
saliency: it will be interesting to observe how strongly the most salient roles 
(i.e. the roles regime declared the most often) impact on the foreign policy 
formation. 
In sum, I will map the changes together with their time classification and I 
subsequently put them in the context of North Korean relations with its 
significant others. By mapping of changes in the operational framework of 
North Korean foreign policy, I should be able to assess the trends and 
patterns of these changes which will help me to better understand the 
dynamics of North Korean foreign policy formation. At this moment, several 
practical questions arise: What is the composition of the North Korean role 
sets? Are there any roles that have been constantly present in the North 
Korean role sets? If the change in the role set composition occurred, was it a 
result of certain “traumatic events” (Breuning 2011, 20) or was it rather 
product of gradual vanishing of roles? To be able to answer these questions, 
the codebook mapping North Korean role set will be used. 
To sum up, the goals I identified above imply four research questions: 
1) What were the national roles North Korea declared in the time 
framework I examine and how the composition of North Korean role 
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sets looked like? (this question will be answered after accomplishing 
the first step mentioned above) 
2) How the saliency of particular roles within the role sets changed over 
time? Were the national roles subjected to any changes? (this 
question will be answered after accomplishing the first step 
mentioned above) 
3) Which roles declared by North Korea projected into its foreign policy 
the most? (this question will be answered after accomplishing the 
second step mentioned above) 
4) If any changes occurred, what were the patterns of these changes with 
regard to North Korean interactions with significant others? (this 
question will be answered after accomplishing the second step 
mentioned above) 
The first two research questions are rather descriptive and instrumental in 
their character. Nevertheless, the identification of the national roles via the 
content analysis is demanding both in terms of time and abilities of 
researcher when considering the fact that I will search for the roles in 
relatively extensive dataset. Both second and third question refer to the 
issue of role saliency. As Harnisch (2012, 55) points out, the role saliency 
refers to the fact that roles are not of the same importance to their beholder 
(in our case, it is North Korea) and consequently, not all the roles have the 
same influence on the foreign political behaviour. Thus, it seems to be 
meaningful to pay attention to the role saliency by observing the occurrence 
frequency of particular roles in.  
Finally, the third and forth question does offer the explorational potential 
which mainly lies in the searching for the patterns of role changes in relation 
with the significant others, impact of those changes on the North Korean 
foreign policy and in searching for the actual influence of roles declared to 
the foreign policy of the DPRK. If I am able to identify the particular 
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moments of interaction causing the role changes, it will be very helpful for 
obtaining more comprehensive picture of North Korean foreign policy 
formation. 
The structure of this dissertation will be as follows. In the first chapter, after 
the brief overview of relevant literature, I introduce the developments and 
theoretical waves of the role theory-oriented foreign policy analysis as this 
approach presents my broadest analytical perspective. Afterwards, I 
operationalize the crucial concepts I work with and link them to the North 
Korean case study whereas the special attention is paid to the 
conceptualization of the role change. The issue of the role change is 
important for this thesis (which is also reflected in research goal and 
questions) but at the same time, it has not been elaborated on the 
theoretical level in satisfactory way yet (comp. Breuning 2011, 22). 
Therefore, I pay special attention to this problematique. In the second 
chapter, I proceed to the content analysis as a method which constitutes the 
stepping stone enabling the subsequent course of my investigation. I aim to 
describe both the methods of texts’ selection and sorting and the methods of 
identification of national roles. 
After dealing with theoretical and methodological questions, I will approach 
the third chapter which can be mainly perceived as a presentation of the 
data which arose from the content analysis. In this chapter, I pay attention to 
the national roles I have previously identified. As my work with the coding 
of texts is referential and the code (i.e. the particular national role which 
roofs the relevant text extracts) is formed “on the fly” (comp. Hájek 2014, 
63–64), I am unable to vouch for the roles' content before I analyse the 
North Korean texts. Therefore, I delimit both the content of the particular 
roles and possible changes the roles underwent after I do the content 
analysis.  
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Finally, in the fourth chapter, I will explore the dynamics of roles North 
Korea declares. I will try to contextualize the particular moments of change I 
identified before with the North Korean interactions with significant others. 
This part should help me to better understand the dynamics of North 
Korean foreign political roles' formation and transformation in the light of 
the DPRK's interactions with its significant friends and foes (see below). In 
the very end of this thesis, I will naturally proceed with the summarization 
of my conclusions and answering my research questions. 
Last but not least, the integral part of this thesis is actual codebook which is 
crucial for the identification of North Korean national roles in the depicted 
time framework. The codebook is enclosed in the very end of this 
dissertation thesis.  
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Note to the Transcription of Korean Names and Terminology 
The official language in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is 
naturally Korean which uses a specific alphabet named Hangul. As this 
alphabet is completely different from the Roman letters, there is a need to 
deal with its transcription to the roman letters. There are several methods of 
transcription in use but I decided to adopt so called Revised Romanization of 
Korean as it is the most common and accepted way for Korean language 
transcription into English. 
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1. Evaluation of the Role Theoretic Literature, Role Theory 
Background and Delimitation of the Crucial Concepts 
1.1 Role Theoretic Literature  
Even before I introduce the approaches present in the role theory, let me 
proceed with a short overview of existing works of scholars who use the role 
theory in the foreign policy analysis. To begin with, there is the already 
mentioned article written by K. J. Holsti10 (1970). Together with his team of 
researchers, he created a list of national role conceptions (17 in total) on the 
basis of content analysis of speeches of foreign political elites from 71 
countries. Moreover, he focused on search of correlation between the 
particular types of national role conceptions and activity/passivity of the 
particular state on the international scene. Holsti admits the national role 
conceptions can be used for anticipation of diplomatic steps to certain 
extent which can be useful. As I have already indicated above, Holsti also 
searches for North Korean national role conceptions between 1966 and 
1967 whereas he argues the DPRK enacted roles “bastion of revolution-
liberator”, “anti-imperialist agent” and “liberation supporter” (Holsti 1970, 
275).11 
The analytic framework created by Holsti was subsequently adopted by 
several authors in order to grasp states’ foreign policy. Although it would 
not be meaningful to name all the works of all the scholars working with 
Holsti’s legacy, it is reasonable to mention at least those that were somehow 
ground-breaking or important with regard to our dissertation. The first 
book whose authors use Holsti’s foundations is collective monography 
edited by Stephen G. Walker (ed. 1987) named “Role Theory and Foreign 
Policy Analysis”. In this book, authors further elaborate Holsti’s approach 
                                                          
10 Even before Holsti published his pivotal article, several authors (for example, James N. 
Rosenau, see below) worked with the notion “role”. Nevertheless, they did not contemplate it 
properly and used it in rather marginal way.  
11 In order to achieve as much clarity as possible in the text that follows, I always write the 
name of individual roles in italics. 
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and use it for the foreign policy analysis of several countries. As Beneš (2009, 
25) points out, this publication actually confirms the usefulness of the role 
theory in foreign policy analysis. Although the reflection of the role theory 
was rather weak in 1980s, some important works were published, for 
example the article of Noami B. Wish (1980) who offers more extensive 
typology of roles, or Chih-yu Shih’s paper (1988) which presents the case 
study of Chinese foreign policy and puts special emphasis on the relation 
between the Chinese cultural psychology and diplomacy. Similarly to Holsti, 
Shih mainly discusses the sources of national role conceptions arising from 
the domestic environment. 
In the 1990s, the role theory experienced a comeback in many works of 
scholars focused on foreign policy analysis. If I should mention at least some 
of the most frequently quoted publications, it would be the collective 
monography edited by Le Pestre (ed., 1997) or the article by G. Chafetz, H. 
Abramson and S. Grillot (1996) where authors analyse correlation between 
national role conceptions articulated by elites and foreign political actions of 
Ukraine and Belarus with a particular emphasis on the probability of 
proliferation of nuclear weapons. Important (but rather implicit) 
contribution to the field of the role theoretic foreign political analysis was 
also introduced by Alexander Wendt (1992 and 1999). His work is one of 
the first ones that grasp both socially-conditioned roots of national roles and 
the issue of role identity change and thus, it is highly relevant for this 
thesis.12 Last but not least, when dealing with the national identity of post-
Soviet Russia, Glenn Chafetz pays attention to social origins of national role 
conceptions as well (comp. Chafetz 1996–1997, 664–665). Generally 
speaking, some new issues have penetrated the role theoretic approach in 
the 1990s which foreshadowed a new course that the role theory-inspired 
foreign policy analysis was supposed to take later. I call this new course the 
second wave of role theory later in this thesis. 
                                                          
12 For more, see Chapter 1.3.3. 
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Since 2000, more attention has been paid to the role conflict, role changes 
and especially, to the intersubjectivity and social conditionality of the 
national roles. In this regard, it is needed to mention the book edited by 
Sebastian Harnisch, Cornelia Frank and Hanns W. Maul (eds., 2011) named 
“Role Theory in International Relations: Approaches and Analyses”, articles 
written by David McCourt (2012), or by Leslie E. Wehner and Cameron G. 
Thies (2014). Together with the contribution of Alexander Wendt (1999), 
their work is highly relevant for the purposes of this thesis. Nevertheless, 
even in 2000s, some behaviorally-oriented works appeared, such as the 
book by S. Walker, A. Malici and M. Schafer (eds., 2011). 
If I should reflect the response to the role theory in the Czech environment, 
it has been rather weak so far. The role theory-inspired research firstly 
appeared at the Czech academic scene in 2009 thanks to the dissertation 
thesis written by Vít Beneš who used the role theory to analyse the relations 
of Russia and Turkey with the European Union (Beneš 2009) and to his 
rather theoretically oriented article focused on the ontological and 
epistemological issues connected with the role theoretic approach (Beneš 
2010). Furthermore, the authors of collective monography written by 
Vladimír Handl (Handl ed., 2011) apply the Holsti’s categories of national 
role conceptions when analysing the German foreign policy. In sum, I can say 
the role theory has had rather marginal position in the Czech academic 
sphere so far. 
 
1.2 The Role Theory, Its Roots and Development 
1.2.1 The First Wave of Scholars  
The role theory approach has its roots in the middle of 20th century in the 
social psychology, sociology and anthropology (comp. Gross, Mason and 
McEachern 1958; Goodenough 1965, or Sarbin and Allen 1968) but we can 
track its origins back to George H. Mead’s conceptualization of social roles in 
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1930s (comp. Mead 1934). Nevertheless, it was not until 1970s when 
Kaalevi J. Holsti systematically13 used the approach in the field of foreign 
policy analysis (hereinafter referred to as FPA) in his path-breaking article 
“National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy” (Holsti 1970) 
which has already been mentioned in the Introduction. After publishing of 
this article, several authors (I have mentioned a handful of them in the 
Introduction as well, for example Wish 1980; Shih 1988, or Walker, ed. 1987) 
followed up Holsti’s approach.  
The “first wave”14 scholars were often (but not always) based at the 
American universities (Thies and Breuning 2012, 2) and usually focused on 
how the international system compelled states to adopt certain roles. Those 
scholars also perceived the structural influences on a particular role 
beholder as rather rigid and the relationship between structure and actor as 
deterministic (comp. Tewes 1998, 118). Thus, the majority of works of the 
first wave of role theory remained connected with the 
positivism/objectivism and structural realism on the field of the 
international relations theory. This approach naturally suffered from similar 
difficulties and became subject of similar criticism as the structural realism 
itself such as neglecting the actor’s side as far as the “actor–structure” 
debate is concerned.15 Moreover, some proponents of the first wave of role 
                                                          
13 The concept of role itself in the IR was occasionally used on the field of international 
relations even before 1970s, as Holsti (1970, 255) points out. However, the concept of role used to 
be accepted rather uncritically and supplementarily to their existing approaches. It was Holsti 
(1970) who actually elaborated the concept in detail. Besides him, one should not forget about the 
work of James Rosenau who also contributed to development of the concept of role on the field of 
foreign policy analysis (comp. Rosenau 1966 and 1987). 
14 Roughly speaking, the works of the first wave of role theoretic approach were elaborated 
between the beginning of 1970s and 1990s whereas the writings of second wave scholars have 
been expanding since the very end of 1990s till present. However, this time classification should 
not be taken as a rigid one as some first wave scholars show certain degree of diversion from 
traditional structural approach and vice versa. Even Holsti (1970, 240) takes account of social 
relations between ego and alter in the international environment which is rather present in the 
works of the second wave scholars. Nevertheless, he still pays more attention to objective (eg. size 
or location) and systemic factors as far as the sources of the national role conceptions are 
concerned (comp. Holsti 1970, 245).  
15 Even the above mentioned Noami B. Wish (1980) suffered from excessive reliance on the 
influence of international structure or the states’ status in the international system as also Breuning 
(2011, 17) points out. 
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theory resorted to behavioral methods of excessive quantification 
(especially Walker 1979, and Walker ed., 1987) which can be also perceived 
as the “heritage” of the positivist/objectivist background. The reliance on 
excessive quantification not only led to distorted conclusions or 
measurement errors, as Walker (1979, 204) himself admits but made the 
findings of the research somehow less comprehensible for the readers too 
(comp. Walker 1979, 194). Last but not least, McCourt mentions another 
problem connected with the first generation of role theory scholars, i.e. their 
conceptualization of roles as something which is simply hold by the actors 
who play them (McCourt 2012, 374). This issue is closely connected with the 
term national role conception that will be discussed later in this thesis. 
To sum up, the first wave scholars often focused on proving the existence of 
relationship between roles and actor’s foreign-political behaviour (comp. 
Wish 1980; Shih 1988, or authors in Le Pestre, ed. 1997) and believed in the 
influence of structural and material aspects as far as the origins of roles 
were concerned. Nevertheless, they did not pay much attention either to the 
role change processes or to the actual sources of this change. They simply 
did not perceived roles as social entities, worked on the presumption that 
international politics has rather sparse social density and thus did not really 
deal with the alter part as far as the roles' formation is concerned as 
Harnisch (2012, 52) points out. 
The disproportionate attention to influence of international structure on the 
national roles’ formation was also criticized by more sociologically-oriented 
Peter Gaupp (1983). Although he could be rather integrated to the first wave 
of role theoretic scholars in terms of temporal classification, his approach is 
more compact with the second wave. That is because he seems to be much 
less concerned with the objective (such as states' size or material capacities) 
and structural factors as the sources of national role conceptions and 
subsequent foreign political behaviour. On the contrary, he pays attention to 
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the relational and social factors as sources of national role conceptions 
(comp. Gaupp 1983, 109). His legacy leads us to the second wave of scholars 
using the role theory in the FPA, i.e. to the relationarily-oriented one. 
 
1.2.2 The Second Wave of Scholars: Relational and Interactionalist Turn 
Chart 1 placed in the end of this chapter summarizes both the differences 
between the two waves of role theoretic approach and it also grasps the 
disagreements inside the second wave. As we can see, the second wave of 
role theory in FPA to which I incline in this dissertation was largely 
influenced by social-constructivist ideas that started to manifest themselves 
mainly since the late 1980s in the field of international relations and 
brought a new emphasis on the others (or so called significant others, see 
below) and their interaction with self in mutually influential relationship as 
far as the self's role formation is concerned. 
Although it has not been any strict rule, the second wave scholars were often 
based in Europe and stressed the relevance of role demands and alter 
expectations when contemplating about the role enactment. Still, the 
emphasis to the relational origin of roles differs from author to author. On 
one hand, the works of some authors remained partially but yet, not 
deterministically, tied with structural explanation. Alexander Wendt (1992 
and 1999) whose contribution to the role theory is discussed below 
represents one example.16 On the other hand, the works of those who prefer 
interactionism usually pay more attention to the process of role learning 
where the actor’s decision to accept or not to accept a role is shaped both by 
the Others’ expectation and by their own judgement of particular situation 
(Wehner and Thies 2014, 415; Harnisch 2012, 49; McCourt 2012, 379). Thus, 
                                                          
16 Nevertheless, the existence of the structure-oriented category of the second wave of role 
theory is questionable. First, the contribution of Alexander Wendt on the field of role theory was 
rather implicit as he has never claimed his allegiance to the role theory as such. Moreover, he seems 
to be the only representative of the structure-oriented category which makes its value even more 
problematic. Still, I decided to establish this category in order to depict the existing diversity in the 
framework of the second wave of role theory. 
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it is possible to see that the way how the second wave scholars deal with 
what I call relational turn later in this chapter differs from author to author. 
Let me explain those divergent streams in more detailed way. 
Sebastian Harnisch (2011b, 36, or 2012) mentions George H. Mead’s 
symbolic interactionism as a significant source for the second wave of role 
theory as the Meadian approach brought some innovative claims. First, it is 
the assumption of the mutually constitutive relation between the actor and 
(international) society. In this regard, the relations between actors at the 
international scene became increasingly important factors that are needed 
to be taken into consideration if we contemplate the origins of national roles 
(Harnisch 2012, 52). Second, the Meadian approach brought somehow 
different point of view to the “(…) shifts in state behavior through role 
taking and making”17 (quoted according to Harnisch 2011b, 36). This refers 
to the fact the Meadian approach contributed significantly to the debates 
about the processes of role change as a product of social interaction.  
To sum up, the main contribution of social constructivist ideas to the role 
theoretic FPA lies in the understanding of foreign political roles as emerging 
social objects (Harnisch 2011b, 38). What is crucial here is that influence of 
international structure18 on actors’ roles is much less rigid (in comparison 
with the first wave of scholars) and the role making is perceived as much 
more creative process which is subject of “(…) constant negotiating and 
renegotiating” (Tewes 1998, 118). Generally speaking, the relational turn 
significantly broadens possible sources of national roles. They can no longer 
been perceived as mere products of structural and/or material/objective 
aspects’ influence as a lot of first wave scholars argued. Rather, they have to 
be understood and grasped as increasingly social entities and products of 
social interaction between ego and alter’s expectations (Harnisch 2012, 52). 
                                                          
17 The notions of role taking and role making will be explained later in this dissertation. 
18 It is needed to point out at this place that I do not perceive the international structure in 
the Waltzian way. I further discuss this issue and explain my stance in Chapter 1.3.1, pages 26–27 of 
this dissertation. 
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The relational turn also gives a rise to something called foreign policy 
culture19 which can be defined as “(…) a set of attitudes, beliefs and 
sentiments which give order to the foreign-policy process and which 
provide the underlining assumptions and rules that govern behaviour in the 
international system” (Tewes 1998, 119). What is also interesting here is 
that those actors’ roles actually influence the foreign policy culture (ibid.) 
which reasserts the relevance of roles’ states take. 
As far as the proponents of the second wave are concerned, one can begin 
with rather implicit enactment of this approach by Alexander Wendt in his 
pivotal article (Wendt 1992) and more explicit one in the book he published 
a few years later (Wendt 1999).20 What is important here is that Wendt 
presents social view on the transformation of roles/identities. He perceives 
the transformation of actor’s identity/role which is incremental and very 
slow process as a product of the mutual interaction between actors. On the 
example of the evolution of cooperation, Wendt shows us that the positive 
transformation only occurs if the actors cease to identify negatively with one 
another and when the atmosphere of distrust disappears. However, as it is 
very difficult to change the relational patterns between actors, the roles and 
identities they enact tend to be relatively stable and actors generally do not 
want to change them because they usually shape their image and character. 
Consequently, Wendt concludes that the conscious transformation of roles is 
rather exceptional (Wendt 1992, 417–419).  
Furthermore, Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein (1996) implicitly 
contemplate roles states take in the international environment too. They 
speak about the concept of identity which comes from social psychology (as 
does the role theory) and perceive it as a “(...) crucial link between 
                                                          
19 The issue of foreign policy culture is broadly discussed in Katzenstein ed., 1996. 
20 In his book, Wendt presents his typology of roles which is however too narrow as he just 
proposes the roles of enemy, rival and friend, the roles that are actually derived from his 
conceptualization of three cultures of anarchy, i.e. Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian culture (Wendt 
1999, 247).  Nevertheless, as McCourt points out, Wendt’s overall work with the notion of role is 
sometimes confusing and too vague (comp. McCourt 2012, 374). 
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environmental structures and interests” (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein 
1996, 14). They also capture crucial relational aspect valid even in the role 
theoretic environment, i.e. that the identity refers to “(…) the images of 
individuality and distinctiveness (“selfhood”) held and projected by an actor 
and formed (and modified over time) through relations with significant 
others” (ibid.). They conclude this with an assertion that those relations 
refer to “(…) mutually constructed and evolving images of self and other” 
(ibid.). Wendt’s (1992 and 1999) and Jepperson’s, Wendt’s and 
Katzenstein’s (1996) works also show us the tendency of some scholars to 
merge the notions role and identity, especially whilst contemplating the 
modes of their changes21 (comp. Wendt 1992, 417 or Jepperson, Wendt and 
Katzenstein 1996, 14, especially n. 85). If I should mention other authors 
who can be included in the second wave of role theoretic approach to FPA 
and who enact this approach in a more explicit way,  I would highlight 
authors in Ole Elgström’s and Michael Smith’s book (eds. 2006) who adopt 
relational view while they apply the role theory to FPA of European Union,22 
Trine Flockhart who deals with the reconstruction of roles of NATO 
(Flockhart 2011) or rather theoretical chapter of Dirk Nabers (2011) dealing 
with the role change processes and many others. 
Nevertheless, even the second wave scholars are subjected to criticism. In 
particular, Wehner and Thies (2014, 412–413) present three points of 
criticism whereas two of them may be relevant for this thesis. First, some 
                                                          
21 The merging of concepts of role and identity is relatively common feature of the 
constructivist role theoretic FPA (comp. Wehner and Thies 2014, 412). David M. McCourt (2012, 
372–373) also points out that several authors (such as Jeffrey Legro or Mlada Bukovansky) who use 
term “identity” when speaking about states in international environment define this notion in a 
way that is actually interchangeable with the term “role”.  This is also very obvious in case of Tewes 
(1998) who seems to be inclining to some statements typical for the first wave scholars (comp. 
ibid., 118). Nevertheless, McCourt argues that despite those notions are related, they cannot be 
perceived as synonymous (McCourt 2012, 373). Last but not least, Dirk Nabers perceives the role as 
a basis for identity which is however filled with meaning through identity (Nabers 2011, 83). I 
argue that identities are much broader phenomenon than roles whereas the roles accepted by 
particular state have to make sense within its identity (or better set of identities). Otherwise it 
might shake the basic principles on which the particular regime rests. 
22 Very often, the proponents of the second wave often focussed on the analysis of 
European integration process. 
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scholars (such as Wendt 1999) remain too tied with structural/material 
explanation. Second, the role theory still suffers from methodological 
poverty as there has never been any attempt to develop coherent 
methodological tools in addition to its rich conceptual tools. This is however 
not insurmountable problem as the scholars often use existing methods such 
as process tracking, content analysis or discourse analysis (Wehner and 
Thies 2014, 413). I have already pointed out above that this dissertation is 
not any exception.23 Finally, they mention the negligence of domestic 
contestation and debates as far as the origin of national roles is concerned 
(Wehner and Thies 2014, 413). The issue of domestic debates and their 
influence on the role change is also discussed by Hollis and Smith (2000, 
182–183). However, there is significantly less space left for the domestic 
debate in the North Korean case when we consider the authoritative regime 
character itself, although some form of debate within the North Korean 
ruling elite probably exist. The analysis of roles I implemented actually 
shows that the broader space for influence of internal dynamic opened the 
year immediately after the death of Kim Jong Il. Again, I will discuss this 
issue later in this thesis.  To sum up, the second wave of role theory both 
broadened the spectrum of possible sources of national roles whilst the 
scholars pay significantly higher attention both to the social origins of the 
national roles and the role change process. 
 
                                                          
23 In Chapter 2, I dedicate proper space to the method of content analysis I use.  
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1.3 Role Theory Approach as an Instrument for the North Korean 
Foreign Policy Analysis: Operationalization of the Key Concepts 
As it has already been mentioned earlier, the conceptual framework of the 
role theory can be perceived as a valuable and innovative instrument with 
potential to grasp the complex reality of states’ foreign policy. However, 
before we start to work with it in our analysis, there is a need to grasp the 
key notions and operationalize them with regards to specifics of the North 
Korean foreign policy case study. 
Chart 1: Waves of Scholars on the Field of the Role Theory in Foreign Policy 
Analysis 
  
First wave Second wave 
structure-oriented interactionalist 
Approximate time 
classification 
from 1970s till 1990s from 1990s till present 
Theoretical and 
methodological 
background 
structural realism 
(strong positivism) 
thin constructivism thin constructivism 
Inclination in actor-
structure debate 
strong structural 
determinism 
enlightened structural 
approach; structure 
still perceived as an 
formative element for 
the roles actors enact 
but structural 
influence is not 
deterministic 
interactionist approach; 
accounting both actor 
and structure as equally 
valid aspect influencing 
roles enacted; 
Role change 
rare 
problematic but 
possible 
roles are subject of 
gradual but omnipresent 
forming and reforming 
Sources of 
NRCs/roles 
predominantly 
material 
rather 
social/ideational 
predominantly 
social/ideational 
Sources of 
NRCs/role change 
N/A 
rather 
social/ideational 
predominantly 
social/ideational 
Field of interest 
attempts to 
prove/grasp the 
correlation (or even 
causality) between the 
NRCs and foreign 
political behaviour; 
role identity 
transformation 
role change, role 
conflict, processes of 
role formation 
Example of authors 
Noami B. Wish, 
Stephen G. Walker, 
Philippe Le Pestre 
Alexander Wendt 
Sebastian Harnisch, Dirk 
Nabers 
Source: created by author. 
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1.3.1 National Role Conceptions, Roles and Their Formation: Considering the 
Interactionalist Legacy in the Role Theory 
First concept that requires attention is the national role conception 
(hereinafter referred to as NRC or NRCs). Broadly speaking, this is a notion 
primarily defined, developed and used in the first wave role theoretic 
tradition by Kalevi J. Holsti (1970). Due to its relationship with the first 
wave scholars, the original definition of this concept is quite intensely 
connected with the strong structuralism and positivism, respectively (see 
Chart 1) which makes its use in my analysis questionable. Still, there is a 
need to explain this concept before I start to critically evaluate it. 
Originally, the NRCs were defined as “policymakers' own definitions of the 
general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to the 
state and of functions, if any, their state should perform on the continuing 
basis in the international system or in subordinated regional systems” 
(Holsti 1970, 245–246). Noami B. Wish (1980, 532) proposes another 
definition: role conceptions can be defined as relatively stable “(…) foreign 
policy makers' perceptions of their nations' positions in the international 
system”. Last but not least, Le Pestre (1997, 5–6) perceives NRCs as duties 
and responsibilities of a country articulated by its foreign-political elites. To 
sum up, in the framework of the first wave, the NRCs were mainly perceived 
as expressions of commitments, tasks or duties of a state in the international 
system. The role theory in its original version goes on: once declared, the 
NRCs start functioning as general categories foreign political elites rely on. 
As Chafetz, Abramson and Grillot (1996) emphasise, after being declared, 
the NRCs are transformed into certain operational principles that 
subsequently contribute to the formation of particular diplomatic steps 
which actually makes them to a stimulating point of interest for foreign 
policy analysis.  
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However, as I pointed out, those definitions do not seem to be quite fitting 
for the constructivist role theoretic FPA. In particular, roles are not and 
cannot be limited just to the duties and responsibilities given actor actually 
holds because only little space is left for the influence of (social) interaction 
on the roles' formation. As McCourt (2012, 376) argues, “(…) role playing is 
not in the main about doing what must be done, or what it is permitted to do; 
it is for the most part about doing what is expected24, appropriate or possible 
in a given situation”. Also Le Pestre (1997, 5) points out that the states need 
both to define a role and “(…) having it accepted by other actors”. Thus, we 
should not accept roles are just responsibilities and duties hold by states 
because if we do so, a significant aspect is missing in our conceptual 
framework, i.e. the aspect of an interaction of actor with his or her 
environment, his or her perception of the others' expectations and in 
general terms, the dynamics of interaction itself.  
Above mentioned considerations lead me to the problematic nature of the 
notion of national role conception itself which is the reason I will work with 
a mere notion of national role (hereinafter referred to as NR or simply role). 
I omit the word “conception” as it could lead reader to an incorrect 
conclusion that I adopt the original conceptualization of NRCs. For me, the 
NR stands for the North Korean regime's expressions of its commitments, 
tasks and duties that are formed in the process of North Korean interactions 
with the significant others. In other words, the roles should be understood 
as a combination of self-conceptions held by Ego and expectations of the 
Alter (comp. Kirste and Maull 1996). By accepting the interactionist point, 
the claim of Noami B. Wish that the NRCs are stable perceptions held by 
foreign policy makers (see above) becomes increasingly challenged. Again, S. 
Harnisch argues that the roles are inherently contested “(…) because roles 
and their enactment are closely related to the roles of other actors” 
                                                          
24 Italics added by author. 
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(Harnisch 2011a, 8). Thus, it is possible to see that the interactionist 
approach makes the space for the role change significantly broader. 
This leads me to question of the processes of formation and transformation 
of the national roles. As it has probably become obvious from the previous 
part where I introduced the two waves of the role theory, there is a 
disagreement between the second wave scholars about what are the main 
impulses for formation and transformation of the NR. When looking at the 
second wave of the role theory in Chart 1 again, we can see the structure-
oriented scholars tend to prefer the influence of a structure to the influence 
of significant others to the roles' formation whereas the interactionists try to 
pay equal attention to structure, significant others and judgement of actors 
(comp. Wehner and Thies 2014, 415). I do not want to rely excessively on 
structural influences but at the same time, I cannot neglect their influence 
either. Therefore, I pay attention to both actor’s judgements and structural 
influences25 and the structure in the form I grasp it (see next paragraph) 
seems to stay highly relevant in my approach.  
I argue that the structure cannot be understood in structural-realist terms as 
Kenneth Waltz perceives it, i.e. as a rather abstract set of limitations that 
determine actor’s behaviour that should be separated from its constituting 
units, their actions, behaviour and characteristics (Waltz 1979, 74 and 79). 
Furthermore, I do not think we can simply omit the way how the units 
interact as Waltz proposes (ibid., 80). By contrast, I believe the structure as I 
work with it in this thesis is based mainly on the interaction between the 
units. To be more specific, I believe the mutually constitutive relation 
                                                          
25 However, I will not be able to fully grasp one of the factor that is typical for the 
interactionists in the role theoretic FPA, i.e. the already mentioned domestic contestation and 
debate about the content of roles which is typical for democratic regimes. This is understandable 
with regard of the fact I analyse the foreign policy of North Korean regime which is authoritarian. 
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between an actor and his or her significant others can be perceived as a core 
aspect that defines the structure.26  
At this point, I finally come to the notion of the significant others27 I have 
already mentioned several times above. Sebastian Harnisch (2011a, 11) 
provides useful definition based on the legacy of George H. Mead's work. He 
argues that in the interpersonal relationships, the significant others (such as 
parents or siblings) are the primary socializing agents for particular role 
beholder. To put this assertion in the context of the international relations, 
the significant others are the actors that are the crucial reference point for 
the role beholder28 as the role beholder forms the roles with regard to the 
significant others. Harnisch also adds the selection of the significant others 
is usually based on  role beholder's past experience and the whole process of 
change of significant others may be connected with shock or crisis situations 
(Harnisch 2011a, 12).  
Alexander Wendt also discusses the issue of the significant others arguing 
that “(…) the identities are learned and then reinforced in response to how 
actors are treated by significant Others” (Wendt 1999, 327). Furthermore, 
Wendt pays attention the interaction between given actor and others. He 
argues that if the (significant)29 other treats us as we were an enemy, we 
reflect that and we are likely to accept this belief in our own role identity in 
relation with the other (ibid.). In short, the significant others are crucial 
                                                          
26 This definition leads us to what Waltz (1979) calls the reductionist conception of 
structure. However, I think this conception is much more suitable for my analysis as it can help me 
to understand the actor’s foreign political behaviour which is the goal of this thesis in general 
terms. 
27 Erving Goffman uses the notion “role others” (comp. Goffman 1961, 75). 
28 It is useful to delimit the two key concepts closely connected with the concept of the 
significant others and interactionist or Meadian tradition of the role theoretic FPA, i.e. the notions 
of “I”, “me” and “self”. As I have already stated above, those terms arise from the work of George H. 
Mead. Briefly speaking, Mead understands the “I” as “(…) the response of the organism to the 
attitudes of others” (Mead 1934, 175) and “me” as “(…) the organized set of attitudes of others 
which one himself assumes” (ibid.). What is highly relevant here is Mead's assumption that “the 
attitudes of others constitute the organized “me” and then one reacts toward that as “I”” (ibid.). 
Finally, those two elements meet in what Mead calls the “self”: “The self is essentially a social 
process going on with these two distinguishable phases (ibid., 178). 
29 The attribute “significant” is crucial in Wendt’s work too as he admits that not all others 
in the international environment are equally important for given actor (Wendt 1999, 327). 
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actors that the role beholder needs in order to be able to actually delimit the 
roles he or she intends to play. The importance of the significant others for 
one’s role formation also corresponds with the Median conception of self 
which is elaborated in note 28. 
The implication of the previous paragraph for my analysis of North Korean 
foreign policy and role sets30 is that I necessarily must delimit who are the 
significant others for the DPRK as a role set beholder. When I do so, it opens 
me a way to better understanding of North Korean foreign political steps. 
The identification of the North Korean significant others in the time 
framework I analyse31 arose both from the exploration of the original North 
Korean foreign political texts and from examination of the secondary 
resources dealing with the North Korean foreign political vectors.32  
First, the DPRK needs to delimit itself against the significant others in a 
negative way (which contributes to formation of rather inimical roles). At 
the same time, however, the DPRK obviously needs to identify itself with 
some parts of the international community in a positive way (i.e. to form 
amicable roles). When compared with the “foes group”, the concrete 
delimitation of typical proponents of the “friends group” seems to be more 
complicated but yet, it is possible. I deal with the delimitation of concrete 
members of both groups of significant others in Chapter 3.3.  
  
                                                          
30 The role theoretic scholars generally agree the individual national role conceptions form 
so called role set, i.e. the sum of national role conceptions in a given time framework. The main time 
unit we work with here is the year and therefore, our role set is a sum of national roles that were 
identified with the DPRK in twelve months. Later in this thesis, I work with both plural (role sets) 
and singular (role set). By notion role sets, I refer to sum of North Korean role sets for selected 
temporal period. By using notion role set, I only refer to one role set for single year. 
31 The composition of a group of actors that can be called significant others does not has to 
be constant as also Harnisch (2011a, 12) points out and the group of a role beholder’s significant 
others may be transformed. However, I can say from our experience that the North Korean group of 
significant others remained stable in the whole time framework I analyse (i.e. between 1994 and 
2015). 
32 The text of Young Chul Cho is especially relevant as he uses the both interactionist and 
interpretative approach when analysing the North Korean policy (comp. Cho 2011). I discussed and 
analysed his contribution elsewhere (comp. Kudláčová 2015). 
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1.3.2 Role Enactment and Its Correlation with the NRs 
The role enactment (or in Holsti's terms role performance) was previously 
defined as “(…) attitudes, decisions, and actions governments take to 
implement” (Holsti 1970, 240) or as actual behaviour of given actor with 
regard to its roles and role set composition. To be more specific, the role 
enactment encompasses various foreign policy actions, inactions and speech 
acts (Harnisch 2011a, 15) and can be perceived as actual foreign political 
behaviour of given actor.  
The relationship between NRs and role enactment was in the centre of 
attention mainly in the works of the first wave role theoretic scholars (again, 
see Chart 1) as they examined the correlation (and even causal relationship 
in some cases) between them whereas the role enactment usually 
functioned as a dependent variable and NR as the independent variable. To 
begin with sociological literature that created a basis for role theory in FPA, 
even Erving Goffman accepted the existence of correlation between the role 
performance and something which was later called the role conception 
(compare Goffman 1961, 77). If I should mention some later authors who 
actually examined this relationship, Stephen Walker did so when analysing 
the foreign policy of third countries towards two superpowers during the 
Cold War era. He claimed we can observe a group of countries whose foreign 
policy is convergent with the role sets they declare but also a group of 
countries that evinces the divergent tendencies (Walker 1987, 82–83). 
Moreover, Chafetz, Abramson and Grillot (1996) investigated the ability of 
the role theory to anticipate foreign political behaviour on the case study of 
likelihood of the nuclear proliferation of Ukraine and Belarus after the end 
of the Cold War. They reached the conclusion that the NRCs function as 
useful indicators to foresee the future foreign policy. Finally, Noami B. Wish 
concludes that there is a strong correlation between some types of NRCs and 
foreign political behaviour (Wish 1980, 549). 
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As there were numerous studies that demonstrated the correlation between 
the national roles and foreign political behaviour, I accept this assumption 
as the starting point for our analysis. Thus, I assume there is the correlation 
(however, not the causal relationship!) between the NRs and foreign policy 
behaviour. The adoption of this assumption is truly crucial for me. This 
correlation works as a Popperian basic assumption (comp. Popper 1997, 94–
96) for me on which I build my subsequent analysis.  
 
1.3.3 Change of the National Roles 
Whereas the previously mentioned concepts were present both in the works 
of first wave and second wave scholars, the issue of role change was 
elaborated in the framework of the constructivist role theory, i.e. it has been 
a domain of the authors of the second wave. The role change stays in the 
core of constructivist (and interactionalist in particular) literature on the 
role theory as well as of this thesis as my aim is to explore the processes of 
changes which appear in the North Korean role sets. After reading the 
following paragraphs, we will find out the role change is closely related with 
the issue of sources of NRs’ formation which I have discussed earlier in this 
thesis. The conceptualization of the role change can still be perceived as one 
of the aspects of the role theoretic approach which has not been 
comprehensively elaborated yet and the existing contributions on this field 
still seem to be in its infancy. Let me firstly outline the existing contribution 
in this field. After I do so, I will try to concretize and stretch them to the 
North Korean case study. 
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 Role Change Conceptualization: The State of the Art  
Dirk Nabers (2011, 84) defines the role change as “a change in the shared 
conception and execution of typical role performance and role boundaries”. 
Thus, in Nabers’ view, the role change encompasses both the change of NRs 
and role enactment (or performance). He also urges us to carefully 
distinguish the role change from the deviance which can be understood as 
behaviour which is not connected with given role and thus falls outside its 
frame (ibid.). Nevertheless, he fails to elaborate the issue of role deviance in 
detail. Furthermore, Nabers argues that the role change is likely to appear 
when the role performance stops to correspond with actor’s identity. He also 
claims that the roles are located as structural positions inside the social 
structure. Similarly to identities, the roles cannot be understood as static 
entities. Their content is always subject of forming and reforming and they 
are very likely to change in case of crisis, insecurity or dislocation (ibid., 85–
86). 
As we can see, Nabers interprets the roles as inherently instable categories. 
Chafetz, Abramson and Grillot (1996) adopt less radical position as far as the 
possibility of role change is concerned. Firstly, they set three categories of 
factors that contribute to the formation and reformation of roles: social (i.e. 
past and current experiences the nation has with other countries, and social 
and economic pressure arising both other countries and citizens), nonsocial 
(i.e. material aspects such as population, economics strength, or values and 
traditions,33 and contextual. At the same time, they argue the social elements 
probably have the strongest influence on the role formation as the material 
factors do not have any meaning without the social experience: “Social 
interaction is particularly likely to produce change when the centrality or 
saliency of given role conceptions is unclear or when a given state’s national 
                                                          
33 Let me just point out at this place that I perceive the values and traditions as social 
aspects. Therefore, I do not fully agree with the classification provided by Chafetz, Abramson and 
Grillot (1996). 
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role conceptions do not match international expectations of the state’s role” 
(Chafetz, Abramson and Grillot 1996, 736).  
Ulrich Krotz (2002) arrives to similar conclusion arguing that there are 
three main origins of the NRCs: history, memory and socialization. As we can 
see he does not perceive the material aspects as important determinants for 
role formation at all. Wehner and Thies (2014, 419) also emphasize the 
external expectations of the significant others are key source for 
construction of the roles. Chafetz, Abramson and Grillot argue that the 
changes of NRCs tend to be gradual. If the NRCs were subjects of constant 
changes, the world would become highly instable and unpredictable. 
Although authors seem to arrive to the same conclusion as Dirk Nabers does, 
i.e. that the role changes are likely to appear in the time of crisis, at the same 
time, they do not think states abandon their instantly. Rather, they slowly 
downgrade their saliency (Nabers 2011, 86). 
Also Alexander Wendt (1992) touches the issue of the role change although 
rather indirectly. He argues that the conscious transformation of roles is 
rather exceptional and occurs under two conditions. First, there must be a 
reason for given actor to think of oneself in novel terms. This seems to stem 
from the presence of new social situations that simply cannot be dealt 
within pre-existing conditions. Second, expected cost of role change cannot 
exceed the rewards (Wendt 1992, 419). The second argument is connected 
with rational choice of given actor. Last but not least, Wendt claims state is 
more likely to undergo (role) transformation if there is a breakdown of 
consensus about its identity at home (ibid., 420). 
In his later work, Wendt elaborated the issue of role identity34 change in 
detail. Briefly speaking, he identifies two modes of role identity formation. 
                                                          
34 Wendt is not the role theoretic scholar and therefore, he uses terminology which differs 
from the one of the role theoretic scholars (such as “role identity”). However, his findings are useful 
for my role theoretic approach too. This is further confirmed by the fact that he arrives to similar 
conclusions about the possibilities for (role) change as the role theoretic scholars. 
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First, it is the natural selection which correlates with the rational actor 
model which has already been mentioned in previous paragraph: actor 
simply follows his or her strategic and rational choice whereas the identities 
and interests are exogenously given. This implicates actor is able to carefully 
consider the risks, opportunities and conditions in which he or she find 
himself or herself. However, this view on the identity formation (and 
transformation) does not seem to be crucial for Wendt (1999, 324) any 
longer. On the other hand, he pays much more attention on so called cultural 
selection mode of where the imitation (i.e. the situation when the actors 
adopt the positions of those whom they perceive as successful [ibid., 325]) 
and social learning constitute two core sources of identity formation. The 
concept of social learning is especially relevant for Wendt. He argues that in 
this process, “(…) the identities and interests are learned and then 
reinforced in response to how actors are treated by significant Others” 
(Wendt 1999, 327). This leads us back to the interactionist legacy and to the 
formative influence social interaction as far as the role formation and 
reformation is concerned.  
The question of social learning and role learning in particular in relationship 
with the role change has recently been elaborated by Sebastian Harnisch 
(2011b and 2012). He perceives the role learning as rather gradual and slow 
process in which the role beholder changes its roles on the basis of social 
experience.35 When contemplating about the role change, he introduces new 
term as-if role taking (or role making) which can be roughly understood as 
an actor’s attempt to adopt a new role (Harnisch 2012, 54). Similarly to his 
predecessors, Harnisch argues that this attempt is often connected with 
situation of risk and/or uncertainty (Harnisch 2011b, 43). Thus, he 
perceives the as-if role taking as a mechanism of self-reflection via which an 
actor deals with the insecurity and indeterminate situations. Nevertheless, 
                                                          
35 It is needed to point out that the learning is not restricted to socially accepted behaviour 
as it can entail learning role which are unacceptable to others (Harnisch 2011a, 12). This seems to 
be especially relevant in the North Korean case. 
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the success of the new role-taking process is dependent on the acceptance of 
a new role by significant others at the same time.36 If the role taking is 
successful, the new role starts to function as an institution that enables the 
role beholder as well as his or her significant others to act predictably.  
 
 Transformation of the NRs: Existing Framework for Analysis and Its 
Shortcomings 
After reading the previous paragraphs, we can say the debate about the role 
change basically revolves around four questions:  
1) Are role changes gradual and slow or rather sudden and quick? 
2) When the role changes occur? 
3) Why the role changes occur? 
4) If the role change occurs, what were the means via which it comes into 
the existence? 
As far as the first question is concerned, the answer is relatively 
uncomplicated. As I have already mentioned above, the scholars concur in 
the claim that the role changes are rather slow and gradual but they do not 
rule out the possibility of sudden shifts. This assertion confirms that if we 
want to focus on the dynamics inside the role sets, we should do so in a 
longer time period as it is more probable we will be successful in grasping 
them. Furthermore, if a sudden change appears, the scholars argue that it is 
a result of the moment of crisis or shock when actor’s existing role set is 
challenged and stops to reflect the newly developed situation. 
The researchers also addressed the second and third questions. If the role 
change is to occur, there must be a reason for the as-if role beholder to think 
of oneself in a novel terms (comp. Wendt 1992 discussed above), the 
rewards (either material or non-material) which the as-if role beholder 
                                                          
36  At this place, we can obviously notice the legacy of interactionism in the 
conceptualization of the role change Harnisch introduces. 
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would gain exceed the costs of abandoning of the existing role and given 
actor is no longer able to function in the framework of existing role set, i.e. 
the existing role set stops to reflect the current social reality and his 
relations with the significant others. Last but not least, the role change may 
occur if the actor faces a situation of insecurity or risk. The last mentioned is 
rather connected with a sudden change in the role set but yet, not limited to 
it.  
As far as the forth question is concerned, the answer seems to be the most 
complex. It has probably become obvious that the scholars have recently 
acknowledged that the social interaction is very important source for the 
role transformation. Again, it was S. Harnisch (2011a) who elaborated this 
issue, although not without any problems (see below). Chart 2 represents 
his conceptualization of the modes of role change.  
 
 
 
First, he speaks about normative persuasion defined as a process when the 
entrepreneurs of existing normative order try to negotiate a consensus or 
modes of role 
change
social (role) 
learning
socialization
resulting from 
material 
incentives
resulting from 
social incentives
altercasting
normative 
persuasion
Chart 2: Conceptualization of the Modes of Role Change by S. Harnisch 
Source: created by author according to Harnisch 2011a.  
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agreement with the non-members37 (Harnisch 2011a, 13). The second mode 
of change is altercasting which he defines as a technique when the 
significant other is consciously manipulating his or her own role 
performance with an aim to shape the role of given role beholder and vice 
versa (comp. Harnisch 2011a, 13 or also McCourt 2012, 380). To put it 
simply, altercasting is a tactic of the role ascription and it is closely related to 
the normative persuasion. The difference between the normative persuasion 
and altercasting seem to lie in more manipulative character of the latter. 
Third, as we already briefly mentioned above, Harnisch pays attention to the 
role learning (or social learning) defined as a process when the role 
beholder changes his or her roles on the basis of social experience. The last 
mode of transformation Harnisch proposes is socialization38  i.e. “the process 
by which an outsider internalizes the behavioral rules previously set by a 
community of insiders” (Harnisch 2011a, 13).  
Nevertheless, Harnisch’s classification of modes of role change suffers from 
certain difficulties that arise when we examine his definitions in depth. 
Those difficulties seem to be relatively grave as they prevent us from 
practical use Harnisch’s modes of changes categorization. If exploring the 
four modes of change he introduces in more detailed way, we soon find out 
there is strong overlap between them. The problem lies in the very way how 
Harnisch presents them as his explanation often seems to be incomplete or 
unclear. Let us now present some examples of these ambiguities. 
                                                          
37 However, this mechanism of the role change seems to be highly demanding. To be 
successful, the basic precondition for normative persuasion is an existence of shared worldview 
between the norm entrepreneur and the actor who is supposed to be persuaded (Harnisch 2011a, 
13).  
38 There is a plethora of approaches to socialization in the international environment Let 
me mention at least some of them. First one, i.e. the rationalist approach was elaborated mainly by 
Frank Schimmelfennig (2005) although in fact, Alexander Wendt (1992 and 1999) mentions it too 
(see above). According to Schimmelfennig (2005, 828), socialization refers to a process when actors 
react on the material incentives when considering changes of behaviour. The second mode of 
transformation was elaborated by A. Wendt who calls it the cultural transformation that can be 
perceived in two ways: either as the imitation or as the social learning (see above). Harnisch 
(2011a, 13–14) introduces two categories of socialization whereas the first one is compatible with 
Schimmelfennig’s rationalist approach and the second one is compatible with Wendt’s imitation. 
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First, it is problematic to properly distinguish between the socialization and 
role learning as the borderline between the two concepts in the way 
Harnisch defines it is blurred. Second, both altercasting and normative 
persuasion can be seen as the role ascription practices, i.e. practices used by 
significant others to assign particular role to as-if role taker. Thus, they 
should rather be perceived as two sides of one coin. Moreover, if we grasp 
the concept of social learning as a process when the as-if role beholder 
interact with his or her significant others in mutually constitutive way, we 
find out that the altercasting and normative persuasion may occur as 
possible ways of social learning. Last but not least, the conceptualization of 
socialization and its subcategories as proposed by Harnisch (2011a, 13–14) 
partially overlaps with the normative persuasion which he presents as 
different category at the same time. To sum up, as the Harnisch’s 
conceptualization of the modes of role change is problematic and 
unsatisfactory for us, a need emerges to deal with it and to try to grasp 
whole issue from different angle. 
 
 Social Interaction as a Source for the Role Change: Alternative 
Perspective Applicable to the Study of North Korean Foreign Policy 
My critique of Harnisch’s attempt to delimit modes of role change should 
result in proposal of alternative conceptualization of the role change modes. 
Although I refuse the way how he delimits the means of role change, I do not 
reject his interactionist background. Thus, I will try to grasp it in a way 
which better suits my purposes. Doing so, I will borrow some segments of 
Wendt’s work on the identity change as I think he provides more 
comprehensive and feasible framework for role theory FPA I intend to do. 
Moreover, it is needed to point out at this place I interpret roles and the 
changes that occur in the role sets as products of interaction between the 
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DPRK and its significant others, i.e. between the ego and alters. Chart 3 
below represents the modes of role change as I grasp them.  
 
 
Basically speaking, I distinguish between sudden and gradual role change 
whereas I claim that the majority of changes are gradual processes resulting 
from social interaction of the DPRK with the significant others. The 
particular modes arise both from sudden and gradual role change. I suppose 
the sudden change is result of crisis and shock situations functioning as the 
only mean of sudden change in the role set. To put one example of a moment 
of crisis or shock in the North Korean case we can observe this in the period 
immediately after the death of Kim Jong Il when Kim Jong Un came to the 
highest leadership position in the DPRK. Nevertheless, as we will find out 
after going through the results of the content analysis in Chapters 3 and 4, 
the reconfiguration of the role set was rather transitional. This further 
confirms the claim that the role changes tend to be gradual and slow and 
conditioned by interactions.  
Change of NRCs
sudden crisis and shock situations
may lead both to 
role change and 
deviation
gradual
strategic/rational 
choice
socialization
imitation of 
success
imitation of 
material success
imitation of status 
success
social learning 
(altercasting and 
normative persuasion 
may occur as techniques)
shallow learning 
(may lead to role 
deviation)
deep/complex 
learning (may lead 
to role change)
Source: created by author. 
Chart 3: Role Change: Alternative Conceptualization 
M o d e s  o f  t h e  N R C s ’  c h a n g e 
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As far as the gradual change is concerned, larger space for the role change 
opens. First, there is strategic/rational choice mode. Nevertheless, this mode 
is rather contradictory to my interactionist background as it allows 
possibility of a role change arising from the pre-social self-interest. Although 
I feel it is necessary to introduce this mode as many would probably suggest 
it can be important source for role transformation, I believe it is a dead end. 
The existence of any pre-socially existing purely rationally given reasons for 
the role change is unlikely. This is because every actor including the DPRK 
enters the interaction with the significant others who have substantial 
influence on the roles formation and on North Korean perceptions of 
strategic behaviour on the daily basis. This makes the pure strategic 
decisions and choices as the modes of role change much less credible. This is 
also the reason why this mode of change is drawn in grey in Chart 3.  
Second, I propose socialization as a crucial mode of gradual role change. In 
the beginning, it is needed to point out the socialization is very complex 
process. Consequently, there is a huge diversity of delimitations of this 
concept and as Flockhart (2006, 111) or Alderson (2001, 415) notice, the 
contradictory definitions often occur as the research regarding to this issue 
is still rather young. Let me briefly introduce several definitions of this 
process.  
To begin with, there is the above mentioned definition provided by Harnisch 
who is the only scholar explicitly working with socialization directly on the 
field of role theory. In his view, socialization refers to a process “(…) by 
which an outsider internalizes the behavioral rules previously set by a 
community of insiders” (Harnisch 2011a, 13). Wendt (1999, 324) equals the 
socialization with the cultural selection I have already mentioned above. He 
borrows a definition from Boyd and Richerson defining it as a gradual 
mechanism of “involving the transmission of the determinants of behavior 
from individual to individual and thus from generation to generation, by 
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social learning, imitation or some other similar process” (Boyd and 
Richerson quoted according to Wendt 1999, 324).  
Furthermore, Kai Alderson provides us with useful outline of existing 
approaches to socialization starting with realist conceptualization as 
proposed by Waltz39 and finishing with the constructivist grasping of the 
concept and defines state socialization as “process by which states 
internalize40 norms arising elsewhere in the international system” (Alderson 
2001, 417). Finnemore and Sikking (1998, 902) define socialization as a 
mechanism when “(…) norm leaders persuade others to adhere” and argue 
that this involves diplomatic praise or critique which may include material 
incentives.  
If I summarize the above mentioned conceptualization of socialization and 
link it to my role theoretic background, I define it as a complex procedure 
composed of several processes and sub-processes in which the actor can 
either adopt a new national roles on the basis of the patterns of mutual 
interaction with his or her significant others who can be defined as the 
actors of socialization or he or she can actually adjust the saliency of existing 
roles which may cause the reconfiguration of the role set as well. Thus, I 
basically identify two categories of change arising from the actor's 
interaction with the significant others. First, it is the emergence of a brand 
new role. Second, it is a bit more conservative change inside the role, i.e. the 
change of existing role's saliency. The concept of role saliency was 
elaborated by Sebastian Harnisch (2012, 55) who argues that the roles are 
organized hierarchically in the role sets whereas the roles appearing on the 
top of hierarchy have the strongest impact on the role behaviour. I argue we 
                                                          
39 Waltz (1979, 74–76) grasps the socialization in structural-functionalist logic when states 
are socialized into the international (anarchic) structure that moulds their behaviour to be 
egoistically-oriented.  
40 Alderson proposes three processes that are part of norm internalization, i.e. the 
individual belief change, political persuasion, when the domestic actors pressure governments to 
abide by the norm and finally, the cementation of the validity of norm at home (Alderson 2001, 
418). 
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can grasp the saliency of individual roles by measuring the occurrence 
frequency of particular role in the framework of North Korean role sets for 
every year examined. 
By inserting the verb can into the definition of socialization as a mode of role 
change above, I want to emphasize that the whole procedure does not 
necessary have to lead to adoption of a new role. Very often, the socialized 
actor accepts just certain aspects of behaviour and at the same time, it is 
likely he or she will also influence the significant others (or the actors of 
socialization). When I speak about the patterns of mutual interaction, I want 
to emphasize the gradual character of the process as it is dependent on a 
previous course of interactions with the significant others.41 
Right now, let me proceed to the categories of socialization. In this regard, I 
decided to borrow from the work of Alexander Wendt (1999) as he 
successfully grasps the complexity of socialization procedure in a way which 
can be adjusted to the DPRK case too. He identifies two categories of 
socialization, i.e. the imitation and social learning (see Chart 3 again). I have 
already discussed this briefly earlier in this chapter but now, the whole issue 
needs to be elaborated in more detailed way. In the process of imitation, 
identities and interests are acquired when actors adopt “the self-
understanding of those whom they perceive as successful” (Wendt 1999, 
325). Furthermore, actors can imitate two different kinds of success: 
material success (i.e. the success in acquiring wealth and power in its 
material dimension) and status success, which is a function of prestige and 
power in its nonmaterial dimension (ibid.). If I apply this to my role 
theoretic FPA, I can define imitation as a process when the new roles are 
acquired by following the perceived successes of the significant others. It 
                                                          
41 In the North Korean case, the socialization is obviously underway on two stages. First, 
the DPRK seem to be socialized in what we called a group of friends or peers above. Second, the 
DPRK enters to the socialization with the group of foes. Consequently, in the North Korean context, 
socialization can be perceived as a two stage process which is going on simultaneously, although 
separately. We will elaborate those processes in the other section of this dissertation in detail. 
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has probably became obvious after reading this definition that it is more 
likely for the DPRK to imitate the behaviour of members of the friends or 
peers group of significant others rather than to imitate its foes. 
As a second category of socialization, Wendt proposes the social learning. 
Again, I have already mentioned this process several times including its 
grasping by Sebastian Harnisch which I nevertheless do not perceive as 
satisfactory for the purposes of our analysis. Based on Wendt (1999, 327), 
we can define social learning as a process in which the new roles are learned, 
reinforced or weakened in response to how is the as-if role beholder treated 
by his or her significant others. As this definition is still relatively vague, 
Wendt elaborates his conceptualization of social learning relying on the 
principle of the reflected appraisal or mirroring (ibid, 327). In Chart 4 below, 
I tried to draw the whole process to be more comprehensive. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
In the framework of the reflected appraisal process, the as-if role beholder 
(in my case, the DPRK) comes to see itself as a reflection of how it thinks the 
significant others appraise or perceive it (ibid.). Following up the principle 
of reflected appraisal, if the significant others treat the role beholder as if it 
 
 
 
         
as-if role 
beholder (ego) 
significant 
others (alter) 
takes a role and ascribes 
it at the same time 
takes a role and ascribes 
it at the same time 
Source: created by author using Wendt 1999. 
settings for the interaction 
Chart 4: Mechanism of the Reflected Appraisal 
resulting 
role 
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was enemy/friend, then the role beholder is very likely to accept this belief 
in his or her role set. 
Let me now briefly describe the process of the interaction between the as-if 
role beholder and significant others which is also depicted in Chart 4. As 
Wendt puts in, both parts of the interaction have some “body” which consist 
of needs and ideas of who they are and of certain beliefs about the roles of 
others that are based on previous interactions and experience. Thus, it is 
highly important for us to realize that by taking particular role, the as-if role 
beholder is “at the same time casting alter in a corresponding counter role” 
and vice versa (Wendt 1999, 329). To put it differently, when ego (or role 
beholder) acts, he or she gives a signal for alter (or significant other) about 
role the role beholder wants to play in this particular interaction. As a result, 
alter enacts a corresponding role. As Wendt aptly puts in: “the underlying 
logic here is the self-fulfilling prophecy: by treating the Other as if he is 
supposed to respond a certain way Alter and Ego will eventually learn 
shared ideas (…) and [take them]42 as their starting point they will tend to 
reproduce (…) in subsequent interaction” (Wendt 1999, 331). To sum up, 
the social interaction between the as-if role beholder and his or her 
significant others creates certain culture of interaction which shapes the 
subsequent interactions too (ibid.).  
To put a practical example of above described mechanism, the DPRK is 
confronted with being casted in the role of isolated state or proliferator of 
WMDs which actually creates basis for subsequent enactment of roles that I 
later named as isolate and internal developer. This is further cemented by the 
“body” the DPRK enters the social interaction in the international scene I 
mentioned above. If I return to the debates about the stability and change-
proneness of the roles now, the mechanism of self-fulfilling prophecy 
captured by Wendt actually confirms both the tendency of the role sets to be 
                                                          
42 Added by author. 
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stable and the slow and gradual character of their changes. Unfortunately, 
the described mechanism and its linking to the DPRK case leave a little space 
for learning new roles. 
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2. Semantical Content Analysis43 and the Identification of the 
National Roles 
As I already mentioned above, the content analysis stands for crucial 
methodological instrument which helps me to identify the role North Korea 
declares. Basically speaking, there are two approaches to how to identify the 
roles: inductive approach and deductive approach. The inductive approach is 
present in Holsti’s (1970) work: on the basis of the content analysis of the 
foreign political discourses, he defines 17 NRCs in total. At the same time, he 
points out this number does not necessarily has to be final. The deductive 
approach is present in the writings of Martha Cottam (1986): she suggests 7 
categories of role conceptions in total. However, her work is criticized by 
Shih (1988, 600) who perceives her typology as arbitrary as it is not 
supported by cross-cultural research. In general, Cottam’s approach is 
rather marginal on the field of role theoretic FPA as the majority of authors 
use inductive approach which is closely connected with the method of 
content analysis. This dissertation thesis will not be any exception. Let me 
now describe how I implement the sorting of the relevant texts. 
2.1 The Texts 
Generally speaking, the scholars working with the role theory in FPA often 
analyse the discourses of the top-level foreign political elites. However, 
when approaching the North Korean foreign policy, I am confronted with a 
situation where I cannot unequivocally say who are the top level foreign 
policy representatives with the impact on the roles' articulation. As Lim 
(2002) or Koga (2009) point out, we are not able to determine the precise 
mechanisms of duties and responsibilities in the DPRK political system. The 
important foreign political statements are delivered by various authorities 
on various levels. Moreover, some crucial discourses such as the New Year 
                                                          
43 Semantical content analysis refers to the processes enabling the classification of symbols 
(or in my case, references to NRs) according to their meaning (Janis 1965 according to Krippendorff 
2013, 50). 
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editorials,44 which are generally perceived as one of the most important 
objects of reference for the DPRK's policy analysis of the Kim Jong-il's era 
(and in the first year of Kim Jong-un's era), were published with no 
reference to particular author and had institutional authorship. Last but not 
least, after Kim Jong Un came to power in the very end of 2011, he probably 
initiated various changes in North Korean decision-making structure which 
became more obvious recently.45 This situation leads me directly to the first 
challenge regarding the content analysis I intend to do: the North Korean 
settings make an a priori selection of the principal elites consistently in 
charge of foreign policy (comp. Le Pestre 1997, 13) questionable. Facing this 
problem, certain modifications of the existing approach are necessary. On 
which texts should I focus when doing the content analysis?  
It was my focus on the North Korean national roles' presentation abroad 
which helped me to reduce the spectrum of sources suitable for the content 
analysis. First, there are not many easily accessible platforms where the 
DPRK consistently and regularly presents its national roles. I argue that the 
North Korean English-written newspapers and magazines are the only place 
one can use for consistent and long term period-oriented content analysis. 46 
                                                          
44 The New Year editorials are jointly published by Rodong Sinmun (the official organ of the 
Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea), Josoninmingun (the newspaper of the Korean 
People's Army), and Chongnyonjonwi (the organ of the Central Committee of the Kim II Sung 
Socialist Youth League) and subsequently translated and published in every North Korean printed 
and online medias. They are perceived as crucial materials where the DPRK formulates intended 
political course for the following year. 
45 It became obvious that in the framework of the process of consolidation of his power, 
Kim Jong Un initiated the changes in the decision-making structure as well. Most recently (in the 
end of June 2016), this resulted in the establishing of a new lead government body named the 
Commission on State Affairs chaired by Kim Jong Un which actually replaced National Defence 
Commission which stood for the crucial decision-making organ of Kim Jong Il´s era. (comp. Grisafi 
2016, or Kim 2016). 
46 The international bodies never publish the full texts of the speeches of the DPRK 
representatives. This was a reason for me to contact the relevant North Korean authorities in 
charge and to ask them to provide me with any kind of recordings of speeches. Nevertheless, I have 
never received any answer. The only exception are the speeches of North Korean representatives at 
the UN General Assembly as some of them (alas not all of them, the speeches were only available in 
1999, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2013, 2014 and 2015) are available online at the Cable-
Satellite Public Affairs Network (C-Span) (comp. for example Pak 2013). Nevertheless, in order to 
maintain the consistency of the dataset, I decided to not work with these transcriptions and I rather 
used the UN General Assembly speeches as published in The Pyongyang Times and Korea Today. 
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Additionally, my focus on the DPRK's roles abroad actually eliminated 
various Korean-written newspapers such as Rodong Sinmun (Workers' 
Newspapers in English) that are often used by the DPRK-oriented scholars 
from the scale of potentially useful resources as these are primarily 
dedicated to the domestic audiences. I agree with Young Chul Cho's (2011, 
315), claim that “North Korean texts are statements of record by which 
information that regime judges to be important is made public”.  
In particular, I scanned relevant parts (see above) of one North Korean 
English-written newspaper (The Pyongyang Times) and one North Korean 
English-written magazine (Korea Today). 47 After I did so, I thoroughly went 
through these texts for the first time and eliminated those that were too tied 
with particular foreign political measures. This step I made is also supported 
by the method used by authors in the book edited by Le Pestre (Le Pestre 
/ed./ 1997). In his chapter, Le Pestre points out all the authors in the book 
made an effort to select “(…) only general foreign policy pronouncements, 
that is, the speeches that embraced a variety of issues” (Le Pestre 1997, 13). 
By identification of such general statements, I was also able to reduce the 
spectrum of elites who delivered the relevant texts. In particular, Kim Il Sung, 
Kim Jong Il, Kim Jong-un, North Korean Foreign Ministers, their deputies,48  
members of the Workers' Party Korea Central Committee, National Defence 
Commission, Presidium of the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly, Korean 
Peoples' Army General Political Bureau/Supreme Headquarters, Cabinet and 
the North Korean representatives/delegations at various international 
                                                          
47 As there are many more English-written materials published by the DPRK that are 
dedicated to foreign audiences, there is a need thoroughly explain why I decided to work with the 
two mentioned resources only. I do so in Chapter 2.2 of this thesis. 
48 North Korean Foreign Ministers and their deputies regularly deliver speeches at the UN 
General Assembly and other international bodies (such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, the Non-
Aligned Movement Summits and occasionally also the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization 
or the Executive Council of the Asian Parliamentary Association for Peace) that can surely be 
classified as the important, by the international community observed and on foreign policy oriented 
speeches that we should analyse in compliance with the role theory. In the time period I analyse, 
there were four foreign ministers of the DPRK: Kim Yong Nam (1983–1998), Paek Nam Sun (1998–
2007), Pak Ui Chun (2007–2014) and finally, Ri Su Yong (2014–2016). The present foreign minister 
Ri Yong Ho was appointed in May 2016 (BBC News 2016). 
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bodies were the elites who usually gave the general speeches focussed on 
the foreign policy. These texts subsequently functioned as a stepping stone 
for the searching for the North Korean national roles. 
As I have briefly mentioned above, I also worked with the articles focused on 
the foreign politics written by the given magazine/newspaper's redaction 
members. With respect to the fact news redactions members' statements 
articulated in articles (again, these articles cannot be too tied with 
description of any particular foreign political measures) are regime-
controlled, it is possible to accept them as relevant resources where one 
should also look for the NRs. To give just one example, in the beginning of 
the year (mainly in January or February), The Pyongyang Times usually 
publishes an article emphasising the crucial principles of the foreign policy 
for the given year where the NRs are articulated very clearly. If I omitted this 
kind of materials from my analysis, I would lose important resource where 
the NRs are articulated.  
In The Pyongyang Time datasets, 14 texts (i.e. foreign political statements 
plus articles) per one year on the average were located as a source of NRs 
whereas I was able to identify 12 individual roles per year on the average. In 
Korea Today dataset, it was 6 texts per year on the average whereas I was 
able to identify 7 individual roles per year on the average (see Chart 5 
below).49 Let me now proceed with an overview and evaluation of North 
Korean English-written media landscape in order to thoroughly explain why 
I selected The Pyongyang Times and Korea Today for my analysis. 
 
 
 
                                                          
49 The authors in Le Pestre's collective monograph (comp. Le Pestre ed. 1997) work with 
about ten discourses per year which is roughly the same number as I ended with. 
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Chart 5: Overview of Number of Analysed Texts and Roles 
Identified 
Year 
The Pyongyang Times Korea Today 
No. of text 
analysed 
No. of 
individual 
roles 
identified 
No. of texts 
analysed 
No. of 
individual 
roles 
identified 
1994 18 11 6 8 
1995 17 15 4 6 
1996 10 12 7 10 
1997 12 12 4 11 
1998 17 11 3 3 
1999 17 10 6 4 
2000 20 15 5 3 
2001 11 10 6 6 
2002 12 11 7 9 
2003 8 8 6 5 
2004 10 9 9 9 
2005 12 10 12 13 
2006 15 11 9 7 
2007 15 10 7 7 
2008 11 12 11 7 
2009 16 14 5 4 
2010 12 11 5 10 
2011 15 11 5 11 
2012 22 11 5 3 
2013 17 12 9 10 
2014 15 10 5 7 
2015 10 12 4 4 
average 14 12 6 7 
Source: created by author. 
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2.2 North Korean Primary Resources: Suitable and Unsuitable 
Materials 
First of all, there is the Korean Central News Agency (hereinafter referred to 
as KCNA) website. Generally speaking, KCNA is North Korean state press 
agency which provides news adopted by North Korean medial scene and it 
reports in Korean, English, Spanish and Japanese. On the first sight, it might 
seem the KCNA could function as ideal source where one should search for 
the NRs. Nevertheless, this resource has many issues. First, the reports are 
not available for the whole time period I analyse as the online archive goes 
back to 1997 only. Second, the reports published by the KCNA are generally 
too short and very often, they do not provide sufficient space for NRs to 
appear. Third, the reports relevant for the purposes of my investigation (i.e. 
the foreign political texts that are rather general) seldom appear. More often 
than not, the KCNA publishes either insignificant news (for example about 
the floral baskets or congratulations received by regime) or propaganda 
articles focused mainly against the United States, South Korean conservative 
political scene or Japan. If the foreign policy-related reports appear, they 
usually announce the past foreign delegations’ visits to the DPRK or similar 
events austerely. 
Last but not least, there is serious problem with availability of the online 
archive. Up to June 2015, the online archive of reports going back to year 
1997 was available on the official KCNA website. Nevertheless, the website 
had been transformed thoroughly in the end of June 2015 which resulted in 
deletion of the archive.50 Additionally, even when the archive had been 
available, the DPRK authorities were known to alter or delete content which 
made systematic long-term investigation based on the KCNA online archive 
even more unfeasible. Recently, the website called KCNA Watch has been 
                                                          
50 Approximately between September 2015 and the very end of February 2016, the archive 
going back to 1997 was accessible on http://deathnotesapp.com/. Nevertheless, it is not known 
who created it and if the archive was complete. Moreover, when I tried to access it again in the end 
of March 2016, this website was no longer in operation and no other substitution appeared as of 
August 2016. 
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launched by the web NK News51 (comp. KCNA Watch n.d.) Nevertheless, the 
KCNA Watch cannot be used for the purposes of our analysis either as the 
systematic searching in the archives has been practically impossible so far.52 
To conclude, due to above mentioned difficulties, I decided to omit the KCNA 
as a source for searching for the NRs. 
Besides the state news agency KCNA, there are some other periodicals 
published by North Korean regime that could be perceived as a relevant 
platform where the roles are declared too. First, there is the English written 
series of the Rodong Sinmun (newspaper). Whereas The Korean language 
version of the Rodong Sinmun is understood as a leading newspaper inside 
the DPRK (which is however meant to be delivered to the domestic 
audience), the English series is very young with the archive going back to 
January 2015 only. Second, there are English-written magazines called 
Foreign Trade, The People’s Korea, or DPR Korea. The Foreign Trade 
magazine does not report about the foreign policy and thus, it is irrelevant 
for me. The People’s Korea (or originally Choson Sinbo in Korean, see The 
People's Korea n.d.) is published by the General Association of (North) 
Korean Residents based in Japan (Chongryon in Korean). Therefore, it cannot 
be perceived as a platform where North Korean regime itself presents its 
image which makes it useless for my analysis. Finally, we mentioned the 
magazine DPR Korea which provides mainly pictorial materials and focuses 
on apolitical topics. 
Furthermore, there are basically two websites that also need to be 
mentioned: Uriminzokkiri (in English: Our Own Way) and Naenara (in 
English: Our Country) News. The Uriminjokkiri (comp. Uriminjokkiri n.d.) is 
                                                          
51 The NK News is the biggest privately owned site providing the relevant information and 
analyses about the North Korea with a significant contribution of some North Korean studies 
scholars and even North Korean defectors. For more information, see NK News n.d. 
52 The KCNA Watch archive can be perceived as a good and ambitious attempt to 
systematize the primary materials going from the DPRK. Nevertheless, the platform is still quite 
young and suffers from some imperfections. 
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North Korean website based in China and its content is inconsistent and 
incomplete. It also runs its Facebook and Twitter profiles but the 
contributions here are again irregular and often irrelevant as far as the 
foreign policy is concerned. Reportedly, there were several hackers attacks 
to this website too which contributes to dubiousness of the information 
presented on this platform. On the other hand, the Naenara News (My 
Country in English, comp. Naenara n.d.) website was partially used for our 
analysis, as it provides comprehensive archive of PDF versions of The 
Pyongyang Times and Korea Today going back to 2012. I used the online 
accessible issues of both periodicals published between October 2015 and 
the end of December 2015 as I was not able to approach them physically 
during my stay in Republic of Korea which ended in the end of September 
2015. Lastly, there is the Voice of Korea, the radio broadcast from the DPRK 
which runs on the same server as the Naenara website. Again, this radio 
broadcasting does not offer archive which would cover all the period we aim 
to analyse. 
With respect to the abovementioned issues, The Pyongyang Times 
newspaper and Korea Today magazine both stand for the most suitable 
materials for my analysis. The Pyongyang Times, an English-written 
newspaper published weekly in the DPRK is dedicated mainly to foreign 
audiences and as a matter of fact, it is a crucial constantly available material 
representing the image of the DPRK abroad. In my research, it serves as a 
main source where I search for the national roles the DPRK declares. As it 
has already been mentioned above, The Pyongyang Times publishes 
substantial statements or their extracts delivered by the North Korean elites 
at the international bodies that are virtually inaccessible in any other 
platform. It also adopts and further elaborates the relevant articles from the 
KCNA which prevents us from omitting texts perceived by regime as 
important. 
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The monthly published Korea Today magazine serves as complementary 
source for searching for the NRs, in particular, as a control dataset which I 
use for the testing of the consistency of the data acquired in The Pyongyang 
Times (see below). In comparison with The Pyongyang Times, the articles 
focused on politics (and foreign policy in particular) constitute relatively 
smaller share in this magazine. This is represented in the Chart 6 below: the 
total amount of roles I identified in the Korea Today constitute 
approximately one third of those identified in The Pyongyang Times only. 
Nevertheless, Korea Today still provides a solid basis for NRs’ articulation. 
The significant strength of both The Pyongyang Times and Korea Today also 
lies in the fact they are both continuously available53 in the printed editions 
for the whole time period we analyze. The actual availability54 of both 
periodicals in printed version enables me to turn away from the inconsistent 
and often unreliable online materials whose shortcomings have already 
been described above.  
I have mentioned above that I use Korea Today dataset a control one. I do so 
as the process of national role identification (or coding) is complex, possibly 
even error-prone and the consistency check is therefore needed. This was 
the reason why I decided to extract the national roles for the period of 20 
years between 1994 and 2015 from both The Pyongyang Times and Korea 
Today which resulted in two datasets that I subsequently could compare as 
far as the consistency is concerned. In particular, I checked both if the roles I 
                                                          
53 Although the availability and relevance of both periodicals is the best among the existing 
materials, some issues were missing in the library where I scanned them. In two appendixes at the 
end of this dissertation, I provide the list of issues that were not available. The number of missing 
issues was rather small (with exception of Korea Today issues of 1995 which functions as control 
dataset anyway) and thus, it should not distort the results of my investigation. Moreover, as we 
already know from the previous part of this thesis dealing with my theoretical background, the 
roles are relatively stable categories whose change is a matter of longer time horizon which is also 
the reason for me to think the marginal drop-outs will not affect the analysis. 
54 I approached both periodicals in the library of the University of North Korean Studies 
based in Seoul, Republic of Korea. I had been gathering the relevant materials in the library during 
my research stays in the Republic in Korea in summer and autumn of 2014 and 2015. 
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identified in The Pyongyang Times and Korea Today datasets and the role 
saliency were approximately the same.  
The results of this “consistency check” are available in Chart 6 below. As we 
can see in the chart, the national roles identified and the role saliency were 
approximately the same in both datasets which reinforces the validity of the 
data I acquired and the validity of codes/roles I identified, respectively. Of 
course, there were some variations in saliency, for example, the role bastion 
of revolution – liberator holds the fourth position in The Pyongyang Times 
dataset but the seventh position in Korea Today dataset. Nevertheless, the 
variations are rather small or they appear in case of roles that occurred 
rather scarcely and thus, they do not undermine my research findings. 
Furthermore, some less significant roles that I identified in The Pyongyang 
Times did not turn up in the Korea Today. This can be explained by the fact 
that the texts where the roles could be identified constitute much smaller 
share in the Korea Today.  
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Chart 6: The Role Occurrences and Saliency in Both Datasets 
Sequence 
The Pyongyang 
Times Sequence Korea Today 
1. 
internal developer 
(184) 1. internal developer (105) 
2. independent (139) 2. independent (38) 
3. 
active independent 
(106) 3. isolate (35) 
4. isolate (95) 4. active independent (32) 
5. 
bastion of revolution - 
liberator(94) 5. 
anti-imperialist agent 
(29) 
6. 
anti-imperialist agent 
(76) 6. 
bastion of revolution - 
liberator(27) 
7. 
global peace protector 
(64) 7. 
global peace protector 
(22) 
8. 
regional peace 
protector (48) 8. faithful ally (13) 
9. powerful country (28) 9. 
regional peace 
protector, defender of 
faith (9) 
10. 
liberation supporter 
(19) 10. liberation supporter (8) 
11. 
nuclear disarmament 
supporter (17) 11. peaceful country (7) 
12. defender of faith (16) 12. 
nuclear disarmament 
supporter, powerful 
country (4) 
13. peaceful country (15) 13. example (3) 
14. 
South-South 
cooperation supporter 
(8) 
14. South-South 
cooperation supporter, 
fighter against enemy, 
anti-terrorism agent (1) 
15. faithful ally (7) 
16. 
Example, fighter 
against enemy (5) 
17. 
anti-terrorism agent, 
developer (3) 
18. civilized country (1) 
Total no. of roles 
identified in the 
dataset 933 
Total no. of roles 
identified in the dataset 348 
Source: created by author. In brackets, I stated the total occurrences of particular role.  
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2.3 The Pyongyang Times and Korea Today Datasets: What Does Their 
Specifics Imply 
I have already discussed above why I selected these two sources for my 
analysis. Nevertheless, there are a few things that one needs to be conscious 
about when processing the data which arose from the content analysis. 
There is a need to be aware of different character of both periodicals (The 
Pyongyang Times is a newspaper and Korea today is magazine) and by a 
weaker overlap of Korea Today to the field of international politics. 
Consequently, the speeches of foreign political representatives that The 
Pyongyang Times does publish do not often appear in Korea Today. Again, 
this is closely connected with different character of both resources 
mentioned above.  
Thus, there are some discrepancies between The Pyongyang Times and 
Korea Today graph lines which is demonstrated in Chapter 3. They result 
mainly from the lower total amount of roles identified in Korea Today 
magazine. In general terms, the Korea Today gave me considerably smaller 
data sample (about one third of The Pyongyang Times) as the Chart 6 
illustrates as well. This factor may cause a false impression about high 
relevance of a role which is in fact rather low. As an example of this 
situation, let me use year 1997 in Korea Today dataset as depicted in the 
Chart 7.1.  
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Chart 7.1: 1997 Role Set in the Korea Today  
code name (role) occurrences in 
total 
occurrences 
as in % 
global peace protector 3 21 
active independent 2 14 
anti-imperialist agent 1 7 
bastion of revolution - liberator 1 7 
defender of faith 1 7 
faithful ally 1 7 
independent 1 7 
liberation supporter 1 7 
nuclear disarmament supporter 1 7 
peaceful country 1 7 
regional peace protector 1 7 
Total 14 100 
Source: created by author. 
  
As we can see, I was able to identify 14 role statements and 11 roles in 1997 
Korea Today editions. According to my analysis, the global peace protector 
was the most prominent role in the role set that year. However, there is not 
sufficient difference between the role occupying the first place and these 
nine roles sharing the last place. Very similar situation emerged in year 
1998 as depicted in Chart 7.2. 
Chart 7.2: 1998 Role Set in the Korea Today 
code name (role) 
occurrences in 
total 
occurrences as 
in % 
independent 3 60 
faithful ally 1 20 
liberation supporter 1 20 
Total 5 100 
Source: created by author.     
 
Simply speaking, the Korea Today gave me very small data sample in some 
cases which leads me to following conclusion. Although the data (or roles) 
identified in Korea Today are very useful as a control sample, the dataset 
that actually validate the data acquired from The Pyongyang Times (such as 
the trends mapping development of given role, i.e. the macro indicators), it 
is not suitable for observation of micro data (such as particular fluctuations 
in roles' saliency) as it could lead to misinterpretations. Therefore, the Korea 
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Today dataset will be used for validation of both trends and relevance of 
individual roles only.  
Last but not least, when I approach to the roles that occupy rather marginal 
positions in the role sets, it naturally becomes much more difficult to 
observe their trends and developments in the Korea Today dataset. Again, 
this may be linked with the weaker international overlap of Korea Today 
and above all, with the lower amount of roles identified here. 
 
2.4 Data Assortment Mechanism and Coding 
As it already became obvious after reading of previous pages of this 
dissertation, I assume that in its foreign policy-focused texts, the DPRK 
declares the roles which it believes it should be playing. Furthermore, I 
claim these NRs are co-constituted in the process of North Korean 
interaction with its significant others. Last but not least, I claim I am able to 
analyze the North Korean foreign policy in the light of the roles it declares. 
So far, I have already explained how I selected the particular primary 
materials for our analysis. However, I have not clarified how I will carry out 
the content analysis itself nor I explained which type of the content analysis 
I selected. Let me now proceed with this task. 
Generally speaking, the main aim of the content analysis I conduct is to find 
the statements consistent with the national roles. My research is mainly 
interpretative and qualitative. After sorting out the relevant extracts of the 
texts, I ascribe certain “qualities” or to them which I call the national roles. 
On the basis of this ascription of “qualities”, I subsequently interpret the 
North Korean foreign policy. In order to delimit sufficiently representative 
sample of statements and articles for the content analysis, I sort out the texts 
according to location, language and thematic relevance. I have already 
described this process above. Therefore, it is sufficient to state here I search 
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for rather general statements of the DPRK's regime elites and articles 
focused on the foreign politics in the North Korean periodicals The 
Pyongyang Times and Korea Today. 
Let me now proceed to the description of the process of identification of the 
roles in the assorted texts. Again, there is a scale of possible ways we can 
implement. There is a possibility to a priori adopt Holsti’s typology of 17 
roles (comp. Holsti 1970) together with their delimitation. Nevertheless, if I 
did so, I would have become both overly tied with his categories and unable 
to consider the specifics of the North Korean case. Therefore, I am favorable 
both to taking account of the North Korean specifics when I work with 
Holsti’s categories and to the identification of the new roles' categories if 
they fit North Korean case.  
In particular, I start actual analysis with the identifying the relevant key 
words in the baseline texts (i.e. the texts from year 199455). These texts 
function as so called referential texts, i.e. the texts that set the standard used 
for subsequent comparison with the texts of the following years (comp. 
Hájek 2014, 41). I carefully analyse the baseline texts and locate the extracts 
where the role-expressing statements are present. Afterwards, I look at 
these extracts identifying rather general key words that regularly occur in 
correlation with the occurrence of a role. Like Le Pestre (1997) I believe that 
the observation of the key words surroundings enables me to localize the 
relevant extracts of texts where I can expect the occurrence of NRs. This 
claim is further supported by Martin Hájek who argues that “(…) the 
application of such a categorized vocabulary helps us to distinguish the 
passages of text which deal with specific topic” (Hájek 2014, 39). 
The key words identified in this process are: “duty”, “responsibility”, 
“world”, “motherland”, “people”, “country”, “nation”, “international”, 
                                                          
55 Year 1994 was selected as the starting point for our analysis as it is the year of death of 
Kim Il Sung. Owing to this we can expect that significant speeches and statements will occur. 
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“foreign”, “we” and “DPRK”, whereas the most relevant key words, i.e. key 
words whose surroundings most frequently implied the role statement, 
seemed to be “people”, “nation”, “country”, “we” and “international”.56 
Having identified the roles expressed in key words' surroundings, I label the 
relevant text extracts by codes, i.e. by the name of particular role. 
Subsequently, I continue with the content analysis using the key words in 
the following years of our dataset (i.e. the relevant texts published between 
1995 and 2015). Firstly, I observe the presence of roles articulated and 
identified earlier. Secondly, I examine whether some new roles occurred. As 
the role theoretic scholars generally perceive the roles as relatively stable 
categories, I can expect that the roles that the majority of roles that were 
present in previous years will probably occur in the following years as well. 
Using this method, I gain a picture of the North Korean role sets which 
provide me with a good stepping stone for a subsequent analysis. 
Let me now explain how I understand the function of the codes in my 
analysis. As Hájek (2014) claims, codes can have two possible functions: 
factual and referential whereas the latter is more relevant for my analysis. 
The factual coding requires exact definition of the actual content of the codes 
in advance. On the other hand, the referential coding refers to those codes 
that are created “on the fly” which implies we cannot guarantee the exact 
contents of the referential codes in advance. Therefore, if I accept the 
referential function, the code labels particular text extract as relevant with 
regard to the analysed topic and it actually represents rather heuristic tool 
which one can use for the construction of categories (ibid, 63–64). What are, 
however, the implications of accepting the referential function of the codes?  
If I accepted the code in its factual function, I would have to exactly delimit 
and define the content of the individual NRs (used as codes) in advance. 
Nevertheless, with adopting of this approach, I would loose the elasticity of 
                                                          
56 I aimed at selecting relevant key words that are as general as possible in order to prevent 
me from extensive focus just on the foreign-political particularities.  
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roles' categories, i.e. I would a priori decline the possibility of the meaning 
transformation in the framework of particular role. Therefore, I decided to 
work with the codes in the referential way. This means I will not guarantee 
the a priori exact meaning of the roles. Rather, I let the codes “develop on the 
fly”. I believe this approach is more fruitful if my aim is to observe the 
patterns of transformation and change of North Korean roles and role sets. I 
provide the definitions of individual roles in following chapter. 
As my analysis is qualitative, I have to go through the texts manually in 
order to grasp the changing qualities of roles in a satisfactory way. 
Nevertheless, I used the Scantailor and Adobe Acrobat Pro 9 for the 
preparation of the scanned materials. Scantailor was mainly used for 
refining of the scanned materials. It helped to erase the imperfections which 
occurred during scanning process as these imperfections could hinder the 
transfer of the scanned materials to the plain text later. After refining, I 
transferred the materials to the plain text using Adobe Acrobat Pro 9. This 
step is especially helpful as it enabled me to explore the key words’ 
surrounding using the search engine built in the Adobe Acrobat Pro 9 which 
made the content analysis a bit easier. 
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3. The Roles North Korea Declares 
3.1 North Korean Role Statements: General Overview 
The content analysis I implemented according to the methods and 
procedures described in the Chapter 2 helped me to identify the roles North 
Korea declared between 1994 and 2015. In total, I was able to detect 20 
national roles in the whole research period. Some of them constitute crucial 
and stable part of North Korean role sets, some seem to be less significant 
and the others are rather marginal or role deviations. In the dataset for The 
Pyongyang Times newspapers, I was able to identify 606 extracts of texts 
where the roles were declared. In the Korea Today magazine which mainly 
serves as a control dataset (see above), I identified 222 texts containing the 
role statements. On the average, I detected twelve roles per year in the 
Pyongyang Times and eight roles per year in the Korea Today magazine 
(again, see the Chart 5 above).  
Broadly speaking, the North Korean case supports the assumption of role 
theoretic scholars (comp., for example Holsti 1970, 284, or Harnisch 2012, 
55) that states usually adopt more then one role at the same time. In a few 
role statements, it was relatively difficult to delimit the borders between 
individual roles. For example, there was a statement expressing the need to 
“(…) contribute to the establishment of a new international economic order 
by taking active part in South-South cooperation (Hwang 2001, 7) which 
combines role bastion of revolution – liberator with South-South cooperation 
supporter role. Nevertheless, I was still able to delimit the borders between 
individual roles in the end. 
The Charts 8.1 and 8.2 below illustrate role occurrence and saliency for the 
whole time period I analyse for The Pyongyang Times and Korea Today 
datasets. I created these charts in order to better illustrate that roles I 
identified have approximately the same saliency in both datasets. In general, 
it is possible to say the roles implying passivity (such as internal developer, 
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independent, or isolate etc.) prevailed over the roles indicating active foreign 
political involvement (such as active independent, bastion of revolution – 
liberator, or global peace protector etc.).57 Nevertheless, the DPRK tended to 
declare rather activity-implying roles in the beginning of the researched 
period (especially between 1994 and 1996, see chapter 3.3).   
Let me now proceed with an overview and detailed description of the roles I 
identified. I will start with the role that has the highest number of 
occurrences in the researched period, i.e. internal developer and I will 
continue in descending order until I reach the least frequently declared 
roles. When describing the North Korean roles below, the attention is also 
paid to the shifts in the role saliency across the temporal period analysed. 
After the identification of the moments indicating changes in the North 
Korean role sets, I will continue with their contextualization with the DPRK's 
relations with the significant others in Chapter 4.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
57 The delimitation of individual roles on the scale active – passive foreign policy is 
available in Chart 20. 
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Chart 8.1: Role Occurrences between 1994 and 2015 for The 
Pyongyang Times Dataset
Source: created by author. The category “others” includes following roles: faithful ally, South-South 
cooperation supporter, example, fighter against enemy anti-terrorism agent, developer, and civilized 
country. The number of occurrences of these roles is available in Chart 6. 
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Chart 8.2: Role Occurrences between 1994 and 2015 for the 
Korea Today Dataset
Source: created by author. The category “others” includes following roles: peaceful country, nuclear 
disarmament supporter, powerful country, example, South-South cooperation supporter, fighter against 
enemy and anti-terrorism agent. The number of occurrences of these roles is available in Chart 6.  
 
 66 
 
3.2 The Meaning of Roles, Role Saliency and Changes 
In this chapter, I both define individual roles I was able to identify and 
describe the trends and changes of particular roles by observation of the 
graph lines. I also link individual roles in context with group of significant 
others. Subsequently, I delimit particular members of friends and foes 
groups in Chapter 3.3 which follows. For every major role (see below) I 
describe, I present three charts in total illustrating the development of given 
role in time.  
First graph depicts the development of given role for every year in both The 
Pyongyang Times (referred as “PT” in the graph legend) and Korea Today 
(referred as “KT” in the graph legend) datasets. It helps me to observe 
trends of particular role's development together with the major shifts. The 
second graph illustrates development of given role for every year in The 
Pyongyang Times dataset only. The graph line for the Korea Today dataset 
was omitted here from the reasons described in the Chapter 2.3. Lastly, 
there is the third graph depicting the changes for given role for The 
Pyongyang Times dataset. The graph line here helps me to identify both 
moments of changes and intensity of role saliency changes. I obtained the 
numerical expression of change as the difference between the role saliency 
figures expressed as a percentage for the adjacent years. For example, when 
I wanted to depict the change that occurred between 1994 and 1995 in case 
of internal developer role, I proceeded as follows. Internal developer role 
constituted 4 % of North Korean role set of 1994 and 10 % of North Korean 
role set of 1995. Thus, the role internal developer increased its saliency by 6 
% which is the numerical expression of the change. On the other hand, 
independent role constituted 16 % of North Korean role set of 1994 and 11 
% of North Korean role set of 1995. Therefore, the role independent 
decreased its saliency by 5 % which stands for the numerical expression of 
change again. 
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All the charts I drew below are the graphic expression of the data I acquired 
using content analysis respecting all the methods as outlined in Chapter 2 of 
this thesis. For the reference purposes, the codebook which is enclosed at 
the end of this thesis contains the tables with numerical expression of 
saliencies and changes for all the roles identified. 
 
 Internal developer 
This role has been relatively stable part of the North Korean role sets 
especially in later years of the datasets although there were some 
fluctuations as far as the incidence of this role is concerned. As Holsti (1970, 
269–270) points out, internal developer role does not refer to any particular 
task or function in the international environment. It implies the given actor 
puts emphasis on the issues connected with the internal development rather 
than on his or her tasks in the international arena. However, by being an 
internal developer, the actor does not automatically rules out international 
cooperation, particularly in technical and economic matters (Holsti 1970, 
269).  
Basically speaking, I identified this role in North Korean commitments to 
build a “thriving nation/country”, “powerful nation/country”, “prosperous 
nation/country”, “civilized nation/country” etc. If I should mention some 
examples of these role statements, it would be the North Korean 
commitments to “(…) make our country, our motherland, which Comrade 
Kim II Sung liberated, more prosperous” (The Central Committee of the 
Workers' Party of Korea 1995, 2), to build a “(…) prosperous country with a 
firm determination that nothing is out of (…) reach if they make up their 
minds and set to work in a revolutionary spirit of fortitude to brave out any 
difficulties” (Kim 1998a, 2), to “(…) step up the building a thriving socialist 
nation” (Choe 2006, 2), or to “(…) step up the cultural revolution and build a 
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civilized socialist nation by our own efforts so that we can be proud of 
ourselves before the world” (Kim 2015a). 
Let me now link this role to particular group of significant others as this 
should help me later in this dissertation when I will try to contextualize 
moments of changes with North Korean interactions with significant others 
(i.e. the group of friends and group of foes). In the beginning of the 
researched period, it was problematic to assess this role's relationship with 
the significant others. Nevertheless, the internal developer's incidence had 
been often accompanied with the roles that may be perceived as protective 
or defensive (such as isolate) or as directly connected to the group of foes 
(such as anti-imperialist agent). When the strong connection occurred with 
the North Korean effort to develop and boost its military capacities facing 
“complicated international situation” (Choe 2011, 8) in the later years of the 
researched period, the affiliation to the group of foes became more obvious. 
This claim is also supported by Koh (2005) who points out the North Korean 
effort to build a “powerful and prosperous nation” is mainly connected with 
the development of military power.58 Therefore, it is safe to link this role to 
the group of foes. 
 
                                                          
58 Koh (2005) also mentions the dimension of “prosperity” in North Korean phrase 
powerful and prosperous country (kangsong taeguk in Korean) building. He argues that the 
powerfulness (kang in Korean) is connected with the need to boost military capacities. The 
prosperity (song in Korean) may be linked with economics whereas the Kim Jong Il's North Korea 
obviously put stronger emphasis on the first mentioned. 
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Chart 9.1: Internal Developer. Role's Development and the Trends
PT (occurrence as % share of the role
set in given year)
KT (occurrence as % share of the role
set in given year)
Trend in PT
Trend in KT
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Chart 9.2: Internal Developer. Role's Development as in The 
Pyongyang Times (PT)
PT (occurrence as % share of the role set
in given year)
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Chart 9.3: Internal Developer: The Role Changes as in The Pyongyang 
Times
Source: created by author. 
Source: created by author. 
Source: created by author. 
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When closely analysing the North Korean enactment of the internal 
developer role, the interesting aspect is how the meaning of this role has 
been transformed and how its saliency changed over time (see Charts 9.1–
9.3). As Chart 9.1 illustrates, the role shows upward trend. When focussing 
closely on the role development as depicted in Chart 9.2 above, we can see 
the saliency of this role was significantly lower in the first years of 
researched period (mainly between 1994 and 1999). At that time, even the 
meaning of the role had been strongly variable going from need to develop 
ideology or political strength (Kim K. N. 1994, 3), to the need to boost the 
prosperity and military capacities of the country (Pak 1995, 2; Kim T. I. 1995, 
1) or the need to continue with (socialist) revolution and construction 
(Korea Today 1994, 4; Kim J. I. 1997, 4).  
With the strengthening of internal developer's position in North Korean role 
sets, the meaning of this role started to be somehow unified and settled as it 
tended to be tied with the phrases indicating “powerful country/nation 
building”, “prosperous country/nation building”, or “thriving 
nation/country building”. Although these phrases may seem to be quite 
vague, they are closely linked with the need of strengthening of military 
(and especially, nuclear) capacities (comp. for example Kwon 2004, 2, or 
Hong 1999) which was one of the features of Kim Jong Il's military-first 
policy. 59 Therefore, the meaning of the internal developer role was closely 
connected with the military build-up between 2003 and 2013. 
Nevertheless, the meaning of the role started to change slowly from 2013 
when increasing emphasis was put to “economic giant building”, “civilized” 
or “powerful/thriving/civilized nation” building.  This shift in the meaning 
partially reflects the tendency of Kim Jong Un regime to put equal emphasis 
                                                          
59 Mainly from the half of 1990s until the death of Kim Jong Il, there was a “golden era” of so 
called songun chongchi (military/army first policy in English) in North Korea which was the main 
political direction of Kim Jong Il. By emphasizing the military build-up and fundamental role of the 
army in the DPRK in form of songun, Kim Jong Il slowly shifted the main power centre of his regime 
from the Worker's Party of Korea to the Korean People's Army (for more, see Roehrig 2013). 
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on both economy and development of nuclear weapons and it is widely 
known as the byungjin policy60 (or policy of parallel development of 
economy and military in English).  
In sum, the strongest changes in the role saliency occurred in period of 
1996–1997 and 2008–2009 (strongest upswings) and in period of 1995–
1996 (strongest downswings). Last but not least, the swing in periods of 
2003–2004 and 2010–2011 may also be relevant again, because it occurred 
when the role meaning was stable. 
 
 Independent 
 As Chart 10.1 demonstrates, the role had been stable part of the North 
Korean role sets in the whole researched period. This is probably not that 
much surprising as the independence constitutes cornerstone of majority of 
the DPRK's foreign political statements and of its foreign policy itself (see 
below). Holsti (1970, 268) identified this role in his pivotal role theoretic 
research as well and defined it as an expression of state's effort to do the 
policy decisions according to its own interests “(…) rather than in support of  
the objectives of other states” (ibid.).61 As in case of previously mentioned 
internal developer, the role independent refers rather to a passive foreign 
policy. 
Besides the North Korean explicit commitments to the independence and 
self-reliance, I connected other statements to the role independent, such as a 
need to develop “(…) socialism of our country by our people's own efforts, 
not by imitation of other countries nor by instructions or pressure of 
someone” (Kim K. N. 1994, 3), to preserve “(…) national characters in all 
                                                          
60 Byungjin policy firstly appeared on March 31, 2013 during the plenary session of the 
Korean Workers' Party (comp. Cheon 2013, 1). 
61 Although Holsti incorporated the statements where states declare commitments to idea 
of non-alignment as an expression of the role independent, I believe these are rather expression of 
defender of faith role which I will deal with later in this chapter. 
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fields of state activities (…) to defend national independence in the 
revolution and construction (The Pyongyang Times 1998a, 1) or to “(…) 
advance dynamically along the road of their own choice (Kim 1999, 3).62  
The role independent may be linked to the group of foes as well. This is 
because by playing the role independent, the DPRK aims to assure its rivals 
on the international scene it is not willing to accept any advices or impulses 
from them and that it is able to cope with its own issues by itself. Even Holsti 
(1970, 297) argues that one of the sources are anti-colonial sentiments and 
threat perception which further supports its linking to the group of foes. The 
meaning of this role remained stable during the whole researched period. 
 
                                                          
62 In this place, it is also suitable to emphasize the principles of self-reliance and 
independence have been cornerstones of the North Korean policies since 1950s. The importance of 
these principles was further confirmed in the middle of 1960s, when the Juche (which is often 
translated as self-reliance) became the official policy of Kim Il Sung's North Korea (Armstrong 
2013, 53). The fact that the DPRK never joined the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) 
is just one example of how the self reliance and independence impacted the DPRK's foreign policy 
(ibid., 61). 
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Chart 10.1: Independent. Role's Development and the Trends
PT (occurrence as % share of the role
set in given year)
KT (occurrence as % share of the role
set in given year)
Trend in PT
Trend in KT
Source: created by author. 
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The developments of the role independent are depicted in Charts 10.1–10.3. 
On the average, the role counted for 15 % of the North Korean role sets as 
identified in The Pyongyang Times and it shows rather stagnating trend in 
the saliency. As Charts 10.1 and 10.2 illustrate, the role had more prominent 
position in the North Korean role sets until 2003 when the saliency peaked. 
Between 2004 and 2006, the role showed significant decline followed by 
slow re-increase of its saliency. Apparently, the strongest changes occurred 
in periods of 2005–2006 (strongest downfall), 2002–2003 and 2006–2007 
(strongest rises) as Chart 10.3 demonstrates.  
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Chart 10.2: Independent. Role's Development as in The Pyongyang 
Times (PT)
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Chart 10.3: Independent: The Role Changes as in The Pyongyang Times
Source: created by author. 
Source: created by author. 
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 Active Independent  
Active independent has been another constant part of the North Korean role 
sets through the researched period. Like internal developer and independent, 
the active independent was also identified in Holsti´s comparative study. He 
defined this role as an expression of an effort of particular nation to stay 
independent and uninvolved in the military and ideological commitments 
together with an effort to cultivate relations with as many countries as 
possible (Holsti 1970, 262). In North Korean context, I identified mainly two 
dimensions of this role. First, it combines DPRK's willingness to establish 
multiple diplomatic relations with multiple countries whereas very vague63 
or no conditions are laid for this (see below). Second, this role can be also 
perceived as an expression of an effort to avoid any impact of increasing 
diplomatic ties on North Korean right to self-determination and 
independence.  
To put just a few examples of North Korean statements according to which I 
identified this role, there were those expressing DPRK's willingness to “(…) 
develop friendly and cooperative relations with peoples of different 
countries of the world, including socialist and non-aligned countries, on the 
principle of independence” (Rodong Sinmun, Josoninmingun and Rodong 
Chongnyon 1995, 4), to “(…) work hard to increase unity and solidarity with 
the peoples of all countries who champion independence and promote 
friendship with the DPRK” (Hong 1999, 1), or to “(…) establish and develop 
friendly and cooperative relations with all the countries which respect its 
sovereignty and are friendly towards it in the ideal of independence, peace 
and friendship” (The Pyongyang Times 2000a, 7). 
                                                          
63 If at all, the DPRK's role declaring actors typically laid very vague conditions for 
establishment of new diplomatic ties. For example, they spoke about the “friendly countries”, 
“peace-loving countries”, “independence-loving countries” or “progressive countries” (comp. Hong 
1999, 1; Kim C. 2000, 7, or Kim 2015b, 3). 
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As far as the meaning and content of this role is concerned, there have been 
some shifts especially in the definition of the group of states the DPRK 
wanted to create ties with. When expressing the statements correlating with 
the active independent role between 1994 and 1996, the DPRK often 
declared its wish to expand the relations with socialist and revolutionary 
people and countries all over the world (comp. Kim I. S. 1994, 3, or Song 
1996, 8). Later in the dataset, these references gradually vanished and the 
meaning of active independent role shifted mainly to the effort to expand 
relations with “progressive countries”, “friendly countries”, “countries and 
nations that respect the justice and DPRK's sovereignty” or “the countries 
that aspire after independence” (comp. Jon 2007a, 8, or Choe 2009, 7). 
To link this role to the significant others, it is definitely connected with the 
group of friends. Furthermore, the DPRK practically always refers to states 
only when pronounces statements correlating with active independent role. 
As I have already mentioned before, the North Korean delimitation of the 
particular countries is vague as it refers to “independence-loving countries”, 
“progressive countries”, “friendly countries” or “peace-loving countries”. The 
DPRK probably aims not to restrict the spectrum of states with whom the 
cooperation might be feasible. Ming Lee (2009, 166) deals with the concept 
of “friendly countries” shortly in his chapter as well. He argues that North 
Korean definition of “friendly countries” is judged by their willingness to 
support “(…) the DPRK's ideological commitment to build up a socialist 
fortress in the North, (…) the DPRK's bid for national unification and 
(whether or not, added by author) they join the United States and its camp 
in 'interfering with North Korean internal affairs' (like exerting pressure 
about North Korean human rights)” (Lee M. 2009, 166). By accepting these 
criterions, the range of the most significant “friendly countries” becomes a 
bit easier to delimit: the most important allies (or friends) for the DPRK 
would probably be China and Russia. 
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Chart 11.1: Active Independent. Role's Development and the Trends
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Chart 11.2: Active Independent. Role's Development as in The 
Pyongyang Times (PT)
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Chart 11.3: Active Independent: The Role Changes as in The Pyongyang 
Times
Source: created by author. 
Source: created by author. 
Source: created by author. 
 77 
 
Again, this role's development is depicted in three graphs (Charts 11.1–11.3). 
The saliency seems to have a decreasing tendency (see Chart 11.1) with 
several shifts, however. The first upswing occurred between 2000 and 2001 
followed by steep decline in 2002. Between 2006 and 2009, the role's 
position in North Korean role sets became stronger again which is nicely 
illustrated in Charts 11.1 and 11.2. When focusing on the role changes, we 
can say the most obvious ones occurred in periods of 2001–2002, 1996–
1997, 2011–2012 (the strongest downfalls) and 1999–2000 (the strongest 
rise) (see Chart 11.3). 
 
 Isolate 
Once again, the role isolate was present in Holsti's typology. He defined it as 
a role which implies the demand of “(…) minimum of external contacts of 
whatever variety” (Holsti 1970, 270). I identified it according to North 
Korean references to “(…) never tolerate any moves that encroach upon the 
dignity and sovereignty of the country and the nation” (Kim T. I. 1994, 3), to 
“(…) defend the bulwark of socialism” (Kim J. I. 1995, 4), to “(…) make the 
whole country an impregnable fortress” (Kim 2006, 2), or the declarations of 
North Korean peoples' will to “(…) risk their lives to defend the national 
dignity [and]64 never trade their national dignity for fortune” (Kim 2003, 2). 
It is also possible to notice that the role isolate is often declared together 
with the anti-imperialist agent role thorough whole dataset (will be 
discussed later on) which helped me to link it with particular group of 
significant others (see below). To sum up, this role mainly refers to North 
Korean need to show the international audience that it perceives its 
sovereignty, dignity and political system as crucial values it is fully prepared 
to protect and that it is not willing to make any concessions in this respect at 
all.  
                                                          
64 Added by author. 
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Furthermore, it is also interesting to observe the role conflict present in 
North Korean role sets containing both the role active independent which 
implies DPRK's effort to establish relations with as many countries as 
possible (see above) and the role isolate, which creates significant limits for 
the external contacts. The DPRK even had been putting approximately equal 
emphasis on both roles in several years of the dataset (namely, in 1998, 
2002, 2006, 2007, 2013 and 2015) and the roles consisted approximately 
same share of the North Korean role sets which further underlines the role 
conflict.  
Once again, meaning of the role remained relatively stable during the 
researched period as it constantly referred to defence of the national dignity 
and sovereignty, rejection of the outside pressure, or to the need to preserve 
the country as a “impregnable fortress” (comp. Kim 2006, 2).  
The role is connected with the group of foes of significant others. That is 
because the role usually correlates with statements where the DPRK 
explicitly protests against the pressure of the United States and its allies or 
against possible harmful influence of capitalism (comp. Rodong Sinmun and 
Kulloja 1999, 2).  
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Chart 12.1: Isolate. Role's Development and the Trends
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 79 
 
 
  
 
 
Let me now focus on the role saliency developments and changes as 
demonstrated in Charts 12.1–12.3. As we can see in Chart 12.1, this role's 
saliency shows increasing trend. Although it was rather stagnating in the 
beginning of the researched period, there was significant shift in this 
tendency between 2002 and 2005 when the position of the role isolate 
strengthened which was followed by slight decrease. As Chart 12.2 
illustrates, the role saliency peaked in years 2003 and 2012. On the other 
hand, it reached the lowest points in years 2000 and 2010. The most obvious 
changes occurred in 2002–2003 and 2011–2012 (the strongest growth) and 
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in 2003–2004 (the strongest downfall) (see Chart 12.3). Additionally, there 
were strong downswings in periods of 1999–2000 and 2012–2013. 
 
 Bastion of Revolution – Liberator 
This is another role the DPRK had declared implying active foreign politics. 
Holsti defined it as an expression of willingness of a state to lead various 
types of revolutionary movement abroad and to liberate other nations or 
states and provide them with physical, moral, political or ideological support 
or inspiration (Holsti 1970, 260–261). Furthermore, he points this role has 
its source in anti-colonial attitudes, desire for ethnic unity and ideological 
principles (ibid., 296).  
The North Korean statements expressing the readiness to build the forces 
against the domination and subjugation of great powers, especially the 
United States, and the emphasizing of particular activities that need to be 
done in order to liberate the world correlate with this role. To use just a few 
examples, there is DPRK's stressing of the need to “(…) build up the forces of 
global independence and promote the solidarity with them (Ri 1994a, 8), to 
(…) work actively to destroy the old international order of domination and 
subjugation, establish a new order based on equality, justice and fairness 
(Rodong Sinmun, Josoninmingun and Rodong Chongnyon 1995, 4), or to “(…) 
make positive efforts to build a just and equal world under the ideal of 
independence, peace and friendship“ (Choe 2007, 7). All these statements 
indicate the bastion of revolution – liberator role. 
The meaning remained relatively stable during the researched period 
although it is possible to observe the North Korean commitments to this role 
became more vague and symbolical in the later years of the dataset. In 
particular, strong declarations of a need to “(…) make a concerted effort to 
destroy all the old international political and economic orders of domination 
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and subjugation and establish new ones (The Pyongyang Times 1994a, 8) 
gradually changed to vague phrases declaring the need to “(…) make a 
positive effort to build just and equal word” (Choe 2007, 7) or to “(…) 
promote the cause of independence and peace for humankind” (Choe 2009, 
7). This meaning transformation can be also related with the general 
decrease of the saliency of the bastion of revolution – liberator role which is 
discussed later in this chapter. 
After reading North Korean statements correlating with the bastion of 
revolution – liberator role, we can see it is somehow linked to both group of 
foes and group of friends. By declaring this role, the DPRK expresses its 
disagreement with the current international order which is mainly 
represented by the United States, its allies and the United Nations in its 
current shape (comp., for example, Kim 2013, 1). Those actors obviously 
stand for the members of the group of foes.   
At the same time, this role implies the need of existence of a group of actors 
that actually needs to be liberated or the group of actors that the DPRK is 
sympathetic with (i.e. the group of friends). In this respect, the references to 
the “world revolutionary people” (Korea Today 1994, 4), “people of the 
world who advocate independence” (Kim 1996, 4), or of justice-loving and 
peace-loving people (Han 1996, 8) can be found in the North Korean 
statements referring to the role bastion of revolution – liberator. Once again, 
North Korean delimitation of the particular actors that could be associated 
with the group of friends is mostly absent like it was in the case of active 
independent role statements.  Existing North Korean ties with the Third 
World countries (such as Cuba or Ecuador in Latin America or for example 
Tanzania or Zimbabwe in Africa) give us certain clue in this regard. Basically 
speaking, the DPRK tries to cultivate relations with the countries or actors 
we may call “similarly thinking”, i.e. rather leftist, radical, anti-colonial and 
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anti-imperialist countries that often support the idea of non-alignment 
(comp. Owoeye 191, 633). 
Considering this situation, which group of significant others should we 
factor when contextualizing this role's development with North Korea 
relations with them later in this thesis? Holsti (1970, 296) argues in his 
article that one of the sources of the role bastion of revolution – liberator are 
anti-colonial attitudes. Thus, this role serves as another mean for 
delimitation against the group of foes that North Korea often accuses of 
“dominationism and highhandedness” (comp. Kim 2001, 7). Therefore, I will 
contextualize this role to the DPRK's interactions with group of foes.  
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As both the trend and graph lines in Chart 13.1 demonstrate, the saliency of 
bastion of revolution – liberator in the DPRK's role sets has been slowly but 
constantly dropping since 1994. Moreover, we can also see there have been 
many ups and downs in this role's development. The role saliency peaked in 
1998 whereas it reached the lowest level in 2014 (it disappeared from the 
North Korean role set completely). The first period when the saliency 
dropped significantly occurred between 2002 and 2005 which was followed 
by increased emphasis on this role in period of 2006–2008 and in 2013 (see 
Chart 13.2). There were quite significant changes in case of this role. The 
strongest downswings occurred in 1998–1999, 2008–2009, 2002–2003 and 
2012–2013 whereas the most obvious upswings were present in 1997–1998, 
2005–2006 and 2009–2010 (see Chart 13.3). 
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 Anti-Imperialist Agent 
This is an example of a role which can be perceived a Cold War relic to some 
extent. It was also defined by Holsti simply as an expression of given 
country's will to act as an agent of struggle against imperialism (Holsti 1970, 
264). I identified it in North Korean statements referring to a need to “(…) 
frustrate the imperialist manoeuvres of aggression, inference and 
disturbance” (Rodong Sinmun, Josoninmingun and Rodong Chongnyon 1995, 
4), to “(…) smash up the vicious and cunning policy of the imperialists who 
seek to obliterate nations and the reactionary doctrines which try to justify 
this policy” (Kim J. I. 1997, 5), or to “(…)  take the road of independence 
against the imperialist domination and subordination is an unpreventable 
trend of the times in the international arena and a new peaceful world can 
be built only by upholding the banner of antiimperialism” (Kim 2007, 7). 
There have not been any changes in the role's meaning which is naturally 
connected with strict definition of the significant others that actually arises 
from the very term “anti-imperialist agent”. It is probably obvious this role is 
connected with the group of foes where the actors North Korea refers to as 
imperialist ones (again, the United States and its allies) are the particular 
representatives of this group.  
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Again, Charts 14.1–14.3 demonstrate the developments in saliency of this 
role and the changes that occurred. It is apparent the relevance of this role 
shows downward trend thorough the researched period (see Chart 14.1). 
For The Pyongyang Times dataset, this role formed 13 % of North Korean 
role sets in 1990s on the average and it dropped to a mere 7 % on the 
average for period between 2000 and 2015. The trend for Korea Today was 
approximately the same (12 % in 1990s and 6 % between 2000 and 2015). 
When looking on the role saliency in the Chart 14.2, we can see it peaked in 
1999. This was followed by strong decline of the role saliency lasting 
between 2000 and 2001, respectively. There was another slight shift 
between 2002 and 2003 when the role's position in the DPRK's role set had 
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been strengthening again but only temporarily as its saliency had been 
dropping since 2005.  
If we focus on the moments of changes as illustrated in Chart 14.3, we can 
see the strongest one occurred in period of 1999–2000 (downfall). On the 
other hand, the strongest rise was present between 1998 and 1999. The 
other changes are relatively weak. 
 
 Global Peace Protector 
This role was present in Holsti's typology as “defender of peace”. He claims 
he was able to identify this role according to the American and Soviet 
references to “universal commitments to defend against aggression or threat 
to peace, no matter what the locale” (Holsti 1970, 272). Nevertheless, the 
DPRK does differentiate between the global peace protection and regional 
peace protection in its statements. As a mere reference to defender of peace 
would be insufficient in North Korean case, I delimit both the global peace 
protector and regional peace protector role. I define the global peace 
protector role as North Korean universal commitment to defend peace 
around the world.  
It is also needed to point out here the DPRK's interpretation of peace-
oriented roles (i.e. global and regional peace protector and marginal role 
peaceful country) and peace itself is specific. In particular, it speaks about 
“independent peace” and also claims it “loves peace but never begs for it” 
(Kim T. C. 2000, 7). Thus, North Korean conception of peace is predatorious 
rather than harmony-oriented. Seongji Woo (2011, 201–202) further 
confirms this assertion when arguing North Korea too heavily insists on the 
need to maintain “peace by power” or “peace by deterrence”. 
I identified the role global peace protector according to North Korean 
references to make “(…) unremitting efforts for global peace and security” 
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(Kim 2001, 2), or to “(…) discharge their responsibility for world peace and 
security (Choe 2002, 7). Moreover, it is interesting to observe how the 
meaning changed over time. Mainly between 1995 and 1997, the DPRK 
tended to link its mission to defend the global peace with the task to make 
the world free of nuclear weapons (comp. Rodong Sinmun, Josoninmingun 
and Rodong Chongnyon 1995, 4, or Kim H. C. 1997, 8). However, later on in 
the dataset, the logic of North Korean statements reversed and the 
connection had been created between North Korean nuclear program and 
global peace protection in the DPRK's foreign political statements. Especially 
after 2000, North Korea tended to link its efforts to posses the “nuclear 
deterrent” and to “build up the military strength” with its task to safeguard 
the peace and security in both global and regional scale (comp. Mun 2005, 5).  
Moreover, at many places thorough the whole dataset, the role global peace 
protector was connected with bastion of revolution – liberator role. This is 
because the DPRK linked its mission to create a new and fair international 
order with a need to establish a new peaceful world where no unilateralism 
of the United States is present (comp. Rodong Sinmun, Josoninmingun and 
Rodong Chongnyon 1995, 4, or Jon 2007b, 7).  
This role seems to be rather linked with the group of foes. This is because 
the connection is often created between the DPRK's need to protect the 
world peace and fighting against aggression “of war fanatics” and 
domination (comp. The Pyongyang Times 1997, 1; Kim 1997, 8, or Hong 
1999, 1). This is further supported by deliberations of K. J. Holsti (1970, 296) 
who argues the tendency of a state to protect peace arises from its 
perception of threat, besides other factors.65 
                                                          
65 He also mentions geographic location, traditional policies and needs of threatened states 
as sources of give state's tendency to protect peace. 
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Let me now focus on development in this role's saliency and changes 
illustrated in Charts 15.1–15.3. As we can observe at Chart 15.1, The 
Pyongyang Times and Korea Today datasets show different trends in case of 
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this role. 66 As the global peace protector is one of the marginal roles in the 
North Korean role sets, it has not been sufficiently reflected in the Korea 
Today dataset which is the phenomenon I have already discussed earlier in 
this thesis (see the Chapter 2.3). Generally speaking, there was the trend of 
falling saliency of this role between 1994 and 2000 (as Chart 15.1 
demonstrates), slight increase between 2000 and 2007, and finally, the 
decrease between 2007 and 2015. Taking the data as of The Pyongyang 
Times, the role's saliency obviously peaked in 2007 and reached its lowest 
level in 2012 when it disappeared completely from both datasets. The most 
obvious changes occurred in period of 2006–2007 (the strongest rise) and 
2011–2012 (the strongest downswing). 
 
 Regional Peace Protector 
Similarly to global peace protector role, the regional peace protector refers to 
the North Korean commitments to defend the peace, this time in the regional 
scale only and it refers to the North Korean claims about the strong 
confrontation in the region which exists despite the end of Cold War (Woo 
2011, 196).67 I identified this role according to DPRK's statements where it 
claims it strives for “(…) peace and security on the Korean peninsula and in 
the Asia-Pacific region” (Spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of the DPRK 
1995, 1), for “(…) peace and security in Northeast Asia” (DPRK delegate at 
the UN GA 1997, 8), or for building of peaceful Asia and Korean Peninsula 
(Paek 2000, 7). It is possible to see that North Korean regional radius 
reaches up to the Asian continent here.  
                                                          
66 In The Pyongyang Times dataset, global peace protector role's relevance was higher until 
1999 (about 8 % of the role sets in average) and lower after 2000 (about 6 % of the role sets in 
average) whereas the Korea Today dataset shows reverse tendency, i.e. lower relevance till 1999 
(about 4 % of the role sets in average) and a bit higher after 2000 (about 6 % of the role sets in 
average). 
67 This relates to overall revitalization of regional dynamic in Northeast Asia after the end 
of Cold War, which is the issue broadly discussed by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver (2003, esp. 
chapter 6). 
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As far as the meaning transformation is concerned, some changes occurred 
in case of this role. Most often, the DPRK referred to the peace protection of 
Korean Peninsula and Asia as a whole. Occasionally, the references to 
defence of peace in Northeast Asia and Asian Pacific region occurred as well. 
Moreover, it was possible to observe in the later years in The Pyongyang 
Times dataset (mainly after 2010) that the North Korean definition of “its” 
region became more tied with Korean Peninsula. 
When considering the affiliation of this role to the group of significant others, 
we are confronted with the same issue as in the case of global peace 
protector role, i.e. the link with particular group of significant others is 
rather weak. Nevertheless, when emphasizing the need to protect regional 
peace, North Korea sometimes claims it is doing so against the imperialists 
in unity with so called “world's peace lovers” (comp. for example, Kim 1998, 
8). Furthermore, even Seongji Woo (2011, 196) argues that the DPRK strives 
to fight for the peace in the region against the reactionary forces. Thus, 
regional peace protector role can be rather linked with the group of foes. 
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Charts 16.1–16.3 illustrate the development of role saliency and changes. 
The role's saliency has been growing thorough the researched period as the 
trend lines in Chart 16.1 demonstrates. At the same time, the position of 
regional peace protector in North Korean role sets is not settled. This claim is 
supported by the irregular occurrence of this role in the datasets and by 
many significant shifts in saliency as well (see Charts 16.1 and 16.2). 
Consequently, the observation of changes becomes harder due to many 
fluctuations. When seeing the graph line illustrating the saliency as in The 
Pyongyang Times dataset, we can see the regional peace protector's saliency 
peaked in 2011 and 2013 respectively. However, it dropped significantly in 
2014 and 2015 again. 
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 Marginal Roles in the DPRK's Role Sets: Brief Overview 
So far, I have been describing and analysing the major roles, i.e. the roles that 
had significant position in North Korean role sets, i.e. those whose total 
occurrence thorough the researched period in The Pyongyang Times dataset 
exceeded at least 5 %. Right now, I proceed with the brief overview over the 
roles whose total incidence did not reach 5 % but they occurred at least in 
three subsequent years of the researched period.68 I call these roles as 
marginal as they usually neither occupied significant position in DPRK role 
sets (the role saliency was low and shows dropping tendency) nor their 
position in the role sets was settled and thus, their influence on the foreign 
politics is low as well. 
There were eight roles that fulfil the above mentioned criteria: powerful 
country, liberation supporter, defender of faith, nuclear disarmament 
supporter, peaceful country, South-South cooperation supporter, faithful ally 
and fighter against enemy. Let me now proceed with short description of 
these roles.  
I assigned the role powerful country to these statements, where the DPRK 
simply labelled itself as “powerful country” (comp. Kim K. J. 1995, 2), 
“ideological/political/economic/military power” (comp. The Pyongyang 
Times 2000b, 1). The developments in terms of saliency together with the 
trend lines are illustrated in Chart 17.1. Powerful country is the other case 
where the trend lines of The Pyongyang Times and Korea Today datasets are 
different which most likely results from influence of several aspects that has 
already been discussed in chapter 2.3.  North Korea did not linked this role 
with any group of significant others. 
Liberation supporter role was defined by Holsti as an expression of rather 
vague and further unspecified symbolical support for liberation movements 
                                                          
68 I define the role as marginal one according to its compliance with these criteria for The 
Pyongyang Times dataset.  
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abroad (Holsti 1970, 263). Simply speaking, it can be defined as much more 
passive form of above mentioned role bastion of revolution–liberator. As 
Chart 17.2 demonstrates, statements correlating with this role were 
sometimes present in North Korean statements but the saliency of this role 
has obviously been dropping. I identified this role in DPRK's statements 
where it opposes violation of sovereignty of other countries (Han 1996, 8), 
“(…) remains faithful to the cause of global independence” (Ri 1997, 8) or 
where it declares its support for the “(…) world´s people aspiring for 
independence” (Ri 2001, 7). This role is naturally linked with the group of 
friends with whom the DPRK declares its solidarity. 
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Chart 17.1: Powerful Country. Role's Development and the Trends
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Chart 17.2: Liberation Supporter. Role's Development and the Trends
PT (occurrence as % share of the role
set in given year)
KT (occurrence as % share of the role
set in given year)
Trend in PT
Trend in KT
Source: created by author. 
Source: created by author. 
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Defender of faith is the role via which the DPRK declares its support to the 
principle of non-alignment. It was defined by Holsti as a willingness to 
defend particular value systems from attack or to guarantee certain 
ideological/ideational purity for certain group of states (Holsti 1970, 264). 
In North Korean case, I identified this role according to expression of its 
duty or obligation to strengthen and develop the principle of non-alignment 
(comp. Song 1995, 8). As Chart 17.3 illustrates, the saliency of this role is 
slowly dropping as well. This role can be linked with group of friends 
whereas the friends are delimited here relatively clearly (i.e. all the 
members of the Non-Aligned Movement).  
 
 
Nuclear disarmament supporter is another marginal role of the DPRK's role 
sets. Although it was not present in the Holsti's typology, I was able to 
identify it in the datasets simply according to North Korean commitments to 
“(…) do all (…) to realise humankind's desire to live in a world free from 
nuclear weapons by advocating disarmament, especially nuclear 
disarmament” (Rodong Sinmun, Josoninmingun and Rodong Chongnyon 
1995, 4) and alike. As Chart 17.4 shows us, there were just a couple of 
incidences of this role: between 1995 and 1997, in 2006, between 2009 and 
2011, and in 2013. When occurred mainly after 2000, this role often stood in 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
5
%
 o
f t
h
e 
ro
le
 s
et
 in
 g
iv
en
 y
ea
r
Chart 17.3: Defender of Faith. Role's Development and the Trends
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contrast with internal developer role which indicated the need to develop 
nuclear capacities (see above). Once again, North Korea did not linked this 
role with any group of significant others. 
Peaceful country is the case of role which correlates with North Korean 
statements about its the peacefulness: “A lofty ideal embodying the people's 
wish for peace, the country's peace-oriented ideal of foreign policy 
encourages the peace campaign of the world's progressives” (Kim 2014, 7). 
This role seems to increase its saliency in recent years as both Korea Today 
and The Pyongyang Times occurrence lines show us (see Chart 17.5). The 
affiliation of this role to particular group of significant others is unclear.  
 
 
In couple of years, the DPRK's role statements correlated with something 
which I labelled as South-South cooperation supporter role. I identified it 
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Chart 17.4: Nuclear Disarmament Supporter. Role's Development and the 
Trends
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Chart 17.5: Peaceful Country. Role's Development and the Trends
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according to commitments “to discharge the duty to expand the S-S 
cooperation” (Ri 1994b, 8) and alike. As we can observe in Chart 17.6, the 
role was mainly present in the statements of 1990s. 
Faithful ally role was defined by Holsti as the commitment to “(…) support 
the policies of another government” (Holsti 1970, 267). For the purposes of 
my investigation, I substitute the word “government” with “actor” as it but I 
agree this role's enactment requires the as-if role beholder to precisely 
define the ally. In statements relevant for the purposes of my investigation, 
North Korea only occasionally expressed its support that much clearly. To 
put a few examples, it expressed its support for Cuba, Iran, Libya, Syria and 
Colombia “(…) in their just cause for national sovereignty and dignity” (Choe 
1996, 8) or it also articulated its backing for “(…) workers all around the 
world”69 (The Pyongyang Times 1994b, 1), or for members of the Non-
Aligned movement (Kim 2009, 2). The saliency of this role has been 
dropping as well as Chart 17.7 demonstrates. 
 
                                                          
69 The expression of solidarity with the „world´s working class was present mainly in the 
1990s whereas it disappeared later. It can be perceived as a Cold War relic.  
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the Trends
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The last role which can be added between the marginal roles is fighter 
against enemy. Its incidence in the role sets is rather recent as Chart 17.8 
shows us and I identified it in those statements, where the DPRK sharply 
delimited itself against some actors: “The WPK's new strategy is a reflection 
of his will to (…) resolutely smash the wicked charts of the US and its 
followers to isolate and stifle the DPRK” (Pak 2013, 4). This role is one of the 
very few ones where the DPRK namely delimits particular actors. Clearly, 
this role can be linked with group of foes whereas the United States is the 
main representative even at this case. 
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Chart 17.7: Faithful Ally. Role's Development and the Trends
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Chart 17.8: Fighter against Enemy. Role's Development and the Trends
PT (occurrence as % share of the role
set in given year)
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Trend in PT
Trend in KT
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 Deviances in North Korean Role Sets 
I have already pointed out sooner in this dissertation that there is a lack of 
knowledge as far as the issue of role deviances is concerned and I promised 
to grasp this issue better in North Korean case. I labelled as the role 
deviances these roles in the North Korean role sets which neither exceeded 
5 % in their incidence thorough The Pyongyang Times dataset nor fulfil the 
criteria set for the marginal roles (i.e. they did not occur in three subsequent 
years of the researched period). Simply speaking, the role deviances can be 
defined as the roles which were present very scarcely (or even randomly) in 
the role sets in very small number of occurrences. 
There are four roles in the DPRK's role sets that can be classified as role 
deviances: example, anti-terrorism agent, developer and civilized country. 
There is no point in drawing any charts capturing developments of these 
roles which arises from their deviant nature.  
Example was first case of deviant role I linked it mainly to DPRK's 
statements about how it demonstrates its national strength and dignity to 
whole world (comp. Rodong Sinmun and Kulloja 2000, 4). Anti-terrorism 
agent naturally correlates with North Korean declarations of its effort to 
either oppose or fight against all forms of terrorism (comp. The DPRK 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008, 4). North Korean pledge “(…) to promote 
the common development and prosperity of humankind” (Pak 2011, 8) 
refers to role developer which was really rare in the DPRK's role sets. The 
same can be told about civilized country which is the very last role that 
occurred only once in whole researched period and refers to only one 
statement where the DPRK labelled itself as “(…) highly civilized, socialist 
country” (Rodong Sinmun, Josoninmingun and Rodong Chongnyon 2012, 
6).70  
                                                          
70 The particular occurrences of these roles are depicted in the codebook in the sheet 
named “role deviances”. 
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3.3 North Korean Roles, Role Sets and Significant Others: 
Summarization 
In the previous chapter, I defined the individual roles I was able to identify 
in the datasets and I focused both on the developments in their saliency and 
their linking to particular group of significant others. Let me now briefly 
summarize the findings I made. 
In the period between 1994 and 2015, I was able to identify 20 roles in total 
whereas only eight of them were constant and relatively stable part of the 
North Korean role sets. At this place, let me put forward the finding of 
Sebastian Harnisch again. He argues that the roles are not of the same 
importance to their beholder whereas they are organized hierarchically “(…) 
with those roles on the top effecting most on role behavior” (Harnisch 2012, 
55). In harmony with this assertion, I claim these eight major roles with the 
highest saliency can be perceived as the roles with the strongest impact on 
the North Korean foreign policy.  
I have already mentioned earlier in this thesis that various studies showed 
correlation between national roles states declare and their and foreign 
political behavior. If I contextualize both composition of North Korean role 
sets and saliency of individual roles with actual foreign political 
developments, it is possible to see North Korean case in not any exception. 
To make this linkage a bit more obvious, let me present at least one example. 
The composition of role sets between 1994 and 1996 reflect the foreign 
political isolation or lack of allies or friends in the international environment 
(comp. Lee M. 2009, 162) which resulted from North Korean loss of the 
major friend, i.e. USSR/Russia71 and also from the disintegration of the 
socialist camp.72 In this period, the DPRK was keen on establishing new 
                                                          
71 The North Korean hopes for the exclusive relationship with Moscow were terminated by 
establishment of Russian diplomatic relations with South Korea in June 1990 whereas the same 
was done by China in 1992 (Lee M. 2009, 163). 
72 Also, the newly established Chinese policy of open doors and reforms made the DPRK 
increasingly nervous as it was afraid “(…) of being 'sold out' by China's conciliatory policy towards 
the United States (Lee M. 2009, 162).  
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diplomatic ties in order to end up this isolation. This is reflected in the fact 
the roles active independent and bastion of revolution – liberator occupied 
significant share of the role sets between 1994 and 1996. These are roles 
indicating very active foreign policy (see Chart 18) and in case of the active 
independent, even a strong effort to “cultivate relations with as many 
countries as possible” (Holsti 1970, 262).  
In Chart 18, I tried to grasp the major roles on the scale of active – passive 
foreign policy as well as to summarize their ling to particular group of 
significant others. Let me deal with the group of foes first as the majority of 
relevant roles in the DPRK's role sets were linked to them. First, it is needed 
to point out the DPRK not always referred to a specific actor in its role 
statements as it often spoke about “imperialists”, “dominationsists” and the 
like. Nevertheless, some references were more than obvious. The United 
States surely stood for the main representative of the group of foes. In its 
statements connected with “foes roles”, North Korea also often referred to it 
as “the United States and its allies” or “the United States and its vassal forces” 
(comp. Kim 2013b, 1, or Han 2013, 4) but it scarcely determined who these 
“allies” or “vassal forces” were. When it did so, it was usually Japan or South 
Korean “puppets” (comp. The Pyongyang Times 1998b, 2).  In several cases, 
it also delimited itself against the UN in its current shape. 
Chart 18: Delimitation of Major Roles on the Scale of Activity – Passivity 
role 
scale active–passive foreign policy 
group of the 
significant 
others 
very 
passive 
rather 
passive rather active very active  
internal developer   X foes 
independent X foes 
active independent   X friends 
isolate X foes 
bastion of revolution - 
liberator   X foes 
anti-imperialist agent   X foes 
global peace protector   X foes 
regional peace protector   X foes 
Source: created by author. 
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As far as the group of friends is concerned, North Korea was even less 
specific when referring to it although some important clues are visible. For 
example, in the statements referring to the active independent role (which is 
the most prominent and obvious example of the role connected with group 
of friends) references to the unity with members of The Pyongyang 
Declaration73 of 1992 were occasionally made (comp. Song 1994, 3). Thus, 
the signatories of the Declaration 74  could be perceived as the 
representatives of group of friends, at least in 1990s. Nevertheless, the 
relevance of The Pyongyang Declaration is too low to be perceived as a lead 
and North Korean references to it vanished in late 1990s. Afterwards, the 
DPRK referred to the “progressive/peace-loving/ friendly” countries or to 
the members of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Movement itself75 
which traditionally has been very important platform for the DPRK (comp. 
Kim 1986, 328).  
Basically speaking, countries or actors we may call “similarly thinking”, i.e. 
rather leftist (but yet, not necessarily!), radical, anti-colonial, anti-
interventionist and anti-imperialist countries that often support the idea of 
non-alignment that North Korea cultivate relations with may be perceived as 
members of the group of friends. In particular, Cuba or Iran represent recent 
examples of this group (comp. Jung 2013, 114–115). What is interesting 
here is that the DPRK never refers namely to China or Russia in the 
statements where I identified roles. Nevertheless, these countries are 
usually perceived as major patrons for the DPRK, especially as far as China76 
                                                          
73 The Pyongyang Declaration was a joint statement of 30 countries signed during the 
celebrations of the 80th birthday of Kim Il Sung on April 20, 1992. The declaration mainly referred 
to the need to defend the socialism whereas the signatories expressed their commitment to 
socialism. By initiating The Pyongyang Declaration, the DPRK attempted to “portray itself as the 
patron of world communism” (Kim 2011, 86). 
74 Briefly speaking, the Declaration was signed by communist and socialist parties of Third 
World Countries around the Latin America, Africa, and Asia but also by some Western communist 
parties.  
75 This was mainly the case of role defender of faith.  
76 However, the China-DPRK relations underwent significant transformations after the end 
of the Clod War. As Lee (2014, 192) points out, the unconditional alliance rooted in ideological 
concord shifted to rather pragmatic relations which means that China would support North Korea 
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is concerned (comp. Lee 2014, 191) and thus, they can be incorporated 
among those countries the DPRK refers to as “progressive, peace-loving or 
friendly”. This is also supported by Ming Lee (2009, 166) who explicitly links 
China to North Korean definition of “friendly countries”. Moreover, thorough 
whole researched period, I noticed North Korea always strongly highlighted 
and carefully reported its meetings or negotiations with Russia and China in 
both Korea Today and The Pyongyang Times (comp. for example, Korea 
Today 2001a, 1–4, or Korea Today 2001b, 1–4). Thus, it is possible to argue 
that the DPRK puts strong emphasis on its relations with these countries. 
To sum up, the DPRK deeply identifies itself with the group of friends, i.e. it 
mainly perceives itself as a citadel of progressives and, as Woo (2011, 192) 
aptly points out, it “(…) pictures a fierce struggle between independence-
respecting and imperial forces, peace-loving and war-mongering forces, and 
progressive and reactionary countries”. This is how it presents its image to 
the international audiences.   
When looking at Chart 18 again, the major roles North Korea declared are 
linked with the group of foes of significant others (represented mainly by 
the United States) with only one exception. Thus, it is possible to say the 
group of foes embodying the unfair and unjust international order against 
which the DPRK delimits itself (ibid., 195) is essential for the existence of 
majority of the most important roles the DPRK declares. Nevertheless, one 
should not forget about the group of friends as they function as the 
secondary (still essential, however) base for remaining role the DPRK 
declares.  
  
                                                                                                                                                                          
mainly when the existence and maintenance of North Korea is endangered. In other cases, China 
declared it is willing to support the DPRK only selectively. Lastly, the new dimension of the 
relationship also allows China to oppose North Korean “dangerous actions” but as the same time, it 
is also determined to block the Western sanctions against the DPRK which could cause collapse of 
the North Korean regime (ibid, 206). 
 103 
 
4. Roles and North Korean Foreign Politics: Interactions, Role 
Changes and Fluctuations 
In this chapter, I put the changes that occurred in the major roles discussed 
in Chapter 3 in the context with North Korean interactions with significant 
others. Using the data which have already been presented in graphs 
depicting role changes in The Pyongyang Times dataset, I created Chart 19 
(see the following page). 
As I have already linked the roles having significant position in North Korea 
role sets to particular group of significant others, I can now take these roles 
one by one and contextualize the major role changes as depicted in Chart 19 
with the interactions with the group of foes/friends. To make whole process 
clearer, I identified several spheres of interactions according to which I will 
subsequently proceed with my analysis. I summarize these spheres in Chart 
20. In accordance with formerly mentioned work of Chafetz, Abramson and 
Grillot (1996, 736), I took (North Korean) past and current experiences with 
other countries into consideration. Nevertheless, two points have to be 
mentioned in this regard.  
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Chart 19: Changes in the Role Saliency: Downfalls and Rises 
  
1994-
1995 
1995-
1996 
1996-
1997 
1997-
1998 
1998-
1999 
1999-
2000 
2000-
2001 
2001-
2002 
2002-
2003 
2003-
2004 
2004-
2005 
2005-
2006 
2006-
2007 
2007-
2008 
2008-
2009 
2009-
2010 
2010-
2011 
2011-
2012 
2012-
2013 
2013-
2014 
2014-
2015 
internal developer 6 -10 14 -3 9 6 -6 0 0 7 -2 -2 -8 -6 15 5 -8 11 -7 1 5 
independent -5 5 3 -3 -5 -1 5 0 7 -1 -4 -12 6 -1 -1 3 2 -5 4 6 -6 
active independent -1 3 -13 4 -9 12 6 -17 1 8 -6 1 6 5 -7 0 3 -10 5 -1 7 
isolate -5 5 0 -5 6 -9 3 0 17 -16 5 -3 5 -6 -5 -1 4 14 -11 3 0 
bastion of revolution - 
liberator -2 -2 -2 12 -11 1 5 -5 -9 0 2 11 -5 -1 -10 9 -2 -7 7 -9 2 
anti-imperialist agent 8 -2 4 5 10 -22 -2 7 6 -4 -3 1 -1 0 -7 1 2 -3 4 -3 1 
global peace protector -2 -2 2 -6 3 -5 1 4 -3 0 5 -6 10 -4 -2 2 -2 -7 7 -2 1 
regional peace protector 6 -2 -2 2 -4 7 -7 10 -10 4 2 4 -6 -4 11 -2 3 -12 12 -9 -1 
Source: created by author. The shades of red in the cells stand for the downfalls, the shades of green stand for the rises. The highest downfalls and rises are depicted in bold and are written in larger font. 
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First issue is connected with the human rights criticism as one of the 
spheres of interaction. One should be aware that the consistent human 
rights criticism of the DPRK is still very recent issue. In particular, the 
concerted pressure of international community on North Korea due to its 
human rights record did not obtain stronger contours until March 2013 
when the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the DPRK (hereinafter 
referred to as CoI) was formed as a part of the United Nations Human Rights 
Council. Although there were some hints of human rights pressure on North 
Korea even sooner, for example, 2004 U.S. North Korean Human Rights Act 
(see below) or various civil society initiatives that were criticizing the 
situation, 77  the consistent pressure did not materialize until 2013. 
Furthermore, the coherent human rights criticism occurred when the power 
transition was under way in North Korea which significantly shook the 
composition of role sets. Therefore, it is problematic to observe the 
correlation in its full scale here. Nevertheless, I argue that we should not 
fully give up the factoring of human rights pressure as we might loose a part 
of the picture of North Korean interactions with the significant others. 
Second issue relates to the aid provision as one of the spheres of interaction 
as delimited in Chart 20. It is problematic to observe the correlation 
between aid provided by China as main representative of group of friends 
and composition of North Korean role sets. The exact data about the 
assistance provided are unavailable as China classifies them as a matter of 
national secret.  Sophisticated estimates show that Chinese aid to DPRK is 
most likely massive (comp. Lee M. 2009; Reilly 2014, or Haggard and Noland 
2009) whereas China probably provides energy assistance, sponsors 
                                                          
77 The civil society organizations focussing on North Korea have often both humanitarian 
and human rights dimension. They started to be more active mainly after 2000 in the United States 
and South Korea. One of the oldest ones is Citizens' Alliance for North Korean Human Rights 
(CANKHR), or for example, People for Successful Korean Reunification (PSCORE). Although their 
human rights activities were quite limited during the Sunshine Policy era, their influence grew after 
2008. In 2011, they created a network called International Coalition to Stop the Crimes against 
Humanity in North Korea (ICNK) which involves more than 40 organizations nowadays (ICNK n.d.). 
ICNK significantly contributed to the establishment of the UN Commission of Inquiry on Human 
Rights in North Korea. 
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infrastructure projects, food aid, training programs and provides emergency 
aid (Reilly 2014, 1167). Nevertheless, existing aid/assistance data alone are 
not sufficient for proper observing of correlation between the aid provision 
and development of particular role on regular basis. Thus, it is useful to 
supplement the existing estimates of aid quantity with trade figures in order 
to obtain more complex picture of economic dimension of Sino-North 
Korean relations. This is also approach that students of Chinese aid to the 
DPRK often choose (comp. Hong 2014; Lee J. 2009; Reilly 2014, or Choo 
2008).78 For example, Julia Lee's claims that there are three types of China's 
energy assistance: grant type aid, trade at “friendship prices”, and exchange 
with alternative natural resources for oil (Lee J. 2009, 51). Combining the 
figures depicting the trade between the China and North Korea and China's 
aid to the DPRK can help me to grasp the economic dimension of China- 
DPRK relations in satisfactory way. 
For every major role previously identified in North Korean statements, I will 
follow the spheres of interaction depicted in Chart 20. I selected these 
particular spheres as they constitute the core of North Korean interactions 
with the significant others. In chapters that follow, I deal with the 
                                                          
78 As far as the process of implementation of Chinese aid to the DPRK is concerned, article 
of James Reilly (2014) is very useful in this regard. By interviewing various Chinese officials and 
analysing relevant materials, he was able to map the terrain of Chinese aid provision to the DPRK in 
satisfactory way (comp. Reilly 2014, 1164–1165). 
Chart 20: Spheres of North Korean Interactions with the Significant Others 
group of foes group of friends 
negotiations about North Korean 
nuclear/ballistic missiles program 
humanitarian/development aid provision, 
economic exchanges 
humanitarian/development aid 
provision 
diplomatic support/criticism 
human rights criticism 
negotiations about nuclear/ballistic missiles 
program diplomatic isolation and imposition 
of sanctions 
Source: created by author. 
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substantial changes which occur in that particular North Korean role and 
contextualize them with the DPRK's interactions with significant others. Let 
me start with internal developer. 
4.1 Internal Developer: Role Changes and Interactions with the 
Significant Others 
As we can see in Chart 19, the strongest downfall in this role's saliency 
occurred between 1995 and 1996 whereas the year 1996 was the only one 
when role internal developer dropped out of the role set completely. This 
period was quite dynamic as far as North Korean interaction with the U.S. is 
concerned. On 21st October 1994, the first nuclear crisis which was brought 
to its end: the Agreed Framework79  was signed by the U.S. and North Korean 
representatives. As I pointed out elsewhere (Kudláčová 2014a, 94), the 
Agreed Framework and the Korean Energy Development Organization 
(KEDO) which was established in March 1995 to implement the principles of 
Agreed Framework is often observed as a breakthrough in the North Korean 
nuclear freeze. In the beginning of 1996, the United States also expressed its 
willingness to ease its economic sanctions formerly imposed on the DPRK 
(Arms Control Association 2016). 
As Wendt points out in his article, the role change occurs when the actor is 
unable to deal with a new (social) situation within preexisting roles (Wendt 
1992, 419). If I put this claim into the context with above mentioned 
developments, it is possible to see a new situation indeed arose between 
1995 and 1996 for the DPRK. To begin with, it was firstly ever when the 
DPRK reached a joint agreement with the United States. This can be 
perceived as a brand new situation for North Korea which only experienced 
confrontation in its interaction with the United States. Also Leon Sigal (1998, 
                                                          
79 By signing the Agreed Framework, the DPRK agreed to freeze its nuclear facility in 
Yongbyon and enable the international inspectors to enter the country in exchange for two light 
water reactors that should have been provided by the United States and fuel aid (The New York 
Times n.d., or Niksch 2003, 9). The Korean Energy Development Organizations was subsequently 
established as a platform that was supposed to support the implementation of the goals declared in 
the Agreed Framework (KEDO, non-dated). 
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6) points out the DPRK indirectly signalized it will abide by the Agreed 
Framework, i.e. to leave the internal developer role in its military 
development-oriented dimension. For example, it permitted International 
Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as IAEA) inspectors enter 
and verify the DPRK was not reprocessing the spent fuel from its reactors.  
Nevertheless, the drop-out of internal developer in 1996 was followed by 
relatively steep increase of this role’s saliency in 1997. Again, this may be 
interpreted in terms of North Korean interactions with its main foe. In the 
end of 1997, the negotiations between the United States and DPRK about 
North Korean concessions in its missile program failed and the United States 
decided to impose new sanctions on the DPRK for unspecified missile-
proliferation activities (Arms Control Association 2016). In the situation of 
insecurity which was further intensified by significant food shortages,80 the 
strategy of threatening and sanctions gave North Korea more of reasons to 
further proceed with military build-up (Sigal 1998, 12). The rise of internal 
developer role saliency in 1997 in context with newly imposed sanctions can 
be interpreted as the result of reflected appraisal mechanism described in 
Chapter 1.3.3.  
Role internal developer had been gaining stronger position in North Korean 
role sets since the end of 1990s which may be related to its inconsistent 
interactions with significant others (see Chapter 3.2). On one hand, the first 
ever bilateral talks between the U.S. and DPRK took place in New York in 
June 2000 where Kim Jong Il even spoke of acceding the U.S. military 
presence on the peninsula and both countries declared (Suh 2014, 157) 
followed by another visit of North Korean delegation to the U.S. and signing 
                                                          
80 North Korean famine which started in the middle of 1990s was caused by many factors. 
The most important ones were probably the structural problems and economic mismanagement of 
North Korean government together with the loss of former suppliers of crucial goods and series of 
floods that hit the country. For more information about it, see for example Haggard and Noland 
2007.  
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of joint NK-U.S. Communiqué in October 2000.81 On the other hand, the 
implementation of Agreed Framework turned out to be problematic after 
2000 as many delays occurred in case of U.S. heavy fuel oil shipments and 
the construction of the light water reactors (hereinafter referred to as LWR) 
was postponed several times. Moreover, the United States refused to lift the 
past economic sanctions and perceived the high level negotiations with the 
DPRK as a reward for the DPRK which is somehow a distorted opinion 
(comp. Sigal 1998, 83). Thus, situation combined with famine emergency 
inside the DPRK probably deepened North Korean feeling of insecurity 
which was followed by firmer nesting of internal developer role in the North 
Korean role sets. 
As Chart 19 illustrates, the role saliency shows relatively steep fall between 
2007 and 2008 preceded by mild decreasing of the saliency starting from 
2004. This is also a period of six party talks82 (hereinafter referred to as 
SPT), the series of negotiations with North Korea about its nuclear program 
lasting between 2003 and 2008. By being integrated to SPT where all its 
important friends and foes were present, the DPRK was confronted with an 
unusual situation that it was not able to deal with in the framework of 
continuing rise of saliency of the internal developer role. Stable decreasing 
tendency of the internal developer role saliency which correlates with the 
continuation of the SPT also demonstrates North Korean receptivity to 
                                                          
81 By signing the communiqué, the DPRK agreed to abandon its plans for developing of 
long-range missiles whereas the United States agreed to guarantee North Korean survival together 
with economic aid. Moreover, both countries agreed they will participate on the four party talks 
which should also serve as a method for the future reunification of the peninsula (Suh 2014, 167). 
82 The six party talks were negotiations between the DPRK, United States, Republic of 
Korea, Japan, China and Russia about North Korean nuclear program. Since their inception in 2003 
in reaction to the second nuclear crisis of 2002 and North Korean decision to withdraw from 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (hereinafter referred to as NPT), SPT had several phases of 
negotiations but they have been discontinued in April 2009 in reaction to North Korean test of 
intercontinental ballistic missile/satellite launch. The Six Party Talks were preceded by four party 
talks where the DPRK, South Korea, China and U.S. participated between 1997 and 1999. The four 
party talks are perceived as a failure as the parties were not able to “set agenda items for their 
talks” (Kwak 2009, 122). As Joo (2009, 208) points out, the participation of Russia in the SPT also 
contributed to smoother course of the negotiations as Russia (together with China and South Korea 
in period of sunshine policy) spoke in favour of North Korea and helped to moderate the U.S. hard 
line position. 
 110 
 
negotiations.83 The fall of internal developer role saliency in 2006–2007 and 
2000–2001 correlates with other significant events in North Korean 
interaction with South Korea, i.e. two inter-Korean summits in 2000 and 
2007. The first inter-Korean summit of June 2000 84  brought joint 
declaration that should have ensured peaceful coexistence of both Koreas 
(Kwak 2009, 119).  
Chart 19 shows the strongest rise of internal developer role saliency in 
period after 2009. Again, it is possible to interpret this shift in context with 
development of DPRK's relations with group of foes. In 2008, South Korean 
Great National Party led by to-be president Lee Myung Bak who promoted 
containment of the DPRK on a long term basis published the Vision 3000 
through Denuclearization and Openness (also referred as DNO 3000). This 
document became essential for following South Korean policy towards its 
northern neighbour.85 DNO 3000 essentially brought much more tensions 
into the inter-Korean relations and made inter-Korean communication much 
more complicated as I have showed elsewhere (comp. Kudláčová 2014b). As 
Scott Snyder aptly notices, the DPRK carefully refrained from criticizing Lee 
Myung Bak during the political campaign before 2008 in order to leave “the 
door open to continuity in the inter-Korean relationship” (Snyder 2010, 
155). This changed drastically after Lee Myung Bak won the presidential 
election (comp. for example, The Pyongyang Times 2008, 1, or Kim 2009, 6). 
Despite the signals that occurred during the campaign, the newly elected 
                                                          
83 Although it is often argued the SPT brought only little results, they led to North Korean 
agreement to abandon its nuclear program in exchange for the fuel and food aid shipments (Bajoria 
and Xu 2013). 
84 Nevertheless, it is needed to point out that in March 2000, South Korean president Kim 
Tae Jung made secret journey to Singapore where he met representatives of North Korean Asia-
Pacific Peace Committee and offered them a secret payoff of 450 million dollars together with 
unspecified shipment of goods for regime in value of 50 million dollars (Kirk 2009, 157–158).  
Thus, the first summit is sometimes perceived as a mere result of this “bribe” that Kim Dae Jung 
made. 
85 Basically speaking, the initiative should have raised the DPRK's per capita income to 
3000 dollars if it abandoned its nuclear program and opened to the world (Snyder 2010, 154). 
Although the initiative is formulated in very attractive and catchy way in South Korean official 
documents (comp. Bae 2009), it brought much more pragmatic and conservative policy towards the 
DPRK together with cessation of flows of South Korean aid to the DPRK. 
 111 
 
Obama administration did not bring any changes the DPRK hoped for. The 
U.S. continued with politics of sanctions and pressure on North Korea in 
form of the “Strategic Patience” doctrine (Suh 2014, 161). Thus, the rise of 
internal developer role saliency in 2009 and generally stronger emphasis on 
this role even in the following year correlates with dramatic change of South 
Korean approach towards the DPRK, with the discontinuation of SPT, with 
intensification of sanctions imposed against the DPRK in 2009 and also, with 
the fact the Obama administration retained former confrontational stance. 
Chart 19 demonstrates there was relatively strong fall in role saliency in 
2011. In this year, the DPRK expressed its will to come back to SPT which 
was backed by Russia and China. Furthermore, North Korean representative 
travelled to the U.S. where the United States expressed its willingness to 
return to the negotiating table as well (Arms Control Association 2016). The 
improving atmosphere and hopes to restart SPT that seem to correlate with 
the fall of internal developer role saliency in 2011 were nevertheless 
interrupted by death of Kim Jong Il which started the period of power 
transition to his son, Kim Jong Un. It is needed to point out at this place that 
the DPRK underwent the period of relatively unexpected power transition 
after 2011. This may be perceived as the time of crisis or shock as Nabers 
(2011, 85–86) defines it and it might have resulted in the fluctuations that 
occurred in practically all the roles between 2011–2012 and 2012–2013 
(again, see Chart 19).  
It is also interesting to observe that the amount of aid provided by the 
United States and South Korea to the DPRK correlates with the 
developments in internal developer role saliency only partially. Although the 
amount of aid peaked in 1999 and remained very high till 2003 in case of the 
U.S. aid, the emphasis on internal developer role showed growing tendency. 
On the other hand, in the peaking assistance from South Korea 2005–2007 
actually correlates with decreasing saliency of internal developer role. When 
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putting this into the context of debates about the potential influence of aid 
provision on change of the actual politics of its recipient, North Korean case 
shows this strategy does not bring consistent evidence about that. 
Lastly, there is the sphere of criticism of human rights situation in the DPRK. 
I have already pointed out above it did not reached stronger contours until 
2004 with issuing of the North Korean Human Rights Act.86 The human 
rights pressure aimed to the DPRK has been reaching higher intensity 
mainly after 2011 and still, the criticism did not really impact the DPRK until 
March 2013 when the CoI was formed by the United Nations Human Rights 
Council which brought more consistent approach in investigating of human 
rights violations.87 Therefore, the consistent and institutionalized human 
rights pressure did not occur until 2013 which makes the observation of 
influence of this form of interaction difficult. Nevertheless, there is one 
interesting connection. As I pointed out above, the statements correlating 
with internal developer role have contained reference to “civilized country 
building” since 2013. Moreover, I was able to identify the role civilized 
country in North Korean statements in 2012. It is possible to interpret the 
North Korean references to “civilized nation building” as an expression of its 
sensitivity to the increased human rights pressure coming from the group of 
foes. This reminds the debates about the influence of norms and taboos in 
the international environment as discussed by Richard Price and Nina 
Tannenwald (1996, 2). They try to find out why the nuclear weapons were 
not used and provide the alternative explanation to the deterrence theory. In 
particular, they claim the social and cultural meanings became attached to 
                                                          
86 The criticism of North Korean human rights situation gained significant momentum in 
2004 when the United States approved the North Korean Human Rights Act (hereinafter referred to 
as NKHRA). In sum, the document states the North Korean human right will be crucial element for 
the U.S. when negotiating with the DPRK. Furthermore, NKHRA proposed to establish a multilateral 
forum in Northeast Asia where the North Korean human rights situation should be debated (Kang 
2004, 155 and 167). 
87 CoI's mandate is to “to investigate systematic, widespread and grave violations of human 
rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” (UN Human Rights Office of the High 
Commissioner n.d.a). So far, it initiated public hearings in Seoul, Tokyo, London and Washington 
during which the witnesses of human rights violations and experts provided their testimonies (UN 
Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner n.d.b). 
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these weapons which gradually resulted in the refusal to use them. I argue 
that similar mechanism may be emerging in case of human rights norms' 
influence on the DPRK. Although the evidence is still very young, it seems 
the DPRK has actually started to reflect something what we might call 
human rights abuse taboo by labelling itself as “civilized country” recently.  
Surely, this claim is relatively brave and further evidences and investigation 
would by needed to further support it. Nevertheless, if looking at the overall 
frequency of North Korean use of word “civilized” in The Pyongyang Times 
between 1994 and 2015, we can see its occurrence frequency has been 
significantly increasing as well. In particular, the articles in The Pyongyang 
Times tend to use this world in connection with the lives of North Korean 
people or above mentioned civilized nation building after 2012.88 As the 
extract of the texts where the reference to word “civilized” were often not 
declarations of a role, I could not include them to my data sample. 
Nevertheless, this rise of occurrence frequency supports my statement 
about possible forming of human rights abuse taboo. 
 
4.2 Independent: Role Changes and Interactions with the Significant 
Others 
It is needed to point out that independence and self-reliance have been 
absolutely crucial values for North Korean regime practically since 1950s. As 
Charles K. Armstrong points out, ideology of Juche (which embodied the 
principle of self-reliance) has been “the most extreme and uncompromising 
expression of national and economic sovereignty in the world” (Armstrong 
2013, 53). Thus, we can expect that the role independent is rooted very 
deeply in the North Korean role sets, that it constitutes cornerstone of the 
DPRK's identity and that the issue of sovereignty and independence is 
                                                          
88 Besides many others references, see for example Rodong Sinmun, Josoninmingun and 
Rodong Chongnyon 2012, 6; The Pyongyang Times 2012, 1; Bok 2013, 2; Bok 2014, 3, or Kim Jong 
Un 2015b, 1. On the other hand, if going through the Pyongyang Times issues between 1994 and 
2011, the word “civilized” in connection with North Korea occurred only very scarcely. 
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indeed absolute and indivisible for North Korea, as Armstrong (ibid., 292) 
claims. Given to such a deep nesting of the role independent in North Korean 
identity, it is neither probable this role vanishes from the role sets nor its 
saliency drops significantly. To put it differently we can expect the North 
Korean ego will prevail over alter's influence in their mutual interaction in 
the international scene. This is actually confirmed by stagnating trend of this 
role saliency depicted in Chart 10.1. 
As we can see in Chart 21, there was relatively strong rise in this role's 
saliency in 2003 which is the year of the second nuclear crisis on the 
peninsula. Let me now focus on this complex situation in detail. First, North 
Korean policy of President Bush was quite inconsistent and produced 
different signals to the DPRK. On one hand, there was strongly 
confrontational rhetoric such as the incorporation of the DPRK into so called 
Axis of Evil in the beginning of 200289 or declaration of a possibility to use of 
nuclear weapons against the DPRK in March of the same year (Arms Control 
Association 2016). On the other hand, foreign policy representatives 
announced the U.S. willingness to negotiate with the DPRK without any 
preconditions (ibid.) and there were some other some hints of cooperative 
atmosphere, such as the August 2002 ceremony when the concrete base for 
the first LWR was poured in North Korea or North Korean announcement to 
indefinitely extend its moratorium on missile testing as a part of former 
agreement with Japan in the same year. The mixed signals were present 
even in later years in the U.S. policies towards the DPRK (see below).  
Second, there was the atmosphere of insecurity after 9/11 attacks and 
subsequent U.S. invasion to Iraq in 2003. Third, there were major issues and 
delays as far as the Agreed Framework and LWR project is concerned. As 
                                                          
89 There were more confrontations going from the Bush administration which sometimes 
even touched the personal level. For example, President Bush resorted to the personal assault 
against Kim Jong Il declaring he loathed him (comp. The Progressive 2003), the U.S. Secretary of 
State Powell argued that Kim Jong-il is a dictator (Harnisch 2002, 864), the Secretary of Defence 
Rumsfeld went so far as to declare that North Korean leaders are “idiotic” (Hwang 2004, 15) and so 
forth. 
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Pollack (2011, 131) points out, North Korea had been becoming increasingly 
frustrated over the slow pace of heavy fuel oil shipments and over only little 
progress in LWR project. I have already mentioned above that it became 
clear in 2002 that the LWR will not be finished according to the previously 
set schedule. Moreover, Bush administration proved to be unwilling both to 
sustain the Agreed Framework and bring the LWR project into the existence 
(ibid.).  
What I perceive as the crucial turning point and final trigger of upcoming 
second nuclear crisis (and the factor that strongly contributed to the rise of 
saliency of role independent) were the negotiations between the U.S. and 
North Koreas in the DPRK in autumn 2002.  The then assistant secretary of 
state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly criticized the DPRK for its 
nuclear and missile programs, human rights violations and abysmal 
humanitarian situation whereas he brought out the U.S. intelligence reports 
confirming North Korean nuclear program is still under way. After initially 
rejecting these accusations, North Korea allegedly admitted it has nuclear 
program. Nevertheless, there were no specifications available of the exact 
dimension of this program90 (comp. Arms Control Association 2016, or 
Sanger 2002).  
The U.S. revelation was followed by full cessation of heavy-fuel oil shipments 
to North Korea and by the DPRK's announcement to restart its nuclear 
reactors in December 2002 and to withdraw from the NPT in early 2003. 
The increased saliency of the role independent in 2003 can be interpreted as 
North Korean reaction to the confrontational situation. In front of its 
international audiences, the DPRK wanted to fortify itself with its self-
reliance, independence and sovereignty (and even with nuclear program of 
unspecified scale). It wanted to show that first, it will not comply with the 
U.S. demands despite its pressure and new sanctions imposed in March 
                                                          
90 During the meeting North Korean representatives also claimed the DPRK has even “more 
powerful things” besides the nuclear program (Sanger 2002).  
 116 
 
2003 and second, that it is perfectly able to face the pressure thanks to its 
“powerful” military capacities. Once again, we can see the DPRK shows 
strong receptivity to pressure and sanctions as they correlate with 
strengthened North Korean emphasis on its independence and self-reliance. 
The atmosphere of the U.S. invasion to Iraq in 2003 made significant 
contribution to North Korean increased emphasis to independence and it 
probably even contributed to North Korean nuclear “coming out”. 
Once again, the mechanism of reflected appraisal seems to be relevant for 
interpretation of the crisis of 2003. This is demonstrated by the statement of 
North Korean First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Sok Ju, who 
declared during the meeting with Kelly: “We are a part of axis of evil and you 
(the U.S., added by author) are a gentleman. This is our relationship. We 
cannot discuss matters like gentlemen. If we disarm ourselves because of U.S. 
pressure, then we will become like Yugoslavia or Afghanistan's Taliban, to 
be beaten to death” (Kang quoted according to Pritchard 2007, 25). In the 
escalating situation, North Korea simply reacted by fortifying itself with 
alleged nuclear program91 and the rhetoric correlating with role independent. 
It aimed to remind the international audience that the DPRK is not willing to 
step back in front of the pressure of its main foe.  
We can see here that the sharpened stance of the United States actually 
further supported and strengthened North Korean identity of self-reliance 
and independence. As the situation of escalated confrontation was not 
anything new for the DPRK that was used to it from the previous decades of 
confrontation with the U.S., there simply was no reason to leave or lower the 
saliency of the old role as it still corresponded with the reality. Simply 
speaking, there was no reason for the DPRK to think of itself in novel terms. 
Similar logic can be used for interpretation of the events in 2006 when the 
saliency of role independent dropped to its lowest level. After series of SPT 
                                                          
91 The saliency of role internal developer remains on the high level in this period too. 
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negotiations, the DPRK returned to the NPT in autumn 2005 and declared its 
willingness to denuclearize, basically in exchange for further debates about 
the provision of LWR which brought the second nuclear crisis to its end. This 
also projected in the North Korean role set in 2005 when the saliency 
dropped. Nevertheless, the next round of SPT showed waste disagreements 
between the DPRK and U.S. Moreover, the freezing of North Korean funds in 
the Banco Delta Asia (Macau)92 in late 2005 cut the DPRK from the foreign 
currency.  
In 2006, North Korean manoeuvring space was further shrinking when new 
U.S. sanctions occurred and KEDO executive council announced the end of 
LWR project. In this situation, North Korea was probably shaken and needed 
to reassure both itself and international audience it is still “independent and 
powerful nation”. The reassurance came into being in the form of ballistic 
missiles launch and first ever nuclear test in the end of 2006. These events 
helped the DPRK to reclaim its independence which is demonstrated by the 
rise of independent role saliency in 2007.93  
Again, it is interesting to observe how the inflows of humanitarian aid did 
not really impact the crisis described above. Although the total amount of 
aid provided to the DPRK by the Republic of Korea between 2006 and 2007 
peaked – it reached about $270 million annually in both years (comp. 
Kudláčová 2013, 58) – it did not really make any difference in the course of 
events. The same may be said about the U.S. massive aid to the DPRK 
between 1998 and 2002. 
  
                                                          
92 North Korean funds (about 25 million dollars) in the Banco Delta Asia were perceived as 
the money coming from illegal activities, such as drug trafficking. Therefore, the United States 
applied the USA Patriot Act and froze these funds. 
93 The North Korean Foreign Ministry also declared the nuclear test was executed in order 
to prove the DPRK has nukes that can protect its sovereignty. At the same time, it claimed it 
remains unchanged in its support to denuclearization (comp. DPRK Foreign Ministry 2006, 1). 
 118 
 
4.3 Active Independent: Role Changes and Interactions with the 
Significant Others 
The active independent stands for the only role among the most important 
ones in the North Korean role sets linked to group of friends. This group is 
mainly represented by China, who is traditionally perceived as the DPRK's 
closest ally and by Russia as well. I have already mentioned in Chapter 3.3 
very briefly how this role's position in North Korean role sets developed in 
the beginning of the period I analyse. Let me now proceed with the 
contextualization of the changes. 
One of the strongest downfalls in the saliency occurred in 1997. As the 
meaning of this role is mainly connected with the DPRK's effort to expand its 
diplomatic ties and is linked to the group of friends, this shift may be 
interpreted in the light of consolidation of the DPRK's relations with China 
and first steps on the way of revitalization of DPRK's relations with Russia. 
In case of Sino-North Korean relations, The Agreement on Economic and 
Technology Cooperation signed in May 1996 symbolized significant 
breakthrough as it ensured stable inflow of aid for next five years and the 
system of “friendly prices” in the bilateral trade between Beijing and 
Pyongyang (Choo 2008, 348). 
Furthermore, Russia gradually started to work on the revitalization of its 
relations with Pyongyang since the late 1990s as well.  For example, in 1997, 
Russia expressed its willingness to be active part and regular participant in 
the nuclear negotiations with North Korea (known as the four party talks in 
that period)94 and both countries made a significant step in revitalization of 
mutual relations by signing the agreement on cultural and scientific 
cooperation between both countries. The full normalization of bilateral 
relations did not come into existence until February 2000 when The Treaty 
of Friendship, Good Neighbourly Relations and Cooperation was signed 
                                                          
94 Nevertheless, Russia did not participate in the negotiations on the DPRK's nuclear 
program in 1990s (comp. Zhebin 1995, 739). 
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(Vorontsov 2007, 7–8). As Joo (2009, 185) aptly points out, it was the rise of 
president Putin that meant a clear break with the Kim Jong Ils's past 
unpleasant memories connected with Yeltsin's Russia. The basic treaty of 
2000 (which is the shorter form often used for the Treaty of Friendship) 
started a new era of active development of relations between North Korea 
and Putin's Russia. Kim Jong Il reportedly perceived new Russian president 
in very positive way. After his personal dinner with Putin, he even argued: 
“If I am treated diplomatically (…) I become a diplomat myself. Putin was 
sincere with me and I opened my heart to him” (Kim Jong Il quoted in Joo 
2009, 187).  
North Korean success in revitalization of its relations with its Cold War era 
friends is also demonstrated in weakening of active independent role 
saliency. The DPRK regained its self confidence after the normalization of its 
relations with China in 1996 and the same development followed with 
Russia in period between 2000 and 2002. This is also demonstrated by the 
composition of the DPRK's role sets. The first downfall of the active 
independent role saliency occurred in 1997, immediately after North Korea 
reached its agreement with China. After that, there was the rise of saliency 
between 2000 and 2001 which can be interpreted as North Korean effort to 
assure its friends (this time mainly Putin's Russia) that it is ready to deepen 
the cooperation. Indeed, further expansion of relations with Russia 
materialized between 2000 and 2001 when more agreements were reached 
(comp. Joo 2009, 187–188). This was followed by steep downfall of active 
independent role saliency between 2002 and 2003 as represented in Chart 
21. 
To sum up, as the DPRK reclaimed its self-confidence by establishing 
relations with China and Russia, there was no longer the need to ensure the 
international audiences of its willingness to develop relations with “friendly 
countries”.  Simply speaking, the reason arose for the DPRK to “think oneself 
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in novel terms” (comp. Wendt 1992, 419) at least temporarily. This is 
demonstrated in the reconfiguration of composition of North Korean role 
sets when comparing years 1996 and 1997 and simultaneous gradual rise of 
saliency of other roles, mainly the internal developer. Thus, we can perceive 
the re-establishment and deepening of relations with China and Russia as an 
important precondition for the rise of the internal developer role's saliency 
in North Korean role sets which basically signalized Pyongyang focus on its 
military build-up (comp. Joo 2009, 183–184). Once again, the mechanism of 
reflected appraisal seems to be relevant even when approaching the DPRK's 
relations with its friends. This is demonstrated in the above quoted 
statement of Kim Jong Il about the DPRK's relations with Russia. 
Clearly, the second half of 1990s and the very beginning of 2000s was 
crucial period that probably strongly determined future of North Korean 
foreign political directions. The rise of U.S. administration of George Bush 
and the U.S. breaking with the Clinton's vigilant engagement policies 
towards the DPRK pushed Pyongyang toward Moscow and Beijing. Once the 
DPRK was able to stabilize its relations with Russia and China, and once the 
stable trade ties with China was ensured,95 it has probably started to feel 
much more confident about its own identity as it was practically reassured it 
can count on its traditional friends. This at least contributed to the rise of 
roles which brought reclusive and inimical policies towards the West (for 
example, the internal developer and isolate). 
If we look closer at the correlation between the sanctions imposed on the 
DPRK with support of Russia and China and development of active 
independent role saliency, we also arrive to interesting findings. Basically 
speaking, Russia and China96 expressed their support to the anti-DPRK 
                                                          
95 The Chinese export to North Korea was sharply rising (comp. Hong 2014, 294). 
96 Before 2006, China was not willing to impose sanctions against North Korea. Although it 
reportedly cut off its oil supplies to the DPRK for three days after North Korea restarted its nuclear 
program in 2003 (Reilly 2014, 1178), this cannot really be perceived as meaningful sanctioning 
mechanism. 
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sanctions mainly since 2006 when the DPRK carried out series of ballistic 
missile tests and the first nuclear test ever (see above). After China and 
Russia expressed their support of UN Security Council resolutions against 
the DPRK mainly in 2006, 2009 and 2013 (Reilly 2014, 1178), the saliency of 
active independent role in North Korean role sets grew as Chart 11.2 
demonstrates. This actually indicates worsening of North Korean relations 
with its friends, especially with China (Hong 2014, 295), whereas the 
repeated strengthening of saliency of active independent role indicates 
possible reopening of space for a new engagement with the DPRK.   
At this place, it is also needed to point out Chinese as well as Russian 
criticism of North Korean nuclear and ballistic missiles tests in 2006 and 
2009 was rather circumspect but it became harsher in 2013 and afterwards 
(comp. English News 2013; Jun 2013, or The Guardian 2016). Furthermore, 
China reportedly decreased amount of its export of both grain and fertilizer 
in 2013 to the DPRK (Yonhap News Agency 2013) and general decrease of 
Chinese export to North Korea has continued even in 2014 and 2015 (Shim 
2016). Again, this may explain the rise in active independent role saliency 
since 2012. By using statements referring to this role, North Korea signalizes 
its increased need to look for support in the international environment. If 
we also consider the fact that the aid China provides to North Korea is 
probably crucial for regime survival (comp. Choo 2008, 343), we may 
perceive the economic dimension of Sino-North Korean friendship as both 
formative element for development of active independent role saliency and 
interesting indicator of the development of their mutual relations. 
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4.4 Isolate: Role Changes and Interactions with the Significant Others 
Kalevi J. Holsti argues in his article this role arises from given state's threat 
perception and its insufficient capacities (Holsti 1970, 297). The perception 
of threat accompanied with the feeling of insecurity is especially relevant 
when we observe this role's development in North Korean case. 
The situation in which the DPRK found itself in 2003 has already been 
described above in detail (see Chapter 4.2). The Agreed Framework was 
failing which deepened mutual distrust between Washington and Pyongyang, 
the U.S. policy towards the DPRK was highly inconsistent releasing different 
signals to North Korea going from vigilant signs of engagement to sharp 
containment in the form of sanctions against the DPRK (also comp. Han 
2014, 293). Moreover, the U.S. invasion to Iraq became reality in 2003. All 
these aspects contributed to rise of the role isolate to unprecedented level in 
the same year. I have already demonstrated in case of role independent how 
it functioned as a mechanism of fortification of North Korea against the 
pressure and sanctions. The role isolate seems to have very similar function: 
the DPRK aims to remind its foes it is ready to face the enemies in any case.  
The role saliency dropped from 24 % to a mere 8 % in 2004 when the next 
rounds of SPT negotiations took place in Beijing which brought an 
agreement about the next steps in North Korean denuclearization. We can 
see the saliency of role isolate stayed on lower level between 2005 and 2010. 
This period mostly correlates with ongoing SPT negotiations. Furthermore, 
North Korea hoped that the forthcoming change of presidential 
administration in the United States will bring the change of the U.S. politics 
and revitalization of engagement policies. This argument is widely 
supported by various scholars dealing with North Korean foreign policy. For 
example, Kwang Ho Lee argues that the DPRK perceived the inauguration of 
President Obama as possible opportunity to “(…) start afresh in relations 
with Washington” (Lee K. H. 2009, 2). This North Korean belief arose from 
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previous statements of Barack Obama: he expressed his willingness to meet 
with the DPRK representatives and to negotiate about the nuclear issue 
(ibid., 3). Olsen (2009, 151) or Paik (2009, 9) arrive to very same conclusion. 
The conciliatory tone of North Korean regime was also apparent in 2009 
New Year Editorial where the denuclearization was emphasized as a key 
foreign political goal (comp. Rodong Sinmun, Josoninmingun and Rodong 
Chongnyon 2009, 2). Moreover, the DPRK had probably been experiencing 
the internal crisis due to the deteriorating medical conditions of Kim Jong Il. 
Reportedly, he suffered a stroke (Lee K. H. 2009, 4) and did not show up on 
public since August 2008.  
North Korean hopes for the change of course in Washington's policy turned 
up to be wrong very soon which subsequently projected in North Korean 
nuclear and missile tests (2009) and in gradual rise of saliency of the role 
isolate since 2010. The situation when the DPRK found out the U.S. resorted 
to the “strategic patience” doctrine which basically did not bring much 
changes when compared to Bush's North Korean policy was also one of the 
factors which resonated in the second peaking of the role isolate saliency in 
2012. Furthermore, the administration of South Korean conservative 
president Lee Myung Bak definitely ended the engagement era in 2008 
which pushed the DPRK into even more isolated position. However, we 
should not perceive the U.S.–DPRK and RoK-DPRK interactions as the only 
determinants influencing the rise of saliency of role isolate since 2010. This 
is mainly because this was a highly unstable period of power transition from 
Kim Jong Il who died in December 2011 to Kim Jong Un.97  
The instability of the period between 2011 and 2013 is also visible in Chart 
19 as strong swings in the role sets were present. There was especially 
                                                          
97 The power transition from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jong Il was very different from the recent 
one from Kim Jong Il to Kim Jong Un. Kim Jong Il had been perceived as Kim Il Sung's successor for a 
long time before Kim Il Sung died and consequently, Kim Jong Il was able to build his position in the 
DPRK and gain the support from the senior regime elites. On the other hand, the power transition of 
Kim Jong Un was very quick which left him in the position where he had to work on the 
consolidation of his power after Kim Jong Il died.   
 124 
 
robust reconfiguration in North Korean role set of 2012 when it became 
totally dominated by roles internal developer, isolate and independent 
(together, they stood for 64 % of the role set in this year). At the same time, 
the saliency of all the roles implying active foreign policy experienced 
downfall.  
North Korean redirection to passive and even isolationist foreign policy 
after 2010 can be explained as a result of influence of at least four factors. 
First, there was the issue of unstable and unexpected power transition 
which has already been discussed above. Second, it is highly probable 
(although we cannot claim it for sure) that the breakdown of consensus 
about the North Korean identity occurred in the power succession period. As 
Wendt (1992, 420) points out, this may result in the changes in role sets. 
Third, the pressure of North Korean foes rose and so did the intensity of 
sanctions imposed (comp. Arms Control Association 2016). This actually 
strengthened North Korean tendency to fortify itself by isolationist 
tendencies. Fourth, although the newly elected president Park Geun Hye 
declared the need for trustpolitik and détente of South-North relations 
(comp. Park 2013; Lee 2014, or Kang 2013), the actual policy of South 
toward North retained tense character of the former era. 
As far as the last aspect of interaction, i.e. the aid provision is concerned I 
reached similar findings as in the cases of previously analysed roles. When 
the aid provided to the DPRK by the United States peaked (roughly between 
1998–2002) (comp Kudláčová 2013, 58), saliency of the role isolate was low 
which could indicate certain amount of influence of aid to North Korean 
foreign policy formation. Nevertheless, the saliency of role isolate stayed low 
even before the massive inflows of the aid were initiated and the correlation 
of aid provided with the role isolate gradually vanished in later years of the 
researched period. Thus, the leverage of aid supplies is rather weak in case 
of this role as well.  
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4.5 Bastion of Revolution – Liberator: Role Changes and Interactions 
with the Significant Others 
This role has been constantly present in North Korean role sets in the 
analysed period but it shows very obvious dropping tendency at the same 
time. According to Holsti, its actual implementation should involve sending 
military or other supplies to revolutionary movements in different countries 
and undertaking extensive programs of ideological propaganda abroad (ibid., 
292). Some of these activities are relevant in North Korean case, especially 
the sending of military supplies abroad or consorting with the leftist 
governments or parties from Third World countries. There is serious lack of 
literature dealing with North Korean relations with the countries and actors 
I called “similarly thinking” above. The article of J. Owoeye (1991, 632) is 
one of the few. He shows the DPRK strived to gain the voting support of 
African countries at the UN General Assembly which was essentially aimed 
at the diplomatic isolation of South Korea.98  
This role can be linked both to group of friends and foes, i.e. to the group of 
actors the DPRK aims to liberate and those that it perceives as actors 
causing the subjugation of those formerly mentioned (see Chapter 3.2). 
Nevertheless, I have also explained this role mainly serves for North Korean 
delimitation against its foes (see above). Let me now put the major changes 
in this role's saliency in context with them.  
Despite dropping tendency between 1994 and 1997, the role reached the 
highest level of saliency in 1998. As Kim (2014, 181) points out, the relations 
between the United States and DPRK seemed to be improving between 1995 
                                                          
98 This tactic is similar to the competition between continental China with Taiwan. The 
biggest success of the DPRK's anti-South diplomacy in Africa was that it was able to strengthen its 
ties with Mauritania and Republic of Congo to such an extent that South Korean broke off relations 
with these countries in 1960s (Owoeye 1991, 633). In 1960s and 1970s, the DPRK even provided 
aid to its African allies, for example to Tanzania, Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Somalia, Algeria, 
Sudan, Egypt, Mali, Benin or Togo (ibid., 637–638). Last but not least, North Korea provided its 
African friends with military supplies as well. In this aspect, it is known it cooperated with Nigeria, 
Egypt, Libya, Uganda, Zaire, Angolan Front of National Liberation of Angola, or Mozambique 
Liberation Front (ibid., 639–642). As we can see, the North Korean ties with Africa were really vivid 
in the Cold War era and many have been preserved till present. 
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and 1997. The U.S. lifted its economic sanctions in 1995 and the 
representatives of both countries met in 1996 in Pyongyang and 
participated on the joint inquiry on exhumation of the U.S. causalities of the 
Korean War. Moreover, North Korean athletes were present at the 1996 
Summer Olympic Games in Atlanta and KEDO began the construction of 
LWRs in August 1997.  
However, a new wave of confrontation occurred afterwards. First, there was 
the U.S. criticism of North Korean transfers of missile technologies and 
components to Pakistan which was followed by imposition of sanctions in 
August 1997 and April 1998 (comp. Arms Control Association 2016).99 
Second, the awaited U.S. crude oil shipments to North Korea did not 
materialize and the DPRK was re-designated as sponsor of terrorism (Kim 
2014, 181). The escalating tensions of 1998 were reflected in the steep rise 
of bastion of revolution – liberator role saliency at the very same year. We 
can see the pressure and sanctions helped to feed both the enmity for the 
U.S. and its willingness to act as “a bastion of socialism” as Kim (2014, 184) 
claims. The tensions deescalated slightly in 1999 in the last moments of the 
Clinton's administration which selected more conciliatory approach to the 
DPRK represented by Albright's visit to Pyongyang and other activities. 
Nevertheless, Bush's presidency designated the DPRK as a main enemy 
which contributed to the re-increase of saliency of the bastion of revolution – 
liberator role in 2001.  
We can see in Chart 13.1 the role saliency was low between 2003 and 2005. 
This may be interpreted in the light of North Korean shock connected with 
the U.S. invasion to Iraq (and possibly even by previous one to Afghanistan). 
Furthermore, we can observe the role sets in these years were dominated by 
                                                          
99 As Kim (2014, 181) points out, the relations between the United States and DPRK 
seemed to be improving between 1995 and 1997. The U.S. lifted its economic sanctions in 1995 and 
the representatives of both countries met in 1996 in Pyongyang and participated on the joint 
inquiry on exhumation of the U.S. causalities of the Korean War. Moreover, North Korean athletes 
were present at the 1996 Summer Olympic Games in Atlanta. Furthermore, KEDO began the 
construction of LWRs in August 1997. 
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passive roles, such as independent, isolate or internal developer. Rather than 
to declare its willingness to support world liberation, North Korea probably 
tried to fortify itself with its self-reliance, independence and sovereignty in 
order to show that first, it will not comply with the U.S. demands despite its 
pressure and new sanctions imposed in March 2003 and second, that it is 
perfectly able to face the pressure thanks to its “powerful” military 
capacities. It is possible to interpret the low saliency between 2003 and 
2005 by the shift of North Korean attention towards its own troubles in face 
of standing insecurity connected with the U.S. sanctions and even with the 
reality of the invasions to Afghanistan and Iraq. Although the DPRK 
obviously regained its lost self-confidence in terms of self-perceived ability 
to “fight for the independence of other nations” in 2006,100 the role bastion 
of revolution continued with the decrease of saliency in subsequent years.  
Basically speaking, in the situation of increased international isolation 
combined with increasing amount of sanctions imposed on it after 2000, this 
role was gradually disappearing from North Korean role sets. Thus, we may 
argue that sanctions and diplomatic isolation actually contributed to gradual 
decreasing of this role's saliency. Moreover, if considering that this role is 
connected with North Korean effort to support “similarly thinking countries” 
(mainly in form of military transfers) at the first place, it is possible to say 
the sanctions and international isolation might have been the effective 
instruments for reduction of undesirable North Korean activities in the 
international arena. Still, we need to be aware of the fact that isolation and 
sanctions actually seem to be supporting the growth of internal developer 
role's saliency at the same time which mainly implies the DPRK's efforts to 
boost its military capacities. Consequently, sanctions seem to be double-
edged sword when approaching the DPRK.  
                                                          
100 In 2006, North Korea carried out its first nuclear test which probably helped to boost its 
self-perception as a world liberator.  
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As far as the correlation of aid provided by U.S. and South Korea with 
development of this role's saliency is concerned, I arrived to contradictory 
findings. On one hand, when South Korean aid culminated in 2006–2008, the 
role saliency rose temporarily. It is possible to argue that that these aid 
inflows helped to boost North Korean confidence to perceive itself as a 
world liberator. On the other hand, when the U.S. aid was peaking mainly 
between 1998 and 2002 (comp. Kudláčová 2013, 58), the correlation was 
ambiguous.  
4.6 Anti-Imperialist Agent: Role Changes and Interactions with the 
Significant Others 
According to Holsti (1970, 296), the main sources of this role include 
ideological principles, anti-colonial attitudes and perception of threat. In 
1994, 1995 and 1996, North Korean anti-U.S. rhetoric in form of anti-
imperialist agent role was relatively weak. Once again, this may be linked to 
generally warm atmosphere of U.S.-DPRK relations as well as to the DPRK's 
expectations of change of climate due to new presidential administration in 
the U.S. In both 1993 and 1994 in his New Year speech, Kim Il Sung 
emphasized the bilateral dialogue with the United States as both the way for 
improving mutual relations and for resolving the nuclear issue (Suh 2014, 
153). Nevertheless, the North Korean expectation did not meet reality after 
the first few years of Clinton's presidency: the U.S. imposed sanctions on the 
DPRK in 1996, 1997 and after North Korean test of its ballistic missiles in 
1998. These developments manifested themselves in peaking saliency of 
role anti-imperialist agent role in 1999 as Chart 14.2 demonstrates. 
Furthermore, the Chart 19 indicates the most obvious change in the anti-
imperialist agent role development occurred in period of 1999–2000 when 
the saliency jumped up to 27 % in 1999 whereas it dropped to a mere 5 % of 
the 2000 role set. This situation is quite interesting when considering the 
inconsistent patterns of North Korean relations with its significant others I 
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have already mentioned in case of internal developer role. On one hand, the 
bilateral talks between the U.S. and DPRK took place in New York in June 
2000 followed by another visit of North Korean delegation to the U.S. and 
signing of joint NK-U.S. Communiqué in October 2000. On the other hand, 
problems occurred in terms of Agreed Framework and LWR project 
implementation (see the beginning of this chapter). In contrast to internal 
developer role, the DPRK was more receptive to breakthrough in 
negotiations with the U.S. and at the same time, it seems like it was willing to 
overlook the other issues and problems mentioned before. 
Nevertheless, when G. W. Bush became the U.S. president, the anti-
imperialist agent role's saliency rose again after he classified the DPRK as 
part of the Axis of Evil and spoke about the possibility of the U.S. preemptive 
strike against North Korea in 2002. The rise of this role's saliency in 2003 
reflects North Korean rising feeling of insecurity. Similarly to roles 
independent and internal developer, the saliency of anti-imperialist role 
dropped again when SPT were taking place between 2003 and 2009.  
It is also very interesting that North Korean emphasis on this role has not 
rise again recently. This may be an indicator of North Korean foreign policy 
reorientation later in the post-Cold War era. As Seongji Woo (2011, 195) 
points out, the DPRK might have “(…) solemnly acknowledged that the 
'imperialist-reactionary forces' general offensives against anti-imperialist-
independent forces were gaining ground”. Nabers (2011, 85–86) argues that 
the role change may occur when the role performance stops to correspond 
with actor's identity. Thus, the overall decrease of anti-imperialist agent 
role's saliency can be interpreted also as a signal of gradually vanishing 
ideological dimension of North Korean identity and subsequent waning of 
ideological dimension of the U.S.–DPRK confrontation as well.  
The aid provision did not really correlate with developments in the role 
saliency. On one hand, when the amount of the U.S. assistance to the DPRK 
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was continuously growing from 1995 till 1999, the role saliency 
continuously grew as well. On the other hand, the saliency grew in 2003 
after the United States cut the amount of aid (comp. Kudláčová 2013, 58). In 
case of South Korean aid, the correlation with the role saliency development 
did not manifest at all. Thus, the overall correlation between aid and 
saliency development was weak.  
 
4.7 Global and Regional Peace Protector: Roles' Changes and 
Interactions with the Significant Others 
I decided not to analyse these roles separately as they basically indicate 
focus on the same issue (i.e. peace protection). They also share various 
features and important source of these roles is the threat perception which I 
have already mentioned before. Both of them are less significant and a 
complementary part of North Korean role sets which is reflected by the low 
level of their saliency. As both roles only scarcely occupied prominent 
position in North Korean role sets, it becomes more complicated to follow 
the correlation between their saliency and interactions with the significant 
others in consistent way. In spite of this, I was still able to grasp some 
patterns there. 
The DPRK's commitments to global peace protection were very often 
connected with the commitments to denuclearization in 1990s (see Chapter 
3.2). At the same time, we can see in Chart 15.2 the saliency of this role was 
dropping between 1994 and 2000 whereas the emphasis on internal 
developer role was growing after 1996 at the same time. In context of 
debates about the role change, it is possible to argue North Korea was 
increasingly less confident about the meaning of this role during 1990s 
which is represented in its dropping saliency. Also, I highlighted before 
North Korean commitment to global peace protection became strongly 
connected with its military build-up after 2000 whereas the role saliency 
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was rising again after 2000. This might be interpreted by increasing threat 
perception arising from the United States. Simply speaking, facing the 
confrontations with the U.S., the DPRK perceived its military build-up as an 
instrument not only for protection of its own integrity but also for ensuring 
the global stability. This stance may seem quite distorted to us but this is 
how North Korea articulated its commitment to global peace protection 
approximately between 2000 and 2010. 
It is also quite interesting how North Korea started to put much greater 
emphasis on its role in regional peace protection since 2009 whereas the 
saliency of global peace protector role was dropping at the very same 
time.101 This may indicate North Korea is switching its attention towards the 
regional dynamics in context of escalating confrontation with South Korea 
after Lee Myung Bak became president which is further confirmed by the 
fact North Korean definition of “its” region became more tied with Korean 
Peninsula after 2010 (see above). 
  
                                                          
101 The simultaneous downfall of both roles to zero occurred in 2012. This was probably 
caused by the interim shock after death of Kim Jong Il. Nevertheless, both roles regained exactly the 
same position as they used to have in 2011 again in 2013. 
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Conclusion 
North Korean foreign policy has been in the centre of attention of many 
scholars for decades. Yet, there are still many blind spots that need to be 
filled and questions awaiting the answers. By this dissertation thesis, I 
wanted to contribute to existing knowledge on the field of North Korean 
foreign policy analysis. In particular, my goal was to better understand how 
the North Korea perceives the part it plays (or should play) in the 
international politics and how its interaction with other actors impacts these 
perceptions as I argue that the revelation of these aspects can potentially 
help to facilitate the communication with the DPRK. To be able to proceed 
with the delimited goal, I employed the conceptual and theoretic framework 
of the role theory which has not been comprehensively used for North 
Korean case yet.  
I analysed the content of relevant parts of two North Korean periodicals, i.e. 
The Pyongyang Times newspaper and Korea Today magazine. Some could 
object that analysis of these materials cannot lead us to feasible findings. In 
response to such criticism I refer to work of Seongji Woo. He argues that 
although some elements of North Korean discussion of international politics 
can be perceived as propaganda and a way how the DPRK justifies its actions, 
“(…) some of it represents genuine expressions of North Korea's worldviews 
and past, current and future orientations toward the outside world” (Woo 
2011, 202). Thus, I argue that that a well-organized and consistent analysis 
of North Korean statements can bring interesting insight into the process of 
its foreign policy formation and transformation. At this place, let me 
summarize the findings of my investigation and answer the questions I 
delimited in the introduction of this thesis. I will start with answering the 
research questions and will continue with summarization of main findings I 
made. 
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To begin with, I bring forward the research questions as mentioned in the 
introduction again: 
1) What were the national roles North Korea declared in the time 
framework I examine and how the composition of North Korean role 
sets looked like?  
2) How the saliency of particular roles within the role sets changed over 
time? Were the national roles subjected to any changes?  
3) Which roles declared by North Korea projected into its foreign policy 
the most? 
4) If any changes occurred, what were the patterns of these changes with 
regard to North Korean interactions with significant others? 
As far as the first, second and third questions are concerned I have already 
answered them indirectly in Chapter 3. In the period of 1994–2015, I was 
able to identify 20 roles in total. Subsequently, based on their saliency 
measured by the frequency and regularity of their occurrences in the dataset, 
I divided them into three categories: major roles, marginal roles and 
deviances. The major roles can be understood as relatively constant, 
frequently occurring and stable parts of North Korean role sets whose total 
incidence between 1994 and 2015 reached at least 5 %. In case of marginal 
roles, the total incidence did not reach 5 % but they occurred at least in 
three subsequent years of the researched period. Finally, I labelled as the 
role deviances these roles in the North Korean role sets which neither 
exceeded 5 % in their incidence thorough The Pyongyang Times dataset nor 
fulfilled the criteria set for the marginal roles (i.e. they did not occur at least 
in three subsequent years of the researched period).  
Following the work of S. Harnisch (2012, 55) who states that the roles are 
organized hierarchically with those being on the top of this hierarchy 
effecting the role enactment the most, I claim the roles I labelled as major 
ones have the strongest impact on North Korean foreign policy. Thus, 
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although I identified 20 roles in total, I thoroughly analyzed development of 
saliency in case of 8 roles that constituted the most important core of North 
Korean role sets, i.e. internal developer, independent, active independent, 
isolate, bastion of revolution – liberator, anti-imperialist agent, global peace 
protector and regional peace protector. I also put the saliency shifts of the 
individual roles in the context of North Korean relations with its significant 
others. As Suh (2014, 155) aptly points out, North Korean post-Cold War 
foreign policy took a turn away from political and ideological course which 
was typical for bloc-oriented and non-alignment diplomacy. The 
composition of DPRK's role sets confirms this tendency as the saliency of 
roles linked with group of friends among significant others (such as bastion 
of revolution – liberator or active independent) and those obviously 
ideologically oriented (such as anti-imperialist agent) is obviously dropping. 
At the same time, Suh argues that the main characteristics of North Korean 
post-Cold War foreign policy may be found “(…) in its relations with hostile 
countries, and particularly the United States, which assumed primacy as 
North Korea pursued security guarantees and economic benefits” (ibid.). 
Again, this dynamics projects itself into North Korean role sets' composition 
as the absolute majority of the roles it has declared is related to group of 
foes represented by the U.S. Thus, it is safe to argue that the United States 
became North Korean major significant other of the post-Cold War era. 
In Chapter 3.3, I also delimited the major roles on the scale active–passive 
foreign policy (see Chart 18). Chart 21 below further demonstrates North 
Korean role sets' composition in terms of active–passive foreign policy. The 
chart is based on the role sets' composition as of The Pyongyang Times 
dataset whereas the major roles were taken into the consideration. As we 
can see, North Korea tended to declare roles implying rather active foreign 
policy thorough the 1990s. Since 2002, it mostly resorted to passivity- 
implying roles. The general orientation of the DPRK's role sets in terms of 
activity–passivity scale also correlates with the trends in developments of 
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major roles forming the very core of the role sets. I divided them into three 
groups: roles whose saliency is dropping (i.e. active independent, bastion of 
revolution – liberator and anti-imperialist agent), roles whose saliency is 
growing (i.e. internal developer, regional peace protector and isolate), and 
roles with stagnating saliency (independent).  
 
Chart 21: North Korean Orientation of Foreign Policy 
Based on Composition of  Its Role Sets 
year 
scale activity - passivity 
  
rather active 
foreign policy 
rather passive 
foreign policy 
neither active nor 
passive 
1994 X     
1995 X     
1996 X     
1997   X   
1998 X     
1999     X 
2000     X 
2001     X 
2002   X   
2003   X   
2004   X   
2005   X   
2006 X     
2007     X 
2008 X     
2009     X 
2010   X   
2011   X   
2012   X   
2013   X   
2014   X   
2015   X   
Source: created by author.  
North Korean gradual acceptance of passive and inward-looking roles 
implying passive and inward-looking foreign policy is also related to the 
dynamics of interaction with its significant others. 
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In the beginning, there is North Korean culturally-conditioned ego which 
plays certain roles co-formed by ego's former experience with alters that I 
call significant others. The very same ego ceaselessly enters the interaction 
with alters. This interaction may basically lead to two outcomes as far as the 
ego's role enactment is concerned. First, the ego may enact new roles or 
revise the meaning of the old ones in case there is a reason to think oneself 
in novel terms, in case a new situation emerges that cannot be dealt within 
pre-existing roles (comp. Wendt 1992, 419). Second, ego may stick with the 
old roles as they still correspond with the reality in which it finds itself and 
therefore, there is no need to change anything.  
I have already shown before the reason to think oneself in novel term can 
arise from ego's new experience with alter which deviates from previous 
mode of mutual interaction. One might think this happened in the end of 
1990s when Clinton's administration together with South Korean president 
Kim Dae Jung adopted much less confrontational politics towards the DPRK. 
However, the problem with this so called engagement effort is that it has 
never been really consistent. In particular, the U.S. who stands for the main 
representative of group of foes has never implemented full hearted 
engagement policies towards the DPRK. Approaching the DPRK with 
omnipresent mistrust (and being approached by the DPRK by incredulity as 
well), it always supplemented engagement with some sanctions or 
punishments, i.e. they always supplemented the engagement with the 
ingredient of containment. Furthermore, one must not forget that the North 
Korean culturally-conditioned ego formed by previous experience with alter 
influences the results of interaction as well. The DPRK's experience with 
decades of Cold War confrontation accompanied by inconsistent U.S. foreign 
policy towards the DPRK in post-Cold War are very likely to rather 
consolidate than change North Korean role sets. Due to this reality, the 
sufficient space for the deep learning of new roles (see Chart 3 on page 38 of 
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this dissertation) did not open and rather shallow learning prevailed in 
North Korean case. 
Right now, let me answer the last question I delimited in the introduction, i.e. 
the one referring to the patterns of North Korean role changes. In general, 
the case study of the DPRK showed that roles tend to be stable and that the 
radical change and reconfiguration of role sets is rare. Despite I analysed 
development of North Korean role sets in relatively long time period of 21 
years, their composition did not drastically changed. Still, changes did occur 
but they were rather conservative. Firstly, some changes took place in the 
borders of existing roles (e.g. change of meaning of internal developer role). 
Secondly (and more importantly), the changes occurred in the configuration 
of role sets, in particular, in the role saliency. I depicted these changes in 
graphs when I was describing individual roles in Chapter 3 whereas I argue 
they can be interpreted by North Korean interactions with significant others. 
Let me now focus on this issue in detail. 
After examining the developments of all the major roles constituting the 
core of North Korean role sets across the researched period, I was able to 
identify a few interesting and formative periods and moments. First one 
occurred in the beginning of 2000s when the saliency of role internal 
developer reached high level and became firmly tied with North Korean 
military build-up.102  Several factors contributed to this. There was the 
inconsistent politics of the United States and its allies combined with North 
Korean previous experience with them. I have already mentioned this above. 
Moreover, the DPRK successfully re-established its ties with China and 
Russia. This was an essential step by which North Korea re-gained backing 
together with its self-confidence on the international scene. At the same time, 
                                                          
102 As I noted above, the meaning of role internal developer has been changing since 2013. 
This is mainly represented by the emphasis on so called civilized nation building and also by 
tendency of Kim Jong Un's North Korea to put higher emphasis on economic development which is 
symbolized by the byungjin policy (policy of parallel development of army and economy in English). 
Nevertheless, it is too soon to evaluate the permanency and impact of these changes.  
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the U.S. and its allies failed to establish meaningful relations with North 
Korea which gradually drove it into the arms of China and Russia. This 
dynamics was even amplified by President Bush's North Korean policy 
which further contributed to isolationist and inward-looking policies of the 
DPRK. 
Furthermore, North Korean role set underwent quite significant changes in 
year 2012 which was the first year of Kim Jong Un's regime: it strongly 
shifted toward the passivity-implying roles. This is illustrated below in 
Charts 22.1 and 22.2 enabling comparison of 2011 and 2012 North Korean 
role sets. In this case, we can see how the situation of shock or crisis 
correlates with the role change (comp. Nabers 2011, 85–86), or 
reconfiguration of role sets, respectively. Whereas the passivity implying 
roles constituted about 48 % of 2011 role set, they formed almost 90 % in 
2012. Nevertheless, this reconfiguration did not last long as the 2013 role 
set returned to approximately same shape as it was in 2011. 
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Chart 22.1: Composition of the 2011 Role Set (PT) 
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It is also needed to point out that the ability to contextualize the changes in 
the role sets with North Korean significant others immediately after death of 
Kim Jong Il seems to be hindered by dynamics of crisis inside the DPRK. 
Thus, we could see here the crisis or shock situation prevailed over the 
dynamics of interaction. 
In sum, the changes in North Korean role sets were rather conservative (i.e. 
they mainly occurred in the framework of meaning of existing roles). Thus, 
the claim that the role change is very slow and gradual process seems to be 
valid in here. One of the reasons is that the roles are anchored in or at least 
closely connected with given actor's identity moulded by the experience 
with its significant others (see Chapter 1.3.3). The political representatives 
and negotiators should be aware of this when dealing with the DPRK. Still, 
however, my analysis indicates the DPRK does show receptivity to the way 
how its significant others approach it. To be more specific, the pressure, 
sanctions and confrontations often contributed to the rise of saliency of the 
roles indicating confrontational, isolationist and inward-looking foreign 
policy (such as internal developer or isolate). On the other hand, the 
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Chart 22.2: Composition of the 2012 Role Set (PT) 
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negotiations and hints of engagement policies (such as SPTs or Agreed 
Framework) helped at least partially reduce the saliency of these roles. One 
exception where the opposite seem to be true apply to role bastion of 
revolution – liberator. In case of this role, the saliency was mostly dropping 
when the sanctions against the DPRK were intensified. Consequently, my 
analysis indicates that the containment is at least double-edged sword. 
Furthermore, it was very interesting to find out the aid provided by 
significant others did not projected into the role saliency development. This 
may be quite remarkable finding for the debates about the politicization of 
humanitarian (development) aid.  
The role change is obviously entangled process and in North Korean case, it 
was further problematized by highly unbalanced and inconsistent 
interactions with its main significant other (the U.S.) (comp. Han 2014, 293). 
I have already mentioned this problem on several places in this thesis. Even 
in Clinton's era (not speaking of Bush's one), the U.S. tended to incline to 
what I would call vigilant engagement characterized by contradictory 
tendencies, by combining the threats with aid, sanctions with negotiations. 
Various signals indicate that the period which was favourable to significant 
changes in DPRK's role sets might have been the middle of 1990s. First, 
North Korea lost its backing on the international scene (i.e. the support of 
Soviet Union and China). Second, North Korean leader Kim Il Sung died in 
1994 which probably brought certain feeling of insecurity to North Korean 
regime elites which may be also favourable for the role change, as the role 
theory scholars point out (comp. Wendt 1992, 420, or Nabers 2011, 85–86). 
Third, North Korea underwent drastic famine and needed new ties with 
outer world more than ever. Last but not least, the administration of South 
Korean president Kim Dae Jung initiated high level and even grass root level 
contacts with North Korea which established first personal contact between 
North and South Koreans after decades of separation which may be 
perceived as crucial step forward which might help to reduce mistrust 
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between both countries (comp. Kudláčová 2014b, 51). All these factors 
created atmosphere where the engaging the DPRK could have been viable. 
Unfortunately the opposite happened and North Korea gradually learned to 
use threats and its emerging nuclear program as a bargaining chip.  
Of course, it would be oversimplified to accuse the U.S. only of what the 
DPRK became today. As I pointed out above, there is always both ego and 
alter who actually enter the interaction and North Korean ego was 
corrupted enough even in the beginning of 1990s. Furthermore, from 
pragmatic point of view, certain roles (especially independent or, to certain 
extent, isolate) are probably maintained in the role sets not only due to their 
firm link to North Korean identity as such (comp. Armstrong 2013, 291–292) 
but because there are strongly tied with the regime survival as well. In other 
words, being independent functions also as a way for ruling elites to retain 
power.103 This claim seems to be relevant especially in the situation when 
the human rights pressure gained clearer contours and became more 
consistent recently (see end of Chapter 4.1).  
However, I would like to highlight that the DPRK has often signalized it 
wanted to negotiate and normalize relations with the U.S., South Korea and 
Japan and in several occasions, its deeds proved the actuality of this 
intention. Still, as Leon Sigal (1998, 12) notices, the U.S. too often tended to 
demonize the DPRK and consequently, the DPRK was treated “(…) as an 
outcast, implacable and inimical, with a master plan to deceive the world 
and acquire nuclear arms” (ibid.). This one-dimensional image of North 
Korea as global rogue (comp. Cho 2016) blinded observers including many 
of the U.S. intelligence community to “(…) contrary evidence of Pyongyang's 
efforts to accommodate Washington” (Sigal 1998, 12). Thus, the 
omnipresent accusations of North Korean regime of being isolationist in the 
                                                          
103 The experience with disintegration of the Soviet Union probably strengthens North 
Korean unwillingness to renounce the roles independent and isolate. 
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situation where the DPRK is at least partially pushed into the isolation by its 
main foes are irrational. 
If I should closely examine the modes of role changes as depicted in Chapter 
1.3.3, the social learning and mechanism of reflected appraisal in particular 
seem to be relevant for North Korean case. Still, the conceptualization of role 
change as a process is very young and incomplete and there is wide space 
for its improvements. The case study of North Korean roles and foreign 
policy showed that one of the factors that can mould the roles (and 
subsequently the foreign policy as well) is the threat perception and 
insecurity feeling arising from confrontational approach of significant others. 
Furthermore, North Korean case indicates the influence of significant others 
on its roles and role sets is better observable when no internal crises or 
shock are present. I also argue that some roles are obviously nested deeper 
in the role sets and thus, their change will probably be very complicated. In 
DPRK's example, role independent seems to be the case. In the beginning of 
this thesis, I defined basically two categories of role changes that may arise 
from actor's interaction with the significant others. One was rather radical 
(i.e. the emergence of a new role), the other was rather conservative (i.e. the 
change in the framework of saliency and meaning of existing role). In North 
Korean case the latter manifested. 
What would, then, be the lesson learned from my analysis? I would suggest 
there is an urgent need to focus on strategies of negotiations with the DPRK 
and on the confidence building between the DPRK and its foes. This should 
start at the grass root level – South Korean sunshine policy has put a foot 
toward it already so as the various U.S. NGOs' activities inside the DPRK did. 
The U.S. distrust in North Korean intention to denuclearize accompanied by 
North Korean distrust in U.S. abiding by its promises probably contributed 
to the fact that only shallow social learning occurred. However, one should 
also be aware that the confidence and trust building is long term process 
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which requires a lot of patience. Lastly, we should be aware that if we 
constantly treat the DPRK as if it is nuclear state – rogue state – mad state, it 
is much easier for it to enact the roles that correspond with this. 
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Appendix 1: List of Missing Issues of The Pyongyang Times 
1994 
Vol. 1751, no. 23, 4.6.1994 
Vol. 1760, no. 32, 30.7.1994 
Vol 1768, no. 39, 17.10.1994 
1995 
Vol. 1804, no. 2, 27.5.1995 
Vol 1825, no. 43, 21.10.1995  
Vol 1826, no. 44, 28.10.1995  
Vol. 1827, no. 45, 3.11.1995  
1996 - 
1997 
Vol. 1889, no. 2, 11.1.1997 
Vol. 1890, no. 3, 18.1.1997 
1998 - 
1999 - 
2000 - 
2001 - 
2002 Vol. 2192, no. 43, 26.10.2002 
2003 - 
2004 Vol. 2295, no. 42, 16.10.2004 
2005 - 
2006 Vol. 2366, no. 8, 25.2.2006 
2007 - 
2008 Vol. 2472, no. 10, 8.3.2008 
2009 
Vol. 2557, no. 43, 25.10.2009       
Vol. 2561, no. 47, 21.11.2009       
2010 
Vol. 2622, no. 4, 22.1.2011 
Vol. 2624, no. 6, 5.2.2011 
2011 - 
2012 - 
2013 - 
2014 - 
2015 Vol. 2850, no. 23, 6.6.2015 
Source: created by author. 
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Appendix 2: List of Missing Issues of Korea Today  
1994 
Vol. 450, no. 4 
Vol. 454, no. 8 
1995 
Vol. 459, no. 1 
Vol. 460, no. 2 
Vol. 461, no. 3 
Vol. 462, no. 4 
Vol. 463, no. 5 
Vol 464, no. 6 
Vol 468, no. 10 
1996 Vol. 481, no. 11 
1997 - 
1998 Vol. 498, no. 4 
1999 - 
2000 Vol. 525, no. 2 
2001 - 
2002 - 
2003 Vol. 565, no. 7 
2004 - 
2005 - 
2006 - 
2007 - 
2008 - 
2009 - 
2010 - 
2011 - 
2012 - 
2013 - 
2014 - 
2015 - 
Source: created by author. 
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Abstract 
In this dissertation thesis, I analyse North Korean foreign policy between 
1994 and 2015 using conceptual and theoretic framework of the role theory 
which has not been comprehensively used for North Korean case yet. My 
goal is to better understand how the North Korea perceives the part it plays 
(or should play) in the international politics and how its interaction with 
other actors impacts that. After I identify the roles North Korea speaks out 
using content analysis of North Korean foreign political statements and texts, 
I examine the correlation between these roles and actual foreign policy of 
the DPRK. In particular, I aim to identify the situations where significant 
changes in the role saliency occur, where the DPRK either starts to 
emphasize some role over another, or where the old roles are refused and 
new roles show up. After I do so, I contextualize these role shifts with the 
shifts in actual North Korean foreign policy and with North Korean 
interaction with its significant others. I aim to do so as I argue that the 
revelation of these aspects can potentially help to facilitate the 
communication with the DPRK.  
With regard to my goals, the text was divided into four main chapters. First 
two of them constitute theoretic and methodological part and remaining two 
form empirical part of this dissertation. In particular, in Chapter 1, I deal 
with theoretical background (i.e. the role theory) and with 
operationalization of key concepts. The special attention is paid on role 
change and its modes as it is essential for this thesis. The issue of role 
change has not been elaborated on the theoretical level in satisfactory way 
yet and thus, I provide an alternative grasping of this phenomenon as it 
better suits the purposes of this dissertation. In Chapter 2, I outline the 
method of semantical content analysis which constitutes the stepping stone 
enabling the subsequent course of my investigation. I also introduce and 
evaluate North Korean English-written media landscape in order to 
 173 
 
thoroughly explain why I selected The Pyongyang Times and Korea Today 
for my analysis. In Chapter 3, I describe the roles I identified, depict the 
development of their saliency and link them to particular group of 
significant others. Finally, I proceed with Chapter 4 where the changes that 
occurred in the major roles are put into context with North Korean 
interactions with significant others. 
After examining the developments of all the major roles constituting the 
core of North Korean role sets across the researched period, I conclude that 
the role change is complex process and in North Korean case, it was further 
problematized by highly unbalanced and inconsistent interactions with its 
main significant other, the United States which tended to incline to vigilant 
engagement characterized by contradictory tendencies (at the best), by 
combining the threats with aid, sanctions with negotiations. Although it 
would be oversimplified to accuse the U.S. only of what the DPRK became 
today (there is always both ego and alter who enter the interaction), the 
omnipresent accusations of North Korean regime of being isolationist in the 
situation where the DPRK is at least partially pushed into the isolation by its 
main foes are irrational. 
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논문초록 
본 논문은 기존에는 종합적 측면에서 북한 연구 분석에 사용하지 않았던 역할이론의 개념적, 
이론적 방법론을 적용하여 1994 년부터 2015 년까지의 북한 외교정책을 분석하였다. 본 
논문의 목적은 북한이 국제정치 무대에서 자신들이 맡고 있는 역할 (혹은 맡아야 하는 역할)에 
대하여 어떻게 인지하고 있는지, 그리고 다른 행위자와의 상호작용이 이 과정에 어떻게 영향을 
미치는지에 대하여 보다 잘 이해하고자 하는 것이다. 본 논문에서는 이를 달성하기 위하여 우선 
북한의 공식 발언과 문서를 활용하여 북한이 스스로를 어떻게 규정하고 있는지 확인한 다음, 
이렇게 규정된 역할과 실제 북한의 외교정책 사이의 상관관계를 검증하였다. 특히, 본 
논문에서는 역할특성에 중대한 변화가 일어난 상황이나, 북한이 다른 행위자에 대하여 특정한 
역할을 강조하기 시작한 경우, 혹은 과거의 역할이 부정되고 새로운 역할이 기대되기 시작한 
경우를 중점적으로 분석하고자 하였다. 그리고 이러한 역할변화가 북한의 실제 외교정책 및 
북한과 다른 중요 행위자들 사이의 상호작용에서 어떠한 변화를 가져왔는지를 문맥화하였다. 
본 논문은 북한의 이러한 측면들을 연구함으로써 잠재적으로 북한과의 실질적이고 안정적인 
정치적 대화를 촉진시킬 수 있다고 주장한다. 
본 논문은 네 개의 장으로 구성되어 있다. 처음 두 장은 역할이론의 이론적, 방법론적 적용에 
대하여 설명하고 있으며 이후의 두 장은 경험사례 분석에 할애하였다.  보다 구체적으로 
살펴보면, 제 1 장에서는 역할이론의 이론적 배경과 주요 개념의 조작화에 대하여 설명한다. 이 
장에서는 본 논문의 핵심 개념으로 사용되는 역할변화와 그 방식에 대하여 중점적으로 
설명하였다. 역할변화의 문제는 아직 정치학에서의 이론적 측면에서 충분히 만족스러울 만큼 
연구되지 않았고, 이에 본 논문에서는 핵심 현상을 보다 잘 설명하기 위한 대안적 개념을 
사용하였다.  제 2 장에서는 의미적 맥락 분석 방법론에 대하여 개략적으로 설명한다. 해당 
방법론은 본 논문의 경험연구 사례조사를 위한 후속 연구를 가능하게 하는 출발점이 된다.  
또한 북한의 영문 미디어 지형에 대하여 소개하고 평가하였는데, 이는 왜 본 논문에서 
평양신문의 외국어버전인 Pyongyang Times 와 조선중앙 텔레비죤의 Korea Today 를 
분석대상 자료로 사용하였는지를 철저하게 입증하기 위함이다. 이를 토대로 제 3 장에서는 본 
논문이 북한의 역할을 어떻게 규정하였는지를 설명하고, 북한 역할의 특성이 어떻게 
발전해왔는지 묘사하며 다른 주요 행위자 그룹과의 연관성을 살펴보았다.  마지막으로 
제 4 장에서는 북한과 다른 주요 행위자들간의 상호작용이라는 맥락 속에서 북한의 주요 역할이 
어떻게 변화하였는지를 분석하였다. 
북한의 역할설정을 야기시키는 모든 주요한 역할들의 변화 및 발전과정을 살펴본 후 본 논문은 
다음과 같은 결론을 내린다. 북한의 경우 역할변화가 매우 복잡한 과정을 거쳐 발생하며 이는 
향후 북한과 북한의 주요 상대 행위자인 미국 사이에서 일어나는 고도로 불균형적이고 
불안정한 상호작용 과정에서 문제요소로 작용할 수 있다는 것이다. 이는 미국이 북한을 대함에 
있어 위협과 원조, 제재와 협상이라는 모순적인 방식을 번갈아 가며 사용하는 데에 의존하고 
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있기 때문에 발생한다. 물론 미국이 현재의 북한을 있게 한 유일한 요소라고 결론짓는 것은 
과도한 단순화의 오류를 범할 가능성이 있다(역할 변화에는 항상 자아(ego)와 해당 상호작용에 
참여하는 상대방이 공존하기 때문이다. 그러나 본 논문에서는 현재 나타나는 고립이라는 북한 
체제의 특성이 적어도 부분적으로는 주요 경쟁자들의 비합리적인 강요에 의한 것임을 밝히고자 
한다. 
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Abstrakt 
Předkládaná disertační práce analyzuje severokorejskou zahraniční politiku 
mezi léty 1994 a 2015 s využitím konceptuálního rámce teorie rolí, který 
pro studium severokorejské zahraniční politiky dosud nebyl dosud využit. 
Mým cílem je lépe porozumět tomu, jak Severní Korea vnímá své funkce či 
role v mezinárodním prostředí a jak toto ovlivňuje její interakce s dalšími 
aktéry. Poté, co s využitím obsahové analýzy severokorejských zahraničně-
politických textů identifikuji role, které KLDR vyslovuje, zaměřím se na další 
zkoumání korelace mezi těmito rolemi a severokorejskou zahraniční 
politikou. Mým cílem je zejména identifikace těch situací či momentů, kdy se 
objevují zásadní změny ve význačnosti rolí (role saliency), kdy KLDR začne 
upřednostňovat jednu roli nad druhou či kdy zaniknou staré role a na jejich 
místě se objeví nové. Poté, co identifikuji tyto situace či momenty, uvedu je 
do souvislosti jak se změnami severokorejské zahraniční politiky, tak s jejími 
interakcemi s významnými druhými (significant others). Tvrdím, že odhalení 
vzorců interakcí KLDR s významnými druhými prostřednictvím analýzy rolí 
může potenciálně poskytnout jisté vodítko pro vyjednávání s KLDR. 
S ohledem na vytyčené cíle byl text této disertace rozdělen na čtyři hlavní 
kapitoly. První dvě přitom prezentují mé teoretické a metodologické zázemí, 
poslední dvě pak tvoří empirické jádro této práce. V první kapitole se 
vypořádávám s teoretickým a konceptuálním rámcem teorie rolí a rovněž 
zde přistupuji k operacionalizaci ústředních konceptů. Zvláštní pozornost je 
přitom kladena na problematiku změny rolí a způsobů, jakými k ní může 
docházet. Protože tato oblast zatím nebyla na teoretické úrovni zcela 
rozpracována, přistupuji k vlastnímu alternativnímu uchopení způsobů 
změn rolí, které jsou lépe aplikovatelné na případovou studii KLDR 
s využitím stávajících poznatků v této sféře. V druhé kapitole pak představuji 
metodu sémantické obsahové analýzy, která tvoří odrazový můstek pro další 
postup mého výzkumu. Rovněž zde předkládám a kriticky zhodnocuji 
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severokorejskou anglicky psanou mediální sféru a pečlivě přitom vysvětluji, 
proč jsem pro svoji analýzu zvolila noviny The Pyongyang Times a časopis 
Korea Today. Ve třetí kapitole pak popisuji a definuji role, které jsem 
identifikovala, zaměřuji se na vývoj význačnosti rolí a taktéž jednotlivé role 
vztahuji ke konkrétní skupině významných druhých. Nakonec pak přistupuji 
ke čtvrté kapitole, kde jsou změny, ke kterým došlo ve vývoji sad rolí i 
jednotlivých rolí, uvedeny do kontextu severokorejských interakcí 
s významnými druhými. 
Celou práci pak uzavírám zjištěním, že proces změny rolí je velice komplexní 
a problematický. V případě KLDR je tento proces navíc dále komplikován 
velmi nevyrovnanými a nekonzistentními interakcemi s jejím 
nejvýznamnějším významným druhým, tedy Spojenými státy, které při 
nejlepším inklinovaly k opatrné politice angažmá, ke kombinaci hrozeb 
s humanitární pomocí, sankcí s vyjednáváním. Ačkoliv by bylo příliš 
jednoduché obviňovat pouze Spojené státy z toho, čím se KLDR v dnešní 
době stala (v interakci jsou totiž vždy přítomni jak ego, tak alter), je třeba si 
také uvědomit, že neustálé obviňování severokorejského režimu z toho, že je 
příliš izolovaný v situaci, kdy je KLDR přinejmenším částečně do této izolace 
tlačena, je iracionální.   
